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Wildfire suppression remains an inherently dangerous yet increasingly 
frequent task for fire services throughout Australia and the world.  Each year 
firefighters from career and volunteer agencies respond to wildfires that 
impact the urban interface.  When such an event occurs during a period of 
intense fire behaviour the conditions are often incompatible with life for 
persons either caught in the open or those seeking refuge in a vehicle.  In 
order to improve firefighter safety and operational effectiveness at the rural 
urban interface (RUI) during landscape scale wildfires, this dissertation serves 
to examine critical components of wildfire response, most notably wildfire 
suppression strategies and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire 
event and the procedures and protective systems utilised in the event of 
firefighter entrapment and burnover. 
The theme of the research is firefighter safety and suppression 
effectiveness during mega-wildfire response at the rural urban interface (RUI), 
also known as the wildland urban interface (WUI).  Mega-wildfires are those 
landscape wildfires that overwhelm firefighting resources, typically generate 
their own localized weather systems, and require campaign style efforts 
lasting extended durations. Wildfire events including Margaret River (2011), 
and Yarloop (2016) in Western Australia, the devastating Californian and 
Greece wildfires (2018) and the unprecedented wildfires throughout eastern 
Australia in late 2019 / early 2020 meet this category. The RUI is the land where 
towns and cities exist alongside forest and other vegetation that supports the 
development of an established headfire with a quasi-steady rate of spread 
(RoS) across the landscape.  In such instances, firefighters are called on to 
protect vulnerable communities and critical infrastructure from the ember 
storms, radiant heat and flames that accompany the head fire.  In doing so, 
firefighters face great personal peril.  If the incorrect suppression tactics or 
strategies are applied, or if wildfire behaviour suddenly changes, firefighter 
entrapment and burnover resulting in significant injury or fatality remains an 
all too common consequence.  




The studies not only quantify the severity of the conditions firefighters 
encounter when attempting to protect life, property and the environment at 
the RUI, but also find traditional wildfire suppression strategies and tactics at 
the RUI need to be reexamined.  Whilst the field of wildfire engineering is in 
its infancy, the studies suggest its development and adoption into wildfire 
suppression operations has the potential to improve both operational 
effectiveness and firefighter safety. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Background to research 
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia 
respond to wildfires that impact the rural urban interface (RUI).  When such 
an event occurs during a period of intense fire behaviour the conditions are 
often incompatible with life for persons either caught in the open or those 
seeking refuge in a vehicle.  In order to improve firefighter safety and 
operational effectiveness during wildfires, these studies serve to examine 
critical components of wildfire response, identified through 14 years of the 
lead researcher’s front line operational fire services and fire engineering 
experience supported by over a decade of research in the field.   
These components are the: 
1. Wildfire fighting strategies and tactics applied during a landscape 
scale wildfire event in the defense of the ; and 
2. Procedures and protective systems utilised in the event of 
entrapment and burnover. 
Critically, the studies are designed to have practical benefits to fire services 
and firefighters internationally, for wildfires are not suppressed by theory and 
journal articles. 
1.2. Thesis objectives 
The research objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
1. To explore the critical linkage between wildfire suppression, 
firefighter safety and urban design; 
2. To develop a fire engineering approach to the analysis of forest 
and woodland wildfire suppression strategies that not only 
compares international suppression thresholds, but considers 
firefighter tenability as a key factor for determining the suitability of 
suppression strategies; 




3. To provide guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to 
firefighting strategies required to extinguish large wildfire across a 
wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front 
depths; and 
4. To investigate the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection 
systems (VPS) in reducing firefighter fatalities during wildfire 
suppression: 
a. When applied to historical firefighter entrapments and 
burnovers resulting in firefighter fatality/ies from international 
case studies; and  
b. When applied to simulated wildfires designed to encompass 
the 99th percentile of weather conditions and potential 
wildfire behaviours. 
1.3. Thesis structure 
The thesis is presented in six chapters. 
Chapter 1 is an introduction. 
Chapter 2, The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook) has 
been accepted for publication by the Bushfire & Natural Hazards CRC.  
Each section of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous, 
providing a holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire 
basics before exploring evidence based wildfire suppression.  The critical 
linkage between wildfire suppression, firefighter safety and urban design is 
also explored.  Whilst the primary focus of the Handbook is wildfire 
suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers and 
policy makers.  These are summarized at the conclusion of each section. As 
an engineering handbook, it is designed to be a standalone text, written in 
an appropriate manner.  The Handbook comprises of a review of 
international literature relating to wildfire suppression at the RUI; details each 
of the studies completed as part of the dissertation; and provides firefighters, 
engineers and town planners detailed technical approaches and analysis to 
enhance the resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts, 




and enhance the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the 
urban interface during catastrophic wildfire conditions.  In one sense, the 
Handbook is in its own right, the publication of this doctoral thesis, with limited 
aspects of the literature review pertaining to consideration of vegetation 
structure in wildfire models, and risk management (sections 1 and 8 of the 
Handbook) originating from studies as part of a MEng (Building Fire Safety & 
Risk) through Victoria University in 2017 and MParamedScRes through Edith 
Cowan University in 2016, and subsequent publications (Penney 2019; Penney 
& Stevenson, 2019).  The significant majority of the Handbook (the 
introduction; sections 1.7 and 1.8; full sections 2 to 7; section 8.6 and 8.7; and 
all of section 9) are completely new works for this dissertation.  None of the 
studies presented in Chapters 3 to 7 of this dissertation have been previously 
submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education.  
Chapter 2 includes the full literature review, conclusions and directions for 
future work in the field. Chapter 2 is presented as it has been submitted for 
publication by the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research 
Center, however it has been reformatted in the style of this thesis.  Reference 
formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the work has 
been submitted. Chapters 3 to 6 have been written as manuscripts for 
publication in their own right and so some repetition will be evident. 
Chapter 3 examines firefighter tenability and its influence on siege wildfire 
suppression through two separate studies. International literature and fire 
service doctrine was reviewed to establish wildfire suppression thresholds.  
The first study involved analysis of headfire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and flame 
length (LF) using McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model (DEFFM) 
empirical models was deterministically compared to documented 
thresholds. The second study involved empirical wildfire behaviour and 
radiant heat modelling completed in accordance with the methodology 
detailed in AS3959 Annexure B.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation 
distance at 5 m increments from 0-100 m from the head fire front was 
calculated for each scenario with the results deterministically assessed 




against the defined tenability criteria.  Reference formatting has been 
retained in the publication style for which the work has been submitted. 
Chapter 4 investigates the prediction of water suppression requirements 
and its impacts on firefighting strategies and logistics in the realm of wildfire 
suppression. It provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to critical 
water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of 
forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. This is achieved 
through mathematical empirical analysis of water flow rates required for 
head fire suppression during simulated wildfires in forest vegetation.  
Reference formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the 
work has been submitted. 
Chapter 5 investigates the effectiveness of wildfire vehicle suppression 
systems on firefighter tenability during entrapment and burnover. Accident 
investigation reports of firefighter fatalities from wildfire entrapment and 
burnovers in the USA, Australia and New Zealand between 1979 to 2020 were 
studied. Additionally, wildfire simulation using two separate empirical models 
was completed across a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads and up to the 
99th percentile of fire weather conditions in Australia. The results were 
deterministically compared to defined firefighting vehicle protection system 
(VPS) fire line intensity and radiant heat flux thresholds.  Reference 
formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the work has 
been submitted. 
Chapter 6 proposes the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) to assist 
Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) analyse critical information and 
calculate required versus available safe RUI firefighter preparation time. Case 
studies representative of historical wildfire events are presented to 
demonstrate how the RUIM can be utilised by IMT to reduce the potential risk 
of firefighter injuries and fatalities.  Reference formatting has been retained 
in the publication style for which the work has been submitted. 
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Chapter 2 – The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering 
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M., Richardson, R. (in 
press).  The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering. Bushfire and Natural Hazards 
Cooperative Research Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. 
Foreward 
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia 
respond to wildfires that impact the urban interface.  When such an event 
occurs during a period of intense fire behaviour the conditions are often 
incompatible with life for persons either caught in the open or those seeking 
refuge in a vehicle.  In order to improve firefighter safety and operational 
effectiveness during landscape scale wildfires, as well as providing sound 
engineering guidance to improve community resilience to wildfire impacts, 
this text book serves to examine critical components of wildfire response, 
identified through 14 years of the lead researcher’s front line operational fire 
services and fire engineering experience supported by over a decade of 
research in the field.  These components are the wildfire fighting strategies 
and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire event; the procedures 
and protective systems utilised in the event of burnover; operational risk 
management; and wildfire resilient urban design.  The Handbook of Wildfire 
Engineering (the Handbook) provides firefighters, engineers and town 
planners detailed technical approaches and analysis to enhance the 
resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts, and enhance 
the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the urban interface 
during catastrophic wildfire conditions. 
Each chapter of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous, 
providing a holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire 
basics before exploring evidence based wildfire suppression.  The critical 
linkage between wildfire suppression, firefighter safety and urban design is 
also explored.  Whilst the primary focus of the Handbook is wildfire 
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suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers and 
policy makers.  These are summarized at the conclusion of each section. 
During the preparation of this book, Australia was suffering from 
catastrophic wildfires on both the west and east coasts and tragically civilians 
and firefighters alike were injured or killed. The lead author was deployed as 
a Strike Team Leader from Western Australia and was tasked with wildfire 
suppression and property defense near Walcha, NSW.  In addition to his own 
local experiences in Margaret River in 2011 and Yarloop 2016, during the 2019 
NSW deployment he witnessed first-hand the devastating effects of wildfire 
on firefighters and the communities, survived near miss entrapments and 
nights spent on the fireground cut off by fire behaviour and falling trees. This 
book is dedicated to all those affected by wildfires, particularly for the 
firefighters of all backgrounds and jurisdictions who put themselves in harm’s 
way to protect life, property and the environment.  May the guidance 
provided in this book help firefighters return safely to their loved ones and 
provide enhanced protection of communities in wildfire prone areas. 
 
About the Authors 
Greg Penney is the primary author.  With 14 years’ experience as a career 
urban and wildland firefighter / officer in Western Australia (in both 
metropolitan and country commands), amongst other qualifications he holds 
a MEng (Building Fire Safety & Risk), MParamedScRes (Risk), GDip Bushfire 
Protection and Bachelor of Science.  During the devastating 
Waroona/Yarloop wildfires of 2016, Greg received a commendation for 
distinguished service and outstanding actions in leading the defense of 
Preston Beach facing catastrophic wildfire conditions.  The Handbook builds 
upon his two existing dissertations and serves as part of his current PhD by 
publication “Wildfire suppression in Australian forest fuel structures at the 
urban interface – a quantitative analysis.”  As a subject matter expert, Greg 
authored the Fire Protection Association of Australia (FPAA’s) Bushfire 
Protection and Design Accreditation (BPAD) Level 1 course and has 
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previously consulted in the field to the Western Australian branches of Master 
Builders Australia (MBA), Australian Institute of Building Surveyors (AIBS), 
Australian Institute of Architects (AIA) and Department of Planning (DoP).  In 
his current fire service role Greg leads the development and delivery of 
Incident Management training, including strategic and tactical fire and 
rescue response across a large range of hazards including wildfire, urban fire, 
rescue and Hazardous Materials.  Greg is not only a highly qualified 
researcher in the field of wildfire engineering and suppression, he is also a 
decorated firefighter with extensive experience in both planning and 
engineering in areas prone to wildfire impacts. 
 
Professor Daryoush Habibi is the Executive Dean of Engineering at Edith 
Cowan University. Professor Habibi is a professional engineer with 27 years of 
experience in industry and academia. Prior to his appointment as the Dean 
of Engineering, he was the Head of School of Engineering from 2006 to 2015, 
during which time he initiated and led a program of rapid growth in ECU’s 
engineering  portfolio, making his School the fastest growing engineering 
school in the nation. His other professional experience includes Telstra 
Research Laboratories, Flinders University, and Intelligent Pixels Inc., where he 
served as Vice-President Engineering. Professor Habibi holds the degrees of 
Bachelor of Engineering (Hons) and Doctor of Philosophy, both from the 
University of Tasmania. He is a Fellow of Engineers Australia, and a Fellow of 
the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology.  Professor 
Habibi is one of Greg’s PhD supervisors and is credited for his review and 
contribution to the Handbook. 
 
Dr Marcus Cattani is a Senior Lecturer in Occupational Health and Safety 
at Edith Cowan University. Dr. Marcus Cattani has worked as an academic, 
occupational hygienist, HSE Manager and consultant in the chemical, 
manufacturing, engineering and resources industries since 1988.  Marcus is 
passionate about improving the management of injury risk to an acceptable 
level, and assisting organisations develop the risk management partnerships 
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required to achieve this.  Dr. Cattani’s research focusses on the 
development of educational materials to assist organisations understand 
and manage risk, and, the development of processes to measure risk. Marcus 
is the Chair of the WA Branch of the Safety Institute of Australia, a member of 
the ECU Sustainability in Education Committee, attends the Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy OSH Committee, sits on the ECU Vice Chancellors HSE 
Awards Committee, and the School OHS Committee.  Dr Cattani is one of 
Greg’s PhD supervisors and is credited for his review and contribution to the 
Handbook. 
 
Dr Steven Richardson contributed to Section 3 – Modelling wildfire radiant 
heat flux, and is credited with the alternate view factor equations to AS3959.  
Steven Richardson is a Senior Lecturer at Edith Cowan University. He 
completed a PhD in Applied Mathematics in 2007 at The University of Western 
Australia. His research interests are broadly in mathematical modelling, 
having been involved in projects related to optimal control, asset 
management, bush fires, traffic, aviation and optics. 
 
Section 1 – Wildfire fuels 
Candidature note: Section 1 – Wildfire fuels, subsections 1.1 to 1.6 are 
declared as originally being submitted as part of the lead author’s MEng 
dissertation, subsequently published in Penney and Stevenson (2019). 
1.1. Introduction 
For frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and Incident 
Management Teams alike, understanding how vegetation type and 
structure affects wildfire behaviour is critical to the planning and execution 
of safe and successful suppression strategies.  Just as important is the 
understanding of how vegetation is represented in the empirical and physics 
based models used to predict wildfire spread. During mega-wildfires that 
occur in catastrophic fire weather conditions, wildfire behaviour through 
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vegetation of even moderate density may be near impossible to suppress.  
Conversely, over or under representing fuel structure and density when 
completing wildfire behaviour predictions may result in fire behaviour being 
incorrectly quantified and inappropriate suppression strategies being 
recommended.   
For urban planners and decision makers reviewing planning applications 
at the Rural Urban Interface, including those using AS3959 Construction of 
buildings in bushfire prone areas (SAI Global, 2018) and the relevant bushfire 
planning guidelines in each jurisdiction, it is equally as important to 
understand how vegetation contributes to wildfire behaviour.  When 
considering the benefits and costs of development in Bushfire Prone Areas, 
misunderstanding the vegetation related limitations and inherent 
assumptions of Deemed To Satisfy (DTS) or simplified planning / construction 
standards and guidelines can have significant and costly impacts.  Whilst 
under calculating wildfire behaviour and impacts may result in avoidable loss 
of life (of both the public and the firefighters who defend them) and property, 
inappropriate identification of fuel structures and resultant calculation of 
potential wildfire behaviour can stifle safe and appropriate development 
and lead to unnecessary expenditure of potentially hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in over engineering and redundant infrastructure.   
This section explores how vegetation structure not only contributes to 
wildfire behaviour, but also how it is represented in the models used to predict 
it on both the fireground and in the urban planning context.  It should be 
considered the introductory preparation for firefighters as it represents the first 
step in “knowing the enemy”. 
 
1.2. Vegetation structure  
Wildfire fuel is the vegetation consumed by a fire burning in vegetation 
regardless of the size of the fire itself. The term wildfire fuel applies to 
vegetation involved in a 10m2 fire in the same manner as the vegetation 
involved in a 100,000m2 wildfire.   Often referred to as fuel load, wildfire fuel 
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is defined by its physical structure and density.  The extent to which fuel load 
needs to be defined is dependent on the model used to predict wildfire 
behaviour.  In order to demystify the concept of wildfire fuels this section first 
discusses the concept of fuel load and subsequently discusses how this is 
considered within common empirical and physics based wildfire models.  
Understanding the classification of wildfire fuels and how they are 
represented in wildfire modelling is the first stage of interpreting modelling 
outputs and their application in assessing the suitability of wildfire suppression 
strategies, construction requirements and land use planning decisions. 
 
1Figure 1.1: Fuel load by strata 
As detailed in Figure 1.1, four main fuel strata layers and the bark layer are 
considered (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007) when describing wildfire 
fuels.  These are canopy; elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels as well 
as the bark.  The height of each layer is not considered in the forest, 
woodland or grass fuel empirical models of Australian Standard 3959 – 
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Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas (subsequently referred to as 
AS3959)1 but is relevant for heath or scrub fuels and the empirical model of 
(Gould et al., 2007).  Each layer and description are provided in the list 
below: 
1. Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown 
encompasses the leaves and fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees 
in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may lead to erratic 
and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances. 
2. Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants 
up to 2–3m in height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can 
be included when there is no identifiable separation between the 
canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel components 
generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable 
in ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and 
rate of spread of a fire whilst also contributing to crown 
involvement by providing vertical fuel structure. 
3. Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath, 
sometimes containing suspended components of leaves, bark, 
and twigs. This layer can vary from a few centimeters to up to 0.6m 
in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture of 
orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous 
or have large gaps in ground coverage and influences both the 
rate of spread of a fire and flame height. 
4. Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor. 
Surface fuel (or litter) components are generally horizontally 
 
1 Introduced after the devastating 2009 Victorian Bushfires, AS3959 not only 
details the construction enhancements to the Buliding Code of Australia in 
order to enhance a dwelling’s resilience to wildfire impacts, it also details the 
methodology and equations for calculating wildfire radiant heat flux across 
all Australian vegetation structures.  Bushfire is the Australian colloquial 
equivalent of the term ‘wildfire’. 
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layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the greatest to fuel 
quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil 
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and 
flame depth as well as contributing to the establishment of a fire 
post initial ignition. 
5. Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches 
that contributes to transference of surface fires into the canopy, 
embers and firebrands, and subsequent spot fires. 
 
The consideration of Vegetation Height is only considered in the empirical 
models of shrubland, scrub and heath fuel structures and the dry eucalypt 
forest fire model (DEFFM) of Gould et al. (2007).  The effects of vegetation 
height on fire line intensity and flame length are discussed in the following 
section of this report.  For treed structures, whilst vegetation height has some 
bearing on the deemed fuel loads assigned within AS3959, it is not considered 
in the empirical model itself.   For grasslands structure, the effect of 
vegetation height is not considered in any form in AS3959.   
The “Framework for an Australian fuel classification to support wildfire 
management” (Hollis et al., 2015) provides enhanced taxonomy for fuel 
classification with greater emphasis on fuel attributes (composition, 
geometry, density and physical aspects) within each stratum.    
Unfortunately the corresponding fuel load data sets and attributes for each 
stratum remain the subject of potential future research.  The full potential of 
the framework may also be limited by empirical wildfire models which 
consider binominal fuel structure (understory and total) as opposed to 
incorporating the detailed fuel load data presented by (Hollis et al., 2015). 
Appropriate definition and consideration of wildfire fuel is essential as it 
directly affects calculated wildfire outputs including head fire rate of spread, 
fire line intensity, flame height and radiant heat outputs.  The manner and 
detail with which wildfire fuel is considered is largely dependent on the model 
applied.  The forward Rate of Spread (RoS) and intensity of an active front 
of a fire, known as the head fire, is dependent on the fuel available for 
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consumption in the active flaming front (Alexander, 1982; Alexander & Cruz, 
2016). This is incorporated into existing empirical wildfire models of AS3959 
through the consideration of available fuels within a 1ha assessment area, 
representative of the active fire area directly behind the head fire. Typically 
driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a wildfire 
contributing to the RoS and fire behaviour intensity. Subsequently, it is the 
focus when calculating radiant heat flux for the purposes of determining the 
appropriate standard of bushfire resilient residential construction in AS3959. 
In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, being those greater than 1ha, the 1ha 
area of assessment falls within the greater active fire area, whilst in sub-
landscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the 
1ha assessment area. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.  








1.3. Consideration of wildfire fuel in empirical models 
Wildfire fuels are represented in empirical models through numerical inputs 
in wildfire behaviour equations including Rate of Spread (RoS), fire line 
intensity (I) and flame length (Lf). AS3959 (cB3) states the appropriate surface 
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(understory) fuel load (w) and overall fuel load (W) must be determined and 
that “both the understory and the canopy should be considered in the 
assessment. The rate of spread for forest fires should be determined using the 
understory fuel loads. Flame heights should be determined on the basis of 
both the combined understory and canopy fuels (overall fuel loads) for forest 
fires.”  Further, AS3959 (c1.5.27) defines the understory as “the vegetation 
beneath the overstory” whilst AS3959 (c1.5.20) defines the overstory as “the 
canopy, being the tallest stratum of the vegetation profile.”  This two layered 
classification of fuel load requires the surface fuel load to also incorporate all 
fuel layers below the canopy as illustrated in Figure 1.1.   
Mathematically this broadly assumes that despite the complex structure 
and geometry of fuel below the canopy, all fuel below the canopy will 
contribute to fire behaviour as a single fuel unit, resulting in the assumption of 
cell dimensions for treed fuel structures illustrated in Figure 1.33.  Cell 
dimensions for all other fuel structures are identified in Figure 1.4 and consider 
understory and total fuel load as the same value.   
 
3Figure 1.3: Cell dimensions treed fuel structures 




4Figure 1.4: Cell dimensions non-treed fuel structures – scrub, shrub and grassland 
This two layered mathematical simplification does not necessarily provide 
true consideration of the influence of the fuel layers and their contribution to 
wildfire behaviour, especially where fires occur in small pockets of vegetation 
that do not support the development of a 100m head fire (detailed in section 
2.2.3 of this report).  Greater consideration of the impact of wildfire fuels by 
strata on wildfire behaviour is considered in Hines et al. (2010) and Gould et 
al. (2007), however when applied to the models identified in AS3959, the two 
layered fuel load classification requires fuel loads to be simplified back to 
understory and total fuel density only.  The alternative lies in developing new 
empirical models that have greater consideration of fuel strata or using 
physics based models discussed later in this report. 
 
Despite significant variance in fuel structure between vegetation species 
throughout Australia, only four empirical models are suggested in AS3959 to 
quantify wildfire behaviour.  These empirical approaches consist of a wildfire 
behaviour model enabling calculation of the physical parameters of wildfire 
behaviour (each model unique to the classification of vegetation structure); 
and separate view factor model, otherwise known as configuration factor, 
which details the calculation of the receiving body’s resultant radiant heat 
flux (the same view factor model is used regardless of vegetation structure 
and resultant fire behaviour).  Each of these models assume that all wildfire 
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has attained a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS) and are of landscape 
proportions. 
 
The six wildfire behaviour models detailed in AS3959 are: 
1. Noble et al (1980) used for all treed fuel structures subsequently 
classified as Group A Forest, Group B Woodland and Group F 
Rainforest;   
2. Cruz et al (2013)  shrub, scrub and heath vegetation structures 
subsequently classified as Group C Shrub, D Scrub and E 
Mallee/Mulga;  
3. Purton, (1982) for grassland fuel structures subsequently classified as 
Group G Grassland;  
4. Marsden-Smedley et al (1995) for Tussock Moorland subsequently 
classified as Group H Grassland specific to Tasmania. 
 
Alternate models that may be also be suitable are: 
1. Forest & Woodlands - Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model or DEFFM 
(Gould et al, 2007); 
2. Anderson et al (2015)  for scrub and heath vegetation structures; 
and 
3. Cheney et al (1998) for various vegetation within the identified 
Rangelands geographical areas 
 
  The empirical models are reliant on prescribed fuel load densities measured 
in tonnes per hectare which equates to large cell sizes of a minimum 1ha land 
area (fuel height may vary).  Further, AS3959 prescribes set fuel load 
densities for each vegetation structure regardless of the actual geometry of 
the vegetation involved in the wildfire or the amount of vegetation 
consumed during the fire scenario.  This results in fires burning through small 
areas of vegetation being modelled as landscape scale fires as opposed to 
scenario specific heat release rates that consider the geometry and volume 
of the fuel consumed.  Subsequently the use of landscape scale models 
detailed in AS3959 for predicting sub-landscape scale fires (road reserves, 
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verges, landscaped gardens, vegetation adjacent to rivers etc.) or where 
there is restricted fire run potential, limited fuel loads are consumed or 
substantial boundary walls are present, may not be appropriate as currently 
applied and may significantly over estimate radiant heat flux. 
Defining fuel load and structure is perhaps the most critical input of existing 
empirical models.  It not only determines which mathematical model is 
applied, each model being specific to a broad vegetation type (AS3959; 
Noble, Bary & Gill, 1980; Catchpole et al, 1998; Marsden-Smedley & 
Catchpole, 1995), but when used for determining construction standards for 
buildings in wildfire prone areas, it also determines which prescribed fuel load 
is assigned.  The vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour 
model are detailed in Table 1.1. 
 
1Table 1.1. Vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model (adapted from 





Vegetation Type Description Assigned 
fuel load 
(t/ha) 
Noble et al/ 
Note: DEFFM is also 




Tall open forest 
Tall woodland 
• Trees over 30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may 
include understory ranging 
from rainforest and tree ferns to 
low trees and tall shrubs); 
•  Found in areas of high reliable 
rainfall. Typically dominated by 
eucalypts. 
w = 25 
W = 35 
Open forest 
Low open forest 
• Trees 10-30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may 
include understory of 
sclerophyllous low trees and 
tall scrubs or grass).  
• Typically dominated by 
eucalypts. 
Pine plantation 
• Trees 10-30m in height at 
maturity;  
• Generally comprising Pinus 
species or other softwood 
species, planted as a single 
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Noble et al / 
Note: DEFFM is also 






• Trees 10-30m high;  
• 30-70% foliage cover (may 
include understory of 
sclerophyllous low trees and 
tall scrubs or grass).  
• Typically dominated by 
eucalypts. 
w = 15 
W = 25 
Low woodland 
Low open woodland 
Open shrubland 
• Low trees and shrubs 2-10m 
high;  
• Foliage cover less than 10%.  
• Dominated by eucalypts and 
Acacia.  Often have a grassy 
understory or low shrubs. 
Acacias and Casuarina 
woodlands grade to Atriplex 
shrublands in the arid and 
semi-arid zones; 
• Low open woodland is 
classified on the basis of the 
understory present. 





• Found in wet areas and/or 
areas affected by poor soil 
fertility or shallow soils.   
• Shrubs 1-2m high often 
comprising Banksia, Acacia, 
Hakea and Grevilea.  
• Wet heaths occur in sands 
adjoining dunes of the littoral 
(shore) zone. Montane heaths 
occur on shallow or water 
logged soils. 
w = 15 
W = 25 
Low shrubland 
• Shrubs <2m high;  
• greater than 30% foliage 
cover.  
• Understory may contain 
grasses. Acacia and 
Casuarina often dominant in 
the arid and semi-arid zones. 




• Found in wet areas and/or 
areas affected by poor soil 
fertility or shallow soils;  
w = 25 
W = 25 
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• >30% foliage cover.  
• Dry heaths occur in rocky 
areas.  
• Shrubs >2m high.  
• Typical of coastal wetlands 
and tall heaths 
Open scrub 
• Shrubs greater than 2m high;  
• 10-30% foliage cover with a 
mixed species combination 





• Vegetation dominated by 
shrubs (especially eucalypts 
and acacias) with a multi-
stemmed habit; 
•  usually greater than 2m in 
height;  
• <30% foliage cover.  
• Understory of widespread to 
dense low shrubs (acacias) or 
sparse grasses. 
w = 8 
W = 8 




Tall closed forest 
Closed forest 
Low closed forest 
•  >90% foliage cover;  
• understory may contain a 
large number of species with a 
variety of heights; 
• Not dominated by eucalypts 
w = 10 




All forms, including situations with shrubs and trees, if the 
overstory foliage cover is less than 10% 
w = 4.5 





Tussock Moorland • All forms of vegetation where 
the overstory is dominated by 
the species Buttongrass.  
Only occurs as a significant 
vegetation type in Tasmania. 
w = 17 
W = 17 
 
Some of the confusion regarding wildfire fuel can be attributed to the 
multiple inconsistencies between the qualitative and pictorial descriptions of 
the classifications of vegetation in AS3959 and the quantified inputs such as 
vegetation height and foliage cover used in the calculations (AS3959; DOP, 
2016; FPA, 2016).  Several of the more significant inconsistencies that cause 
confusion regarding wildfire fuels are summarised in Table 1.2.   
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2Table 1.2: Discrepancies of fuel classification in AS3959 
Discrepancy in Fuel Classification in AS3959 Effect on Empirical Modelling 
Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires 
classification of treed vegetation structures on 
the basis of foliage cover (defined as the 
proportion of the ground that would be shaded 
by foliage when the sun is shining directly 
overhead, expressed as a percentage for each 
stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation 
[AS3959, c1.5.17]): 
• 30-70% for Group A Forest 
• 10-30% for Group B Woodland 
• 10-30% for Group B Open Woodland 
(subsequently classified on the basis 
of the understory vegetation) 
 
Table B2 identifies the same amount of wildfire 
fuel above the surface strata (being 10t/ha) for 
both Forest and Woodland vegetation structures 
regardless of foliage cover. 
 
Figure 2.4(B) illustrates Open Woodland as being 
a single tree in a field, however the suggested 
foliage cover may be interpreted as 30%, the 
same as that required for Group A Forest. 
 
Figures 2.4(A) and 2.4(B) illustrate significant 
overlap between understory fuel structures as 
densities with an almost total absence of 
understory fuel for the Low Open Forest 
classification. 
 
Table 2.3 Note 2 states “Overstorys of open 
woodland, low open woodland, tall open 
shrubland and low open shrubland should be 
classified to the vegetation type on the basis of 
their understorys; others to be classified on the 
basis of their overstorys.” 
 
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A 
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha) 
vegetation structures. 
 
In the case of confusion between Group B 
Woodlands and Group B Open Woodlands, the 
incorrect empirical model being applied for 
Group C Shrubland, Group D Scrub or Group G 
Grassland understories.   
 
These discrepancies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs 
including flame angle, view factor and radiant 




Table 2.3 “Tall woodland” has the same 
qualitative description and classification as 
Group A Forest resulting in wildfire modelling 
This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load for Group B Woodland (15t/ha) as 
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reflective of Group A Forest fire behaviour as 
opposed to reflecting the reduced understory 
fuel structure that defines ‘woodland’ wildfire 
fuels. 
opposed to the greater Group A Forest (25t/ha) 
being applied. 
 
These discrepancies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs as 
shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6. 
 
Table 2.3, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 requires 
classification of all treed vegetation greater than 
10m in height and a foliage cover in excess of 
90% to be classified as Group F Rainforest 




This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A 
(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha) 
vegetation structures. 
 
Wildfire behaviour through dense Eucalypt forest 
matching the descriptions in AS3959 Table 2.3 
and AS3959 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 will consume 
significant fuels and result in the highest 
magnitude of wildfire intensity.  
 
Empirical modelling using the Group F Rainforest 
fuel loads will significantly underestimate radiant 
heat flux where treed fuel structures are dense 
and significant. 
 
For modelling the effect is variable fuel load 
inputs which result in significantly different 
engineering outputs as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6. 
Table 2.3 describes Group C Shrubland as shrub 
vegetation less than 2m in height potentially with 
foliage cover greater than 30% whilst Group D 
Scrub is identified as shrub vegetation greater 
than 2m in height, potentially with foliage cover 
greater than 30% 
 
 
Table B2 defines the vegetation height for Group 
C Shrubland as 1.5m and the vegetation height 
for Group D Scrub and Group E Mallee Mulga as 
3m.  B2 identifies the ‘fuel type’ for all three 
classifications as “Shrub and Heath.” 
The variance in qualitative descriptions of 
vegetation height from that of the empirical 
inputs result in potential discrepancy between 
vegetation classification and calculated wildfire 
behaviour.  The discrepancy in fuel type 
description between “shrub and “heath” may 
introduce further confusion. 
 
This inconsistancy can result in incorrect surface 
fuel load inputs being utilised between Group C 
(15t/ha), Group D (25t/ha) vegetation structures.  
It can also result in the incorrect vegetation 
height input being used. 
 
These inconsistencies can ultimately result in 
significantly different fire engineering outputs as 
shown in figures 1.7 to 1.10. 





Using Figures 1.5a-1.5b as a case scenario, the ambiguity surrounding fuel 
classification using the qualitative descriptions in AS3959 become apparent.  
The vegetation structure in the case scenario could arguably be considered 
Group A - Low Open Forest or Group B – Open Woodland as the foliage 
cover, defined as the “proportion of the ground that would be shaded by 
foliage when the sun is directly overhead, expressed as a percentage of 
each stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation” (AS3959, c1.5.17), exceeds 
30%.  Further, the surface and near surface fuel layer do not clearly fit the 
description for either category and arguably does not satisfy the definition of 
minimal fuel condition, defined as “insufficient fuel to significantly increase 
the severity of wildfire attack (recognizable as short-cropped grass for 
example, to a nominal height of 100mm)” (AS3959, c2.2.3.2(f)) required to be 
considered low threat vegetation and excluded from consideration for 
calculation of wildfire impacts in accordance with AS3959.   
The effect of these variable fuel load inputs for the scenario examined 
results in significantly different wildfire outputs as shown in Figures 4 to 10.  The 
outputs detailed were calculated using the detailed methodology detailed 
in AS3959; assuming flat site and effective slopes; and standard inputs of 
AS3959 appropriate to each fuel classification. 
 
  
5Figure 1.5. (a) Case study; and (b) Case study surface fuel. 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
24 
 
In accordance with the vegetation descriptions provided in AS3959 the 
vegetative fuel in the case study could be qualitatively classified as being 
Group A Forest, Group B Woodland or Group F Rainforest (being low closed 
forest) depending on the individual assessor.  Whilst the same empirical 
model (McArthur) is applied to each of these vegetation structures, the 
associated assigned fuel loads vary significantly.  A result is the fire behaviour 
outputs and subsequent radiation modelling outputs are vastly different as 
illustrated in Figures 6-12.  Subsequently, the associated construction 
responses required under the Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 2015) for a 
typical residence could vary by over a hundred thousand dollars (FPA, 2016) 
and result in significant over engineering in situations where landscape scale 
fire behaviour is not possible.  These inconsistencies also facilitate the 
opportunity for consultants and home owners alike to underestimate 
potential wildfire impact in order to reduce construction costs, leaving houses 
potentially vulnerable where landscape scale wildfire impacts occur. This 
subsequently highlights the need for comprehensive understanding of 
wildfire engineering with greater analysis of fuel loads where landscape scale 
fire behaviour is not possible, typically within the urban and peri-urban area, 
as opposed to blind reliance on the broad qualitative descriptions and 
simplified radiant heat flux tables detailed in AS3959.   
 




6Figure 1.6.  Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel 
structures 
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9Figure 1.9.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – 
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10Figure 1.10.  Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, 
scrub and grassland structures 
 
11Figure 1.11.  View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub, 
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12Figure 1.12.  Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – 
shrub, scrub and grassland 
Two of the aims of Project Vesta, perhaps the most significant research 
project into fire behaviour through dry eucalypt forest of recent times, were 
to (Gould et al., 2007, piii): 
i. develop new algorithms describing the relationship between 
fire spread and wind speed, and fire spread and fuel 
characteristics including load, structure and height; and 
ii. develop a fuel hazard assessment guide that provides 
quantitative description of fuel hazard and its effects on fire 
behaviour. 
The published results have subsequently been adapted to other jurisdictions 
including Victoria (Hines et al., 2007) and South Australia (DENR, 2011).   
 
Unlike the two layered  fuel structure incorporated by the models 
suggested in AS3959, the dry eucalypt model of Gould et al. (2007) considers 
three fuel layers contributing to head fire rate of spread being surface, near-
surface and elevated fuels (illustrated in Figure 1, with bark fuels being used 
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(2007) fuels in each strata are assigned hazard scores based on qualitative 
descriptions and the assessor’s inspection.  If the approach of Gould et al. 
(2007) is used, fuel loads are first assigned hazard ratings which are then 
converted to the required hazard scores shown in Table 1.3. 
3Table 1.3. Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al., 2007, Table 9.3, reproduced with 
permission from L.McCaw on behalf of CSIRO and the Department Environment and 
Conservation) 
Vesta Fuel Hazard Score 
Fuel Hazard Rating Surface Near-surface Elevated Bark 
Low 1 1 1 0 
Moderate 2 2 2 1 
High 3 3 3 2 
Very High 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 
Extreme 4 4 4 4 
 
The assigned scores are subsequently 29tilized in the head fire rate of 
spread equation (see Section 2).  The approach of Gould et al. (2007) not 
only provides greater consideration of wildfire fuel structure than the 
empirical methods detailed in AS3959, but also provides a guide to potential 
spotting behaviour resulting from fire brands.  Specific to dry eucalypt forest 
with litter and shrub understory, Gould et al., (2007) does not allow assessment 
of fuel loads or fire modelling in woodland, shrub, or grassland fuel structures.  
Perhaps the main benefit of Gould et al. (2007) is the ability to vary fuel loads 
on the basis of ground truthing and field interrogation, even if this is somewhat 
subjective and constrained by the assumptions of 100m head fire width and 
sufficient vegetation geometry to sustain landscape scale wildfire behaviour.   
The calculated rates of spread and flame heights from the model can 
theoretically be combined with the view factor model of AS3959 to calculate 
radiant heat flux, however there is no evidence within the literature to support 
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1.4. Consideration of sub-landscape scale vegetation 
geometry 
Within the urban environment, wildfire growth in road reserves, urban 
parklands, and similar scenarios can be restricted by the geometry of the 
available fuel beds. Current approaches of AS3959 suggest modification of 
the head fire width may be appropriate in these instances. However, whilst 
the width of the head fire is a vital component in determining radiant heat 
flux, head fire widths greater than 40m resulted in negligible differences 
between the view factor and radiant heat flux within 30m of the flame front 
(Penney, 2017). Through analysis of heat release rates, the same study 
identified that reduction of head fire width alone without further 
consideration of fuel bed geometry was not suitable in scenarios where the 
fuel bed geometry restricted fire growth. It was subsequently identified that: 
1. Regardless of the actual geometry and coverage of fuel within the 
assessment area, AS3959 assumes landscape scale wildfire 
behaviour with a 100% homogenous fuel loading within the 
assessment area and a head fire width of 100m;  
2. When fuel bed geometry prevents a 100m head fire or quasi-
steady RoS  being obtained, failure to adjust wildfire fuel inputs 
may result in significant overestimation of wildfire impact, 
particularly radiant heat flux; and 
3. In order to more accurately model wildfires in fuel beds that restrict 
fire growth, it is necessary to calculate available fuel loads that will 
contribute to fire behaviour over the area being assessed using the 
vegetation availability factor equation as described below.  
As previously published (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), whilst the head fire 
flame width should be considered as the width of the continuous fuel 
contributing to the active fire front, the area covered by potential fuel load 
available for contribution to the RoS and intensity of the active fire as a 
fraction of the total assessment area is defined as the vegetation availability 
factor (VF), given by 




𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝑚𝑚2)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 (𝑚𝑚2)
 (1.1) 
where the fuel cell area is the coverage of vegetation present within a 100 
m by 100 m assessment area directly in front of the receiving body. The 
available surface fuel load wA (t/ha), and the available total fuel load WA 
(t/ha), are then defined as 
𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 (1.2) 
and  
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 (1.3) 
where 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑊𝑊 are respectively the surface fuel load and total fuel load 
sourced from relevant jurisdictional data sets.  
The calculated fuel loads can then be applied to the relevant fire 
behaviour equations of RoS , fire line intensity, and flame length for the 
purposes of determining the suitability of wildfire fighting strategies and 
tactics or for calculating the radiant heat flux on receiving bodies in the path 
of the head fire. Where models do not consider the fuel load when 
calculating RoS , the vegetation availability factor can still be applied for the 
purposes of calculating radiant heat flux, fire line, and intensity. 
 
Where individual vegetation or small vegetation beds are present that 
would result in an isolated fire but would not facilitate the type of fire 
propagation present during wildfire events, it is appropriate to model those 
instances accordingly.  This is discussed in further in Section 2. 
 
1.5. Consideration of wildfire fuel in physics based modelling 
As opposed to empirical models derived from statistical data, physics 
based wildfire modelling involve computational models that considers 
interaction of atmosphere, fire and vegetative fuel using partial differential 
equations to solve for filtered fire spread.  Physics based models predict the 
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wind flow through and above the fuel strata, incorporates ‘chemical kinetics’ 
to describe the drying and pyrolysis and simplified combustion equation to 
predict combustion of the vegetation in defined time steps.  
Significantly more complex than empirical approaches, physics based 
models such as Firestar require both atmospheric quantities and vegetation 
inputs (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Pimont et al., 2006) to be defined on a two 
or three-dimensional spatial grid.  Some models including the Wildland Fire 
Dynamic Simulator (WFDS) allows the resolution of the grid to be altered to 
suit the specific scenario with fine grid sizes as small as 1.6m x 1.6m x 1.4m 
(Pimont et al., 2006), allowing vegetation structures and fires of almost all 
scales to be modelled.  This enables enhanced analysis of potential wildfire 
behaviour compared to traditional empirical models by accounting for each 
mechanism of heat transfer (conduction, convection and radiation) (Porterie 
et al., 2005; Finney & McAllister, 2011; Finney et al., 2015) but subsequently 
requires powerful computers and extended analysis durations (Cruz et al., 
2014).  Whilst the use of physics based models is widely accepted in 
traditional fire engineering analysis (ABCB, 2005; SFPE, 2008) its use in the 
prediction of wildfire behaviour in Australia remains in its relative infancy in 
part due to the complex computational analysis required (Cruz et al., 2014).    
One of the main characteristics of physics based wildfire modelling is the 
requirement to input spatial and physical characteristics for each fuel type 
and structure within the cell to be analysed.  This permits the modelling and 
evaluation of heterogeneous fuels in a single simulation (Cruz et al., 2014; 
Parsons, Sauer & Linn, 2010).  The result of the analysis is a fire ‘map’ with 
outputs including fire line intensity, temperature and radiant heat flux 
captured at set timed intervals in a separate spreadsheet.      
Physics based models categorise wildfire fuel into two separate layers 
being surface and raised fuels.  Unlike empirical approaches however, the 
two categories of fuel are not simply modelled as two distinct fuel layers.  
Fuel structures within each layer are represented as individual fuel units within 
the confines of the grid resolution (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer & Linn, 
2010).  A comparison between the two approaches is illustrated in Figure 
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1.13 and enables individual trees to be considered separately as opposed to 





13Figure 1.13.  Empirical (left) compared to WFDS (right) wildfire fuel cells 
Input parameters for surface fuels including grasses and litter are the 
descriptors of the fine fuels, which are vegetation with a diameter or thickness 
of approximately 6 mm or less. If the surface vegetation is not uniform in size 
then the loading in each representative size class (i.e., surface-to-volume 
ratio) can be inputted. Grasses, for example, are more likely to be sufficiently 
represented by one value of the surface-to-volume ratio and the fuel loading 
would be for that size class. However, litter may be better represented using 
more than one surface-to-volume ratio.  Input parameters for raised fuels 
include trees and shrubs that are large enough to be resolved on the 
computational grid. For example, if the grid cells are 1 m cubes and the 
shrubs are 0.5 m tall, then they are not resolved. Where raised fuels are not 
considered due to grid resolution they are modelled as surface vegetation. 
Similar to WFDS, FIRETEC is a three dimensional physics based model for fires 
through vegetation.  It relies on the formulations of physics and chemistry to 
model the fire behaviour through vegetation in cells of horizontal grid 
resolution as small as 2m and fine fuel grid resolution as small as 0.05m (Pimont 
et al., 2006). 
WFDS has two distinct ways of modelling vegetative fuels, being the Fuel 
Element (FE) model for vegetation that occupies a specified volume such as 
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trees (for example, Douglas fir trees are modelled as cones), and the 
Boundary Fuel (BF) model for surface fuels such as grasslands.   
In the FE model thermally thin vegetation is represented on a three-
dimensional grid.  Porterie et al. (2005, p573) describes the gas phase grid as 
the pyrolized fuel vapour leaving the fuel material, diffusing with the available 
oxidizer and forming a combustible mixture ahead of the flaming edge that 
is subsequently ignited by the flame itself.  The gas phase grid requires 
sufficient resolution so that temperature gradients and conjugate heat 
transfer between the gas and solid phases in the fuel bed can be calculated 
to an acceptable level.  As a result, it is regarded as providing better 
predictions than the BF model if adequately resolved, however it is also both 
computationally intensive and time consuming.   
The BF model utilises a vertical grid with sufficiently high spatial resolution 
to capture vertical radiant heat transfer.  A horizontal grid is also utilised 
similar to the FE model, typically however with larger resolution.  The 
underlying assumptions of the BF model are most consistent with landscape 
scale fires in which the majority of heat release and radiant emission occurs 
vertically above the thermally degrading surface fuel bed. 
Two models may be utilised for thermal degradation of wildfire fuel, ‘Linear’ 
or ‘Arrhenius’, both derived from empirical studies.  The Linear model 
assumes a two-stage endothermic thermal decomposition (water 
evaporation and then solid fuel pyrolysis). In contrast, the Arrhenius model 
considers a three-stage endothermic thermal decomposition being water 
evaporation, solid fuel pyrolysis and subsequent char oxidisation (Morvan & 
Dupuy, 2014).  Solid fuels are represented as a series of layers that are 
consumed from the top down until the solid mass reaches a predetermined 
char fraction at which point the fuel is considered consumed (Cruz et al., 
2014).  The model then continues the process throughout the fuel structures 
in predetermined time intervals providing illustrative and tabularised outputs. 
 
1.6. Use of existing data to advance physics based models 
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The structural framework provided by Hollis et al. (2015) includes several of 
the fuel characteristic inputs required for physics based modelling.  By 
combining datasets when information becomes available, improvements to 
both empirical and physics based models may be achieved.  Table 1.4 
summarises the status of fuel attributes within existing data sets and how they 
correspond to physics based inputs. 
4Table 1.4. Fuel attributes 
Fuel Attribute from Hollis 
et al.  
Equivalent Attribute for 
physics based models 
Notes 
Mass Mass Mass is not currently considered in empirical 
models which rely on density in (t/ha). 
Compactness Density Compactness is not currently considered in 
empirical models. 
Mineral content -  Not considered in either form of model. 
Heat content Specific heat  Considered in empirical models through 
Heat of combustion, being 18600kJ/kg.  
This would be altered in physics based 
models to suit the individual fuel.  Data sets 
from physics based models could be 
applied to empirical scenarios. 
Density Density Empirical models utilise t/ha, however 
physics based models would rely on density 
in 3 dimensions. 
Horizontal continuity Fuel geometry Existing empirical models do not consider 
horizontal continuity due to the 1ha grid 
size.  For physics based models the fuel 
geometry can be manually inputted to suit 
the specific scenario. 
Particle shape and size Fuel geometry Empirical models do not consider particle 
size due to the 1ha grid size.  Particle size is 
captured in physics based models through 
enhanced definition of fuel geometry. 
 
The shape of the fuel (cylindrical, conical or 
cubic for instance) can also be considered. 
Surface area Fuel geometry Empirical models do not consider surface 
area.  Surface area is captured in physics 
based models through enhanced 
definition of fuel geometry. 
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Height to base of 
canopy 
Fuel geometry Whilst empirical models use canopy height 
as a guide to selecting vegetation fuel load 
inputs, they do not consider height to base 
of canopy in the calculation of fire 
behaviour itself.  Physics based models 
can capture this through detailed fuel 
geometry inputs. 
-  Drag coefficient A coefficient derived from empirical 
correlation for laminar or turbulent flow 
around a simplified shape.  Individually 
imputed for each specific scenario and 
affects physics based modelling of fire 
behaviour.  Not considered in empirical 
approaches. 
-  Char component Determines the point at which the fuel is 
considered completely consumed in 
physics based models and value depends 
on individual scenario.  Not considered in 
empirical models. 
-  Pyrolysis range When the pyrolysis starts and finishes, 
assessed in set time steps in physics based 
modelling.  Not considered in empirical 
models. 
 
Existing data sets are limited, however combining the accepted empirical 
two layered fuel loads detailed in AS3959 with analysis of fuel strata detailed 
in (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007; Hollis et al., 2015) may provide a 
suitable starting point for vegetation fuel inputs required for physics based 
modelling.  Tables 1.5 to 1.8 detail suggested bulk densities for initial analysis 
and comparison against existing empirical models (Penney, 2017).   
The suggested fuel loads in Tables 1.5 to 1.8 have been determined by 
adapting the existing data sets identified for the associated empirical models 
to the three-dimensional t/m3 from the existing two-dimensional t/ha that 
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5Table 1.5. Suggested bulk density Forest 
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
(Overlap will occur between strata if 
height is less than 1m) 




25A Near Surface 1-8 
Elevated 0-8 4 
Bark 0-7 1 
Canopy 10 n/a 1B 
A Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 100% foliage cover 
 
6Table 1.6. Suggested bulk density Woodland 
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3 
(Overlap will occur between strata if 
height is less than 1m) 




10A Near Surface 1-8 
Elevated 0-8 2 
Bark 0-7 1 
Canopy 10 n/a 0.3B 
A Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 30% foliage cover 
 
7Table 1.7. Suggested bulk density Scrub 
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per 
hectare (AS3959) 








Canopy 0 10B 
A Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 




8Table 1.8. Suggested bulk density Shrub 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
38 
 
Fuel Strata Bulk Density in tonnes per 
hectare (AS3959) 








Canopy 0 5B 
A Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell 
B Assuming 100% foliage cover 
 
1.7. Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s 
Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity 
of wildfires.  During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-
wildfires in through continuous vegetation structures (particularly in forest and 
woodlands), no amount of resources or water (see Sections 4-6) will be able 
to suppress the head fire.  Firefighting strategies in these situations should 
therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation structure, 
particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are limited and the 
vegetation geometry does not support a continuous wildfire front.  The 
removal of fuel immediately adjacent to assets and communities through 
‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see Section 4) may need to 
be considered early in firefighting campaigns. 
1.8. Implications for frontline fire behaviour specialists and 
urban planners 
To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the 
accuracy of modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended: 
1. Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors 
should not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model applied to the 
scenario without due consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected 
to occur through the vegetation.  Using the case study previously 
provided as an example, whilst the vegetation could reasonably be 
classified as Class A Forest or Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble 
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et al wildfire behaviour model to either of these options without 
modifying the deemed fuel loads would significantly result in over-
estimation of wildfire outputs.  In urban areas where vegetation 
geometry restricts wildfire growth, a more appropriate and accurate 
approach is to assess the fuel load utilizing Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores 
and apply the correct vegetation availability factor.  Further 
guidance on this can be found in Sections 2 and 3; and 
2. Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning 
perspectives) involved in modelling wildfire and calculating potential 
impacts require a sound understanding of the respective models and 
their limitations.  Caution should be applied when attempting to 
‘simplify’ complex equations, models or engineering concepts in 
standards, guidance material or documents for use by lay persons or 
in land use planning decisions.  The profession of wildfire engineering 
is in its infancy and job titles do not necessarily equate to the 
knowledge and skills required to complete the required technical 
analysis or make informed and accurate decisions.  This can be in part 
be remedied by professionalization / accreditation of the sector and 
greater recognition of the role of fire safety engineers with wildfire 
backgrounds in it. 
 
Section 2 – Wildfire behaviour and characteristics 
2.1. Introduction 
Understanding how wildfire behaves and how this behaviour is modelled is 
the next step for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists IMT’s and urban 
planners. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between wildfire inputs and the 
empirical wildfire behaviour models and the radiation view factor model 
adopted throughout Australia.  This section discusses each of the empirical 
wildfire components, whilst the radiation model is explored in the next 
section.  Accurately modelling wildfire behaviour is important as it is used to 
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assist determine the suitability of wildfire suppression strategies and tactics 
(Section 4), as well as for determining the suitability of development in 
bushfire prone areas.  
 
 
14Figure 2.1. Relationship between bushfire and radiation models 
2.2. Fire Weather 
The influence of weather on wildfire behaviour and the potential difficulty 
of wildfire suppression is considered through the use of fire danger indices 
(Dowdy et al., 2009).  In Australia, the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FDI) 
is used to account for the effect of weather on forest wildfires. The FDI is 
calculated by (Nobel et al, 1980): 
Atmospheric conditions selected (Fire Danger 
Index or Wind Speed)
Vegetation classification (fuel structure, fuel load, empirical 
model)
Site parameters (slope under vegetation and 
site slope)
WIldfire behaviour outputs empirically 
calculated (Rate of Spread, Flame Length, 
Intensity) 
Reciever inputs determined (Height of 
receiver, distance to receiver)
Geometry of the radiant heat panel determined from bushfire 
behaviour outputs (Flame Angle, Flame Height, Flame Width)
View factor calculated 
Radiant heat flux calculated
Empirical Wildfire model 
 
Inputs include: 
• Empirical model  
• Fuel load 
• Vegetation height 




• Rate of Spread 
• Intensity 




• Head fire width 
• Separation between 
receiver and head 
fire 
Outputs include: 
• Flame angle 
• View factor 
• Radiant heat flux 
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𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 = 2𝐹𝐹(−0.45+0.987𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹)−0.0345𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅+0.0338𝑇𝑇+0.0234𝑉𝑉) (2.1) 
Where DF is drought factor (given as a number between 0 and 10 
representing the influence of recent temperatures and rainfall events on fuel 
availability); RH is relative humidity (%); T is temperature (°C); V is wind speed 
at 10m (kph) 
 
For grassfires, the Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) is calculated by (Cruz 
et al, 2015) 
GFDI= 2exp (−23.6 + 5.01 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶) + 0.0281𝑇𝑇 − 0.266√𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.633�𝜈𝜈10 (2.2) 
where: 
C is degree of curing (%); T is air temperature (°C); RH is relative humidity (%); 
U10 is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) 
 
Whilst Dowdy et al. (2009, Figure 2, p10) report the 95th and 99th percentile 
FDI’s throughout Australia from 2000 to 2007, future projected changes in FDI 
forecast widespread increases in the severity of near-surface fire weather 
throughout Australia (Dowdy, 2018; Dowdy et al., 2019) as illustrated in Figure 
2.2.  Alternatively, AS3959 provides alternate FDI datasets, summarised in 
Table 2.1.   
 
9Table 2.1: FDI and GFDI (excluding alpine areas) 
Jurisdiction Forest Fire Danger Index Grassland Fire Danger 
Index 
Australian Capital Territory 100 130 
New South Wales 80-100 110-130 
Northern Territory 40 50 
Queensland 40 50 
South Australia 80 110 
Tasmania 50 70 
Victoria 100 130 
Western Australia 80 110 
 
 




15Figure 2.2. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the FDI. (image 
from Dowdy et al. 2009, used with permission from the Bureau of Meteorology) 
During extreme wildfire events strong and deep convection can occur 
within the fire plume (Dowdy et al., 2019).  This phenomenon is termed 
pyroconvection.  Condensation of moisture within the fire plume can 
release latent heat, resulting in enhanced convection and the formation of 
clouds known as pyrocumulus.   In severe cases thunderstorms, (known as 
pyrocumulonimbus), and pyrogenic lightning may result in multiple additional 
wildfire ignitions.  The feedback processes involved in such extreme weather 
events includes significant variations in surface wind speed and direction that 
results in unpredictable and dangerous wildfire behaviour and directional 
changes (Peace et al. 2017; Potter, 2012).  The Continuous Haines index (CH) 
is a numerical index between 0-13 which provides an indication of how dry 
and unstable the atmosphere is above the surface and therefore the 
potential for the formation of dangerous pyroconvective processes (Dowdy 
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et al, 2019; Mills & McCaw, 2010; Potter, 2012; Potter, 2018).  Values of 10 or 
more are considered significant and require additional vigilance to be 
exercised during wildfire suppression efforts.  
The CH is calculated by (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills and McCaw, 2010): 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (2.3) 





if 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 5, then 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 5 + 0.5(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 5) (2.6) 
 
Where CA is the Stability Score based on the temperature difference T850 
– T700, where T850 and T700 are the temperatures at 850 hPa and 700 hPa, 
respectively; CB is the Humidity Score based on the 850hPa dew point 
depression (DD850): equal to T850 – DP850, where DP850 is the dew point 
temperature at 850 hPa. 
 
2.3. Rate of Spread 
During the initial stages of a wildfire only a few particles on the top of the 
surface fuels will be involved, with flame spread influenced by the direct 
contact of the flames with surrounding unburned fuel (Cheney & Gould, 
1997).   As the fire size grows, convective preheating of surrounding fuels 
occur and flame height increases resulting in more fuel becoming available.  
McAlpine (1988) suggests that, influenced by both the wind and topography, 
the fire continues to grow in size and accelerate until it achieves a quasi-
steady rate of spread (RoS).   
In point source accelerating fire scenarios, whereby the developing fire 
originating from a single ignition point is yet to grow sufficiently to reach the 
quasi-steady 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  required to support the assumptions used in landscape 
scale wildfire behaviour, the accelerating head fire rate of spread 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 
(km/h) in forest and woodland fuels is given by (McAlpine, 1998; Van Wagner, 
1985): 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝐹𝐹−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) (2.7) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the equilibrium/potential head fire rate of spread (km/h), t  
is the time since ignition (h), and β (h−1) is a constant related to how rapidly 
the head fire accelerates. A reasonable first estimate for β can be 
established using the assumption that the fire will accelerate to 90% of the 
equilibrium rate of spread in 30 minutes (i.e., 0.5 h) for treed vegetation 
structures, including forest and woodlands. The attainment of the 90% 
equilibrium rate of spread 30 minutes post ignition within treed fuel structures 
is supported by the findings of Gould et al (2007); Kucuk et al (2007); Van 
Wagner (1985); and Cheney (1981). 
Stevenson (Penney & Stevenson, 2019) identified that applying this to 
Equation (1) gives 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
= 0.9 and t = 0.5, as illustrated below to solve the fire 




















It is worth noting that the value of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.0768 stated in previous work by 
McAlpine (1998) is in units of (min−1). This would only be appropriate in the 
current setting if the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 were considered in km/min rather than km/h. 
For modelling purposes, the time since ignition may not be known, 
therefore the ability to determine the rate of spread of an accelerating fire 
in terms of distance travelled since ignition is required. As 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 is the rate of 




By integrating Equation (2.7) with respect to time, and setting D(0) = 0, the 










β 1tetRoSD  (2.8) 
From Equation (2.7) we know that 












which when inserted this into Equation (2.8), enables distance travelled post 





































D aa 1lnβ  (2.10) 
Equation (2.10) can be used to determine the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 of an accelerating 
head fire 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 at a specified distance D from the point source ignition with 
the equilibrium rate of spread. The problem is that it is not possible to re-
arrange Equation (2.10) to express 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 as a function of D. To resolve this 
issue a plot of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 is numerically generated against 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 which can be used 
to approximate the ratio 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 (and hence 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎) for a given value of the ratio 
𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
. Such a plot is given in Figure 2.3 below. 
 










Head fire spread distance at a given time can be calculated using the 
equation McAlpine (1988, Eqn 5):  












Where D is the head fire spread distance at time t; RoS is the potential head 
fire rate of spread; t is the elapsed time since ignition. 
 
The fire will continue to accelerate with an increasing forward RoS until it 
attains a quasi-steady rate.  Whilst Cheney and Gould (1997) report this may 
not occur in forest fuels until a head fire width of approximately 150m is 
reached, Penney (2017) identifies the more conservative figure of 100m, 
which is subsequently consistent with the calculations of Van Wager, is 
adopted for modelling purposes by both AS3959-2009 Construction of 
buildings in bushfire prone areas (AS3959) and NSWFRS (2016).  During 
catastrophic bushfires, the scale and intensity of the bushfire itself can result 
in air-flow and wind conditions generated by the fire itself (Dold & Zinoviev, 
2009) and subsequently ‘explosive’ bushfire behaviour similar to flashover 
phenomena experienced in structural firefighting response (Chatelon, 
Sauvagnargues, Dusserre, & Balbi, 2014). 
 
RoS is calculated in treed fuel structures of forest, woodland and rainforest 
using (Noble et al, 1980 cited in AS3959): 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012 × 𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 × 𝑤𝑤 (2.12) 
Where RoS is the potential rate of spread (kph), also simply referred to as rate 
of spread; FDI is Fire Danger Index (dimensionless); w is surface fuel load (t/ha) 
 
Alternatively, for dry eucalypt forest, potential quasi-steady rate of spread 
(RSS) can be calculated using the Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al, 2007) 
discussed in Section 1: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽 + 𝑏𝑏0(𝑉𝑉10 − 𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏1𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅ℎ���∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓�̇ �∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓�̇  (2.13) 
Where Rss is the potential quasi-steady rate of spread (m/h); Rt is the threshold 
rate of spread of 5kph at the threshold wind speed (Ut); V10 is mean wind 
speed at 10m in the open (kph); Vt is threshold wind speed 5kph; Sfhs is surface 
fuel hazard score; NSfhs is near surface fuel hazard score; NSh is near surface 
fuel height; b0 – b4 are regression constants b0 = 1.132; b1 = 0.904; b2 = 0.279; 
b3 = 0.611; b4 = 0.013; ØMf is fine fuel moisture function; ØSf is slope function 
 
And (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 5)  
∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 = �𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓−1.495� 0.0545⁄  (2.14) 
 
Where Mf is fine fuel moisture content (%); ∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓  is calculated by (Gould et 
al., 2007, Eqn. 6).  
 
∅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(0.069𝜃𝜃) (2.15) 
Where Ɵ is slope of the ground (degrees) 
 
For shrubland and scrub, RoS is calculated by Anderson et al, (2015): 
RoS = 5.67(0.67 U10)0.91 H0.22 e (-0.076MC) (2.16) 
 
Where H is height of the fuel bed (m); U10 is average wind speed at 10m out 
in the open; MC is moisture content 
 
Alternatively, it may be calculated using Cruz et al (2013): 
RoS = 0.023𝑉𝑉1.21𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅0.54 (2.17) 
Where VH is the average height of the classified vegetation (m); V is average 
wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) 
 
. . 
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For grassland, RoS is calculated by Putron (1982): 
RoS = 0.13𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 (2.18) 
When using equations 2.12 and 2.16-2.18, RoS can be corrected for the 
effects of slope by (AS3959):  
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹(0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒ℎ𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (2.19) 
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹(−0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴ℎ𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (2.20) 
Where Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h); R is the 
forward rate of spread determined; slope is the slope (degrees) 
 
Cruz et al (2015) however suggest this approach will grossly over-estimate 
the effect of slope and subsequently will result in an under-prediction of 




2 exp(−0.069𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹) − 1
  (2.21) 
Where Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h); R is the 
forward rate of spread determined; slope is the slope (degrees)  
Residence time is defined as the time the flaming zone takes to pass over 
a given point.  There is some variance in the literature regarding typical 
residence time in forest fuels.  Fire service literature (DFES, 2014) suggests in 
forest fuels a figure of between 45 to 60 seconds can be expected.  During 
the development of firefighting vehicle crew protection systems, Nichols, 
Canderle, Knight and Leonard (2003, p2) identified it was reasonable to 
expect “residence times of several minutes,” however the peak of the 
burover intensity will last between 15-30 seconds as the fine bushfire fuels are 
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consumed.  This is consistent with the findings of Linton (2016) in her report 
into the burnovers experienced during the 2012 Black Cat Creek Fire. Wotton, 
Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012, p270) reported longer periods as 
the “average flame-front residence time for eucalypt forest fuels was 37 
seconds and did not vary significantly with fine fuel moisture, fuel quantity or 
bulk density.”  Poon (2003) describes a significantly longer flame residence 
time as lasting 1-2 minutes and mainly involving the fine fuels of twigs, ground 
litter and foliage, yet in the same report he identifies a residence time of 60 
seconds as being appropriate for modelling purposes.   Smith (2013) 






Where TR is residence time (minutes); D is flame depth (m); RoS is rate of 
spread (m/hr) 
2.4. Flame length and height 
Flame length (Lf) will increase as the fire develops from ignition to a bushfire 
of landscape proportions.  It is also affected by numerous other factors 
influencing the fire behaviour including fuel structure, wind speed and 
topography.  Flame height is the vertical height of the flame above the 
ground as illustrated in Figure 2.4 and will vary depending on the inclination 
of the ground, the flame length and the flame angle.  Whilst Linton (2016) 
reports flame heights of between 8-10m during the fatal Black Cat Creek 
bushfire, Cruz et al. (2012) reports flame heights 10-20m above the crowns of 
trees were experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East fire.  The 
flame heights experienced by crews on Black Saturday are also consistent 
with reports of flames encountered by crews during the 2016 Yarloop 
Waroona fire in Western Australia. 
 




17Figure 2.4. Flame length and height 
 
Flame length (LF) in treed fuel structures including those involved in Australian 







Where Lf is flame length (m); W is the total fuel load (t/ha); Rslope is the forward 
rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h) 
 
Flame height can also be calculated using the assigned hazard scores 
(Gould, 2007, Eqn. 7):  
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 0.0193 × 𝑅𝑅0.723 × 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�0.64𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓ℎ� (2.24) 
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2.5. Fire line intensity 
Current vehicle protection systems utilised in Western Australian fire service 
vehicles have been tested against fire line intensities of between 2.5-
10MW/m and designed to withstand 7.5MW/m (Nichols, Gould, Knight, 
Leonard, & Brown, 2005).  Comparatively, Cruz, et al. (2012) report average 
fire line intensities experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East Fire in 
2009 of 88MW/m.   Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie, (2011) describe bushfires as 
eruptive and unstable combustion involving a process of dynamic 
interaction between RoS and fire line intensity (I).  A critical component of 
the fireline intensity is the heat of combustion, defined as the amount of heat 
released when a unit quantity of fuel is oxidized completely to yield stable 
end products (SFPE, 1-93).  Common values for H are identified in Table 2.2.  
AS3959 details that I, in kW/m and corrected for slope, is calculated using 
Byram’s fireline intensity equation.   
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠/36 (2.25) 
Where H is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), shown in table 2.2; W is total fuel 
load (t/ha) 
 
10Table 2.2. Heat of Combustion 
Fuel Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg) Source 
Wood (European Beech) 19500 DiNenno Table 1-5.3 
Wood (Ponderosa Pine) 19400 DiNenno Table 1-5.3 
Australian vegetation 18600 AS3959 
 
2.6. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s  
This section covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and 
behaviour.  As the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against 
these inputs it is essential that all firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and 
IMT’s alike not only understand the presented models, but are effective in 
accurately applying them.  Incorrect predictions may result in inappropriate 
strategies being devised, leaving frontline personnel exposed to 
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overwhelming wildfire conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see 
Sections 5 and 7).  Whilst fire behaviour specialists are required to accurately 
and competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel from firefighters to 
the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing the margin for 
safety for both firefighters and the community. 
 
2.7. Implications for urban planners 
Perhaps the greatest implications for urban planners apply to assessments 
of potential wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape scale 
wildfire behaviour assumed in AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is 
not possible.  Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Section 1) 
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to paragraph 2.3 of 
this section), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), failure 
to adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of 
potential wildfire behaviour.  This can be in part be remedied by deference 
in such instances to suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire 
backgrounds that can provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level 
of fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions. 
 
Section 3 – Wildfire radiant heat flux 
3.1 Introduction 
Thermal radiation is the energy emitted from a body due to the internal 
temperature of the surface that is transported by photons capable of 
traveling through a perfect vacuum (Massoud, 2005).  The rate of transfer of 
radiation across a given surface is known as radiant heat flux.  Humans can 
only be exposed to relatively small levels of radiation before feeling pain and 
suffering other debilitating effects, hence it becomes a crucial factor in 
determining tenability on the fireground (see Section 5).  Even prior to the 
attainment of a quasi-steady Rate of Spread ( 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ), radiation quickly 
becomes the primary mechanism of heat transfer from a bushfire and 
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impacts the receiving body well before direct flame impingement occurs 
(Leonard, 2009; Sullivan, Ellis, & Knight, 2003; Wotton, Gould, McCaw, 
Cheney, & Taylor, 2012).  This section builds upon Section 2, discussing the 
calculation of radiant heat flux from wildfires and other vegetation fires 
occuring in small fuel beds.  Understanding wildfire radiant heat flux is critical 
as it has impacts on firefighter and civilian tenability, as well as signficant 
implications for land use planning and construction in areas prone to wildfire 
in Australia. 
3.2 Radiant heat flux 
In order to empirically calculate the radiant heat flux during a bushfire 
event the chaotic flame front is geometrically represented by a uniform 
parallelepiped black body radiant heat panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003; 
Tan, Midgley & Douglas, 2005; Mendham, 2013) as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
The horizontal position of the panel in relation to the flame is determined to 
be directly below the middle of the extended flame panel (Sullivan, Ellis & 
Knight, 2003) as shown in Figure 2.  Both the flame temperature and 
emissivity are assumed to be consistent across the panel, whilst AS3959 also 
assumes the receiving body is perpendicular to the approaching fire front.   
 
18Figure 3.1: Geometrical representation of the flame front. 




19Figure 3.2: Geometrical representation of the flame front – side view. 
 
Radiant heat flux is calculated using the equation:  
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 (3.1) 
where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity, 
𝐸𝐸 is the flame emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜏𝜏 is the view factor.  
 
3.3 Atmospheric transmissivity 
With reference to Figure 3.3, atmospheric transmissivity (τ) is calculated 
using the following steps: 
Calculate path length (𝜈𝜈):  
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, then 𝜈𝜈 = 0 (3.2) 
or 
If 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐, then 𝜈𝜈 = 𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 (3.3) 
 
where 𝑑𝑑 is the distance between the fuel bed and the receiver (m), 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 is the 
flame length (m) and 𝑐𝑐 is the flame angle (in degrees) that maximizes the 
view factor, calculated in accordance with the algorithm shown in Figure 3.4 
(AS3959). 
The atmospheric transmissivity is then calculated as follows: 
If  𝜈𝜈 =  0, then 𝜏𝜏 =  1 




If 𝜈𝜈 ≠  0, then 𝜏𝜏 =  𝑅𝑅0 + 𝑅𝑅1𝜈𝜈 + 𝑅𝑅2𝜈𝜈2 + 𝑅𝑅3𝜈𝜈3 + 𝑅𝑅4𝜈𝜈4 (3.4) 
 
where 𝜈𝜈 is the path length and 𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 is the coefficient calculated by 
𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑙𝑙 + 𝐶𝐶2𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 + 𝐶𝐶3𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶4𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (3.5) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 is the ambient temperature, 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the 
relative humidity; and 𝐶𝐶1𝑙𝑙, 𝐶𝐶2𝑙𝑙, 𝐶𝐶3𝑙𝑙 and 𝐶𝐶4𝑙𝑙 are constants defined in Table 
3.1 (AS3959, Table B3, reproduced with the permission of SAI Global on behalf 
of Standards Australia). 
 
11Table 3.1: Constants used in Equation 3.5. 
n C1n C2n C3n C4n 
0 1.486 -2.003 × 10-3 4.68 × 10-5 -6.052 × 10-2 
1 1.225 × 10-2 -5.900 × 10-5 1.66 × 10-6 -1.759 × 10-3 
2 -1.489 × 10-4 6.893 × 10-7 -1.922 × 10-8 2.092 × 10-5 
3 8.381 × 10-7 -3.823 × 10-9 1.0511 × 10-10 -1.166 × 10-7 




20Figure 3.3: Typical building and fire front configuration. 




21Figure 3.4: Flame angle algorithm (Copied by Greg Penney with the permission of SAI 
Global on behalf of Standards Australia). 
3.4 Flame temperature  
Drysdale (2011) identifies that flames emit radiation within the visible 
spectrum with a dull red glow at approximately 823K.  As the flame 
temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓) increases, the flame colour changes as detailed in Table 
3.2.  Poon (2003) identifies that the predominantly ‘reddish-orange’ colour 
of bushfire flames suggests a flame temperature of approximately 1273K, 
which is supported by Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who 
report a flame temperature of 1200K is appropriate for large wildland fires.  
AS3959 (2009) adopts a flame temperature of 1080K and assumes a uniform 
temperature across the flame surface.  Conversley, the approximate 
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maximum flame temperature reported in the research by Wotton, Gould, 
McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012) was 1373K.    
12Table 3.2: Visual colour of flame. 
Temperature (K) Appearance 
823 Red glow 
973 Dull red 





Emissivity (𝜀𝜀) is the ratio of the energy of radiated from a material’s surface 
to that radiated from a blackbody (perfect emitter) at the same temperature 
and wavelength and under the same conditions (NPL, 2014).  It is a 
dimensionless number between 0 (a perfect reflector) and 1 (a perfect 
emitter).  During small scale experiments representative of a bushfire in the 
early stages of development, Boulet et. al. (2009) reported emissivity of up to 
0.74 in flames lengths of 4m.  AS3959 (2009, CB10.2) adopts a flame emissivity 
of 0.95 across the flame surface using the justification that “bushfire flames 
under design2 fire weather scenarios are generally optically thick (𝜀𝜀~1). "  
This value is consistent with the findings of Agueda, Pastor and Perez, cited in 
Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report the emissivity 
of large wildland fires as being able to be considered close to the emissivity 
of a perfect emitter and assigned an emissivity of 0.90.  Poon (2003, p26) 
however, suggests the use of “an emissivity close to 1 may not be a 
reasonable approximation of the emissive power from the flame front” and 
 
2 A design fire scenario is a specific fire scenario on which the analysis will be 
conducted, and a design fire is a quantitative description of assumed fire 
characteristics within the design fire scenario.  
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subsequently assumes a flame emissivity of 0.6 justifying this figure as 
“equivalent to a flame depth of about 5m” (Poon, 2003, Table 12, p38).   
 
The flame emissive power (𝐸𝐸) is calculated by: 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎ɛ𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓4 (3.6) 
 
where 𝜎𝜎  is the Stefan-Boltzman constant of 5.67x10-11 kWm-2K-4, 𝜀𝜀  is the 
flame emissivity and 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature. 
3.6 View factor 
The view factor (𝜏𝜏) is a geometrical factor ranging from 0 to 1 which is 
related to the extent that the fire front fills the field of view looking from the 
site toward the flame. A value of 𝜏𝜏 = 1 indicates that the entire field of view 
consists of flame (i.e. not even sky), while a value of 𝜏𝜏 = 0 indicates that the 
fire front is completely out of view. As such, it is the view factor that must 
incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions on the radiant heat 
flux. To address this issue, this section proposes an alternate view factor model 
to that presented in AS3959. 
In the absence of shielding bodies and referring to Figure 3.5, calculation 
of the view factor in the wildfire context is expressed as: 
 
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) then 
𝜏𝜏 = 1  (3.7) 









































𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 sin(𝑐𝑐) − 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 cos(𝑐𝑐) tan(𝜃𝜃) − 𝑑𝑑 tan(𝜃𝜃) − ℎ
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)
 (3.9) 




ℎ + �𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)�tan (𝜃𝜃)
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐)
 (3.10) 
𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑌𝑌2 =
0.5𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓




𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 is the flame length (m), 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 is the flame width/head fire width (m), 𝑐𝑐 is 
the flame angle (degrees), 𝜃𝜃 is the slope of the land between the site and 
vegetation fuel bed (degrees), 𝑑𝑑 is the horizontal distance between the site 
and the base of the vegetation fuel bed (m), and ℎ is the elevation of the 
receiver (m). Figure 3.5 provides an illustration of these variable in relation to 
a typical site and fire front. In order to consider the worst case scenario, the 
view factor is maximized with respect to the flame angle 𝑐𝑐. To do this, the 
optimization algorithm in Figure 4 (AS3959) is used. 
 
22Figure 3.5: Typical building and fire front configuration. 
Within the urban environment, substantial non-combustible structures may 
stand between the receiving body and the fire front. For modelling purposes, 
these structures include significant walls or buildings, but not tin fencing or the 
like. Ignoring the impact of these structures on view factor may result in 
significant over estimation of wildfire impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019). In 
order to incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions, the total 
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combined view factor of the obstructions must be calculated and then 
subtracted from the unobstructed view factor given by Equations (3.7–3.11). 
This approach may be suitable for empirical calculation of radiant heat flux 
when firefighters are seeking shelter behind a substantial structure, however 
it is not suitable for use where firefighters are sheltering behind a fire 
appliance as the fire front will be significantly wider than the shielding body.  
Flames may also travel underneath and over the top of an appliance, drawn 
down the far side by an eddy caused by flame and air movements (Mangan, 
1997).   
In describing the details of this approach, Penney and Richardson (2019) 
generalise Equations (3.7–3.11) and re-write them as follows: 
1. Equations (3.8) and (3.11) impose the assumption that the site is 
horizontally central with respect to the fire front. This assumption will 
be relaxed to allow the calculation of view factors for obstructions 
and fire fronts which are not centrally aligned to the site. 
2. Equations (3.7–3.11) are formulated in terms of parameters 
specifically referencing the fire front (not an obstruction). 
Furthermore, although convenient from a computational 
perspective, they are not presented in a means that offers 
significant geometrical insight. The equations will be reformulated 
in terms of view angles from the site to the fire front or obstruction(s). 
The first step is to generalise and amend the existing view factor model. The 
second step is to consider the effect of shielding obstructions.  
 
Figure 3.6 displays a generalised geometrical representation of the side 
view of a fire front and site. Consistent with the view factor calculation 
assumptions of AS3959, an inclined flame is approximated by a vertical flame 
with the same height as the inclined flame (height measured vertically from 
the highest point of the flame to the ground directly below) and located in 
the middle of the inclined flame. 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

























23Figure 3.6: Geometrical representation of the side view of the site and vertical 
approximation of a fire front. 
With reference to Figure 3.6, and Equations (3.9) and (3.10), it becomes 
evident that: 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) 
�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 = sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) 
 
for 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2. 
 
Figure 3.7 displays a generalised geometrical bird’s-eye view of the fire front 
and site. Equation (3.7) enforces the assumption that the site is horizontally 
central with respect to the fire front by setting 𝑊𝑊1 = 𝑊𝑊2 =
𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓
2
, however wildfires 
may not be centered with respect to the receiving structure. To reflect this, 
Figure 3.7 represents a generalised asymmetrical case. 
 

















24Figure 3.7: Geometrical representation of the birds-eye view of the site and vertical 
approximation of a fire front. 
With reference to Figure 3.7, and Equation (3.11), it becomes evident that: 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 = sec(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
 
 
for 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2. 
 
Figure 3.8 displays a three dimensional representation of the upper-left 
quadrant of the fire-front relative to the site, and the four angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 
and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2. The indexing of quadrants is summarised in Table 3.3. 
 
25Figure 3.8: Geometrical representation of the upper-left quadrant of the fire front relative 
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13Table 3.3: Indexing of quadrants. 
𝒊𝒊 𝒋𝒋 Quadrant 
1 1 Upper-left 
1 2 Upper-right 
2 2 Lower-right 
2 1 Lower-left 













= tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�  
   
for 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2.  
  
 
Accordingly, the generalised view factor for a rectangular approximation to 





















































where the angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2 are as defined in Figures 
3.8–3.10. Consistent with Equation (3.7), if the vertical approximation to the 
flame front lies on or behind the site (relative to the direction of travel of the 
fire front) the view factor is assigned the value 𝜏𝜏 = 1. 
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The method for calculating the view factor of a flame front that is at least 
partially obstructed by non-combustible structures incorporates greater 
complexity than the existing model of AS3959 which does not consider the 
impact of obstructions on radiant heat flux. To assist with the discussion we 
describe the method with reference to the (𝑟𝑟,𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈)  coordinate system 
illustrated in Figure 3.9. 
 
26Figure 3.9: The (r,β,ν) coordinate system. 
The 𝑟𝑟 component is the distance from the site measured in the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane, 
𝛽𝛽 is the angle in the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane measured anticlockwise from the positive 
𝑒𝑒 -axis when viewed from above (i.e. 𝑧𝑧 > 0), and 𝜈𝜈  is the vertical angle 
measured from the 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑦𝑦 plane with positive values for 𝑧𝑧 > 0, and negative 
values for 𝑧𝑧 < 0. 
The view factor calculation method is based on a discretisation of the fire 
front with respect to 𝛽𝛽 as illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
 




27Figure 3.10: The discretisation of the fire front with respect to β using 6 uniformly distributed 
values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=16  looking from above. Note that 𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3 > 0 while 𝛽𝛽4,𝛽𝛽5,𝛽𝛽6 < 0. 
The discretisation consists of a total of  𝐴𝐴 uniformly distributed values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1𝑙𝑙 , 
with minimum value  𝛽𝛽1 corresponding to the leftmost edge of the flame 
front (looking from above), and maximum value 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙  corresponding to the 
rightmost edge. 
Consider the vertical rectangle illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
 
28Figure 3.11: Any rectangle specified by a set of angles 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝜈𝜈𝑈𝑈, and 𝜈𝜈𝐿𝐿 will have the 
same view factor relative to the site. Note that 𝜈𝜈𝑈𝑈 > 0 and 𝜈𝜈𝐿𝐿 < 0, while 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 > 0. 
 
In order to calculate the view factor of the Figure 3.11 rectangle using 
Equation (3.12), the angles are set as follows: 
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A single flame front with top edge coordinates denoted ��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈��𝑖𝑖=1
𝑙𝑙  and 
bottom edge coordinates denoted {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿)}𝑖𝑖=1𝑙𝑙  is illustrated in Figure 3.12. 
 
29Figure 3.12: A flame front with top and bottom edge coordinates {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈)}𝑖𝑖=14  and 
{(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿)}𝑖𝑖=14  respectively. 
 
















 for  𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀 . Note that 1 ≤ 𝐴𝐴1
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐴𝐴  for 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀 
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since the obstruction(s) may not span the full horizontal angular extent of the 
fire front when viewed from the site, and any part of an obstruction lying 
beyond the angular extent of the fire front does not impact the view factor 
calculation. This is illustrated in Figure 3.13. 
 
30Figure 3.13: An obstruction may only partially obstruct the fire front and will only obstruct 
the fire front if it lies within the angular region. 
The calculation of the view factor 𝜏𝜏  subject to shielding obstructions 
proceeds as follows: If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓cos (𝑐𝑐) (i.e. the center of the inclined flame is 
directly above or behind the site, so the vertical approximation to the fire 
front is on top of the site) then 
𝜏𝜏 = 1, 
otherwise 
1. Calculate the view factor 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹  of the unobstructed vertical 
approximation to the fire front by setting 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝐴𝐴, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 and 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿  in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the resulting 
angles into Equation (3.12). 
2. In order to accommodate non-rectangular obstructions, the 
obstructed view factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂  is calculated by approximating the 
obstructions using thin rectangles defined within the angular 
increments from 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  to 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1  for 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝐴𝐴 − 1. For each angular 
increment, the obstructed view factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖  is calculated by 
determining the maximum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 and minimum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 
for the obstructions that lie between the flame front and the site. If 




𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 > 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 , then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈  is used to denote the top of the obstructing 
rectangle, as any part of the obstruction extending above the 
flame front does not actually block the view of the flame front. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3.14. 
 
31Figure 3.14. (Left) Obstruction 2 completely blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈  as 
the part of Obstruction 2 that extends above the view line of the top of the fire front does 
not contribute to blocking the fire front. (Right) Obstruction 1 partially blocks the fire front 
from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1𝑈𝑈. 
 
Similarly, if 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 < 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿, then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 is used to denote the bottom of the obstructing 
rectangle. Denoting the angle to the top and bottom of the obstructing 
rectangle on increment 𝛽𝛽 as 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 respectively, it follows that  
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈} 





𝑗𝑗�: 𝛽𝛽 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖� 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗�: 𝛽𝛽 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖� 
𝐹𝐹(𝑒𝑒) = �0, 𝑒𝑒 < 01, 𝑒𝑒 ≥ 0 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = �𝛽𝛽:𝐴𝐴1
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗� 
The obstructing view factor 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖  for each angular increment 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝐴𝐴 − 1 
is calculated by setting 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽 + 1 in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the 
resulting angles into Equation (3.12). 
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4. Calculate the view factor of the partially obstructed flame front 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹 − 𝜏𝜏𝑂𝑂. 
 
In order to consider the worst case view factor with respect to the flame 
angle in this approach, four modifications need to be made to the 
optimisation algorithm illustrated in Figure 3.4: 
1. In the original algorithm the initial value (lowest value) of the flame 
angle considered in is the site slope 𝜃𝜃. This is not a valid angle in the 
case that an obstruction exists between the flame front and the 
site, as it effectively allows the fire front to penetrate the 
obstruction. To avoid this situation it is necessary to set the initial 
flame angle such that the fire front would clear the obstruction. This 
amounts to setting 






𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗 , 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀� 
when  𝑒𝑒 > min�𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖):𝐴𝐴1
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗 , 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝜃𝜃 denotes the site 
slope, and ℎ𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)  and 𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)  denote the maximum height and 𝑒𝑒 
component of obstruction 𝛽𝛽 at angle 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 relative to the site. 
A further complication could arise if the center of the fire front lies in front 
of the obstruction when the base of the fire front lies behind the obstruction. 
The issue in this instance is that the obstruction would not have an impact on 
the view factor. To avoid this situation the minimum flame angle is required 
to satisfy 
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𝑐𝑐0 ≥ max �cos−1 �
2�𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) − 𝜀𝜀�
𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓
� :𝐴𝐴1
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗 , 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀� 
when 𝑒𝑒 > min�𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂
𝑗𝑗 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖):𝐴𝐴1
𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝐴𝐴2
𝑗𝑗 , 𝛽𝛽 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀� . Note that 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓  is the flame 
length, and 𝜀𝜀 is a small positive number (e.g. 10-6). 
1. If the fire front is positioned on top of an obstruction, the flame 
angle 𝑐𝑐0 is set to 90 degrees to effectively consider the fire front as 
being behind the obstruction. In this case, the algorithm is not 
required to proceed further to determine an optimal value of 𝑐𝑐0. 
2. Since the algorithm does not start with the flame angle 𝑐𝑐0 equal 
to the site slope 𝜃𝜃, it is possible that the initial value of 𝑐𝑐0 could turn 
out to be the flame angle that optimises the view factor. The 
standard optimisation algorithm of AS3959 terminates or refines its 
search increment when the view factors 𝜏𝜏0 , 𝜏𝜏1 , and 𝜏𝜏2 , which 
correspond to the flame angles  𝑐𝑐0 < 𝑐𝑐1 < 𝑐𝑐2 satisfy 𝜏𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏𝜏0  and 
𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏2, however, if 𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1 at the first step the algorithm will not 
terminate. Hence the additional termination or refinement criteria, 
𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1 must be added to the algorithm in addition to the existing 
criteria (i.e., (𝜏𝜏1 ≥ 𝜏𝜏0 and 𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏2) or 𝜏𝜏0 > 𝜏𝜏1). 
3. In the case that the obstruction completely obscures the line of 
sight from the building site to the top of the flame front, the 
optimisation algorithm will never terminate as it will not be able to 
identify a non-zero view factor no matter how much the flame 
angle (𝑐𝑐) is increased. In order to avoid this situation, an additional 
condition is added to both loops of the algorithm. Specifically, if 
𝑐𝑐1 > 90𝑅𝑅  during the iteration then the algorithm will terminate 
immediately, and the flame angle will be set to 𝑐𝑐1 = 90𝑅𝑅 . This 
measure is only required to avoid an infinite loop, and will not affect 
the outcome of the calculation. 
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3.7 Fire in isolated vegetation and fuel beds that restrict 
wildfire growth 
In urban environments the failure to consider the effect of vegetation 
geometry on restricting wildfire growth can lead to significant overestimation 
of potential radiant heat impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019).  In turn, this 
may result in: 
1. Firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend 
homes as a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that 
indicates suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable 
house loss and impacts on communities. This may occur as 
firefighting suppression thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour 
parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally (Penney et. al., 
2019). Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation 
geometry that does not support the assumptions of landscape 
wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left 
unguarded due to inappropriate evaluation of suppression 
strategies; 
2. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, 
public open space, road reserves, and residential areas within 
urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for development 
may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire 
impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether. 
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small 
unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a 
landscape scale wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting 
development on adjacent and near-by lots; and  
3. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire 
resistant construction standards of affected dwellings and 
structures that hinders development through either 
misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels 
of wildfire impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive 
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as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and 
construction required. 
 
As detailed by Penney and Richardson (2019), within the urban 
environment in road reserves, urban parklands and similar scenarios, 
correction of the wildfire models can be achieved through the application 
of: 
1. The Vegetation Availability Factor (refer to Section 2); 
2. Calculation of accelerating 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 from a point source (refer to Section 
2);  
3. Consideration of shielding structures when calculating view factor; and 
4. Calculating the final radiant heat flux. 
 
 Methods of calculating radiant heat flux that rely of a defined 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
cannot be applied to fires occurring in isolated vegetation structures, 
including individual trees, bushes or small garden beds (Figure 3.14) or other 
situations where there is an absence of a sustained forward 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅.  AS3959 
provides some provisions for the exclusion of defined ‘low threat vegetation’, 
where these exclusions do not apply or modelling is required for other 
purposes. In such instances the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  will be zero, a vertical flame (flame 
angle of 90°) should be modelled (i.e. 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 = 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) and a reduction in emissivity is 
appropriate compared to landscape scale wildfire environments.  
 




32Figure 3.14: Modelling of isolated trees (left) and shrub/scrub (right). 
 
To calculate radiant heat flux in this situation, flame height (𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) is calculated 






where 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 is the flame height (m) and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 is the maximum heat release rate 
(kW). The maximum heat release rate is given by 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝜈𝜈𝑅𝑅 (3.15) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶  is the heat of combustion and 𝑀𝑀𝜈𝜈𝑅𝑅 is the Mass Loss Rate. Finally, 








where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖   is the total fuel load consumed in the isolated vegetation structure 
(kg), calculated using the Vegetation Availability Factor in the absence of 
other available datasets, and 𝐴𝐴  is time (s), assumed to be 37 seconds as 
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reported by Wotton et. al. (2012) reflective of flaming residence times and 
greater than the duration of tall flames, being a maximum 22 seconds. 
 
Once 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 is known, the view factor, flame emissive power and final radiant 
heat flux can be calculated as previously described. 
 
3.8 Case Studies 
A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the application and 
implications of the approaches described previously to consider radiant heat 
flux from a fire front while accounting for fuel loading, non-combustible 
obstruction(s), or accelerating fire fronts.  These case studies, as well as the 
alternative view factor calculations were originally published in Penney and 
Stevenson (2019). 
 
The first case study considers a semi-rural environment in which a row of 
single and two story brick houses backs onto forest type bush land with a fuel 
bed of unrestricted geometry and Vf=1. Suppose that the radiant heat flux of 
a fire in the bush land behind the houses is to be estimated at a site or house 
on the opposite side of the street. The geometry of the specific case 
considered here is provided in Figure 3.15. 
 




33Figure 3.15. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 1 scenario. The measurements within the 
house boxes denote the height of each house. 
The parameter values used in the calculation as described in AS3959 are 
summarised in Table 3.4.  
 
14Table 3.4. Parameter values used in the Case Studies. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Effective slope 0o Flame temperature (Tf) 1090 K 
Site slope (θ) 0o Ambient temperature (Ta) 308 K 
Vegetation class Forest Relative humidity (RH) 25% 
Fire Danger Index (FDI) 80 Flame width (Wf) 100 m 
Surface fuel load (w) 25 t/ha Flame emissivity (ε) 0.95 
Overall fuel load (W) 35 t/ha Stefan Boltzman constant (σ) 5.67 × 10−11 kW/m2/K4 
Heat of Combustion (H) 18600 kJ/kg   
 
The radiant heat flux was calculated for a range of distances from the site 
to the vegetation fuel bed ranging from 10 m to 100m. For the sake of 
comparison, the radiant heat flux at the site was estimated using four 
calculation methods: 
1. The method outlined in AS3959, ignoring the obstructions presented 
by the houses located between the site and vegetation fuel bed. 
2. The method outlined in AS3959 with the receiver height h  set to 3 
m (instead of the mid-level of the flame front). 
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3. The method outlined in this paper, where each of the four houses 
is considered to reduce the view factor of the flame front. 
4. A simplified method in which the four obstructions are considered 
as a single rectangular obstruction with height 5 m (i.e., the height 
of the tallest house), and width equal to the combined width of the 
four houses. The combined width is the distance from the 
westernmost edge of the westernmost structure to the easternmost 
edge of the easternmost structure. 
Figure 3.16 provides a plot of the radiant heat flux at the site as a function of 
the distance to the vegetation fuel bed using each of the methods 1–4 
outlined above. 
 
34Figure 3.16. The radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance to the vegetation 
fuel bed. 
As expected, the methods that did not consider the shielding effect of the 
houses (magenta and red lines) provided higher estimates for the radiant 
heat flux compared to the methods that did consider the shielding effect 
(blue and green). For small distances to the vegetation fuel bed, the 
approaches that did not consider shielding significantly over-estimated the 
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radiant heat flux compared to the method presented in this paper (blue line). 
As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increases, the difference between 
the AS3959 approach and shielding approach presented here becomes 
small. This is most likely because the 10m gap between house 2 and 3 
becomes the most significant zone for heat flux for a more distant fire front, 
so the impact of the obstructions becomes less significant. 
Method 4 (green line) provided the lowest estimates of radiant heat flux as 
expected. As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increased, the radiant 
heat flux estimated using this approach tended to zero far more rapidly than 
the other methods. This was most likely due to the significant gap between 
house 2 and house 3, which was not blocked in methods 1–3, but was 
blocked when the four houses were approximated as a single rectangular 
obstruction. This highlights the importance of considering multiple 
obstructions individually to ensure that the impact of radiation through 
significant gaps is not diminished. 
 
The second case study considers an accelerating fire front burning within 
a 20m wide treed forest style bushland zone within the road reserve between 
the edge of a freeway or highway and a 3m brick wall separating the 
freeway from housing. The geometry of the vegetation fuel bed prevents the 
fire attaining its maximum potential rate of spread. There is a row of houses 
located 10m on the other side of the brick wall, one of which will be 
considered the site at which the radiant heat flux from the fire will be 
considered. The geometry of the specific case considered here is provided 
in Figure 3.17. 
The parameters used in the calculation are summarised in Table 3.3. In 
addition, the vegetation factor Vf = 0.2 scales back the surface and overall 
fuel loads as defined in Section 2. The fire is assumed to ignite from a point 
source at the edge of the Freeway, 30 m from the site/receiver. The fire is 
assumed to spread perpendicular to the Freeway at an accelerating rate 
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aRoS , which is related to the distance from the ignition point D. The rate 
parameter )10ln(2=β h-1, as suggested by McAlpine (1988), is utilised. Figure 
3.18 provides a plot of the accelerating rate of spread aRoS  and the 
equilibrium rate of spread RoS  against the distance from the ignition point D. 
 
 
35Figure 3.17. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 2 scenario. 
 
36Figure 3.18. The accelerating rate of spread RoSa  and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS  
against the distance from the ignition point D. 
 
From Figure 3.18 it is apparent that over 20 m (i.e., the distance from the 
ignition point to the obstructing wall) the rate of spread reaches 
approximately half of its equilibrium value. The rate of spread perpendicular 
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to the forward direction is assumed to be half the forward rate of spread, so 




The impact of incorporating the acceleration of a fire front and an 
obstruction into the heat flux model has been highlighted by comparing the 
above scenario with an additional seven modelling variants. The eight 
scenarios are summarised as follows: 
1. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of 
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor 
of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored (the model of 
AS3959). 
2. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of 
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor 
of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored. 
3. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from 
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction 
(wall) is ignored. 
4. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from 
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the 
obstruction (wall) is ignored. 
5. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of 
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation 
factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included. 
6. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of 
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation 
factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is included. 
7. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from 
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction 
(wall) is included. 
8. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from 
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the 
obstruction (wall) is included (i.e., the Case Study 2 scenario). 
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The radiant heat flux for the above scenarios are plotted against the distance 
from the site in Figures 3.19 and 3.20. 
 
37Figure 3.19. The radiant heat flux for models ignoring the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow 
line represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
 
38Figure 3.20. The radiant heat flux for models including the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow 
line represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
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As expected, the heat fluxes when the wall is ignored are all greater than 
the corresponding fluxes when the wall is incorporated into the model to 
provide shielding. Furthermore, the fluxes with Vf = 1 exceeded those with Vf 
= 0.2. All of the models that include the modelling of acceleration start from 
a flux of zero, which increases as the rate of spread, length, and width 
increase (in addition to the increase from the larger view factor as the front 
closes on the site). Significantly, in Figure 3.20 the yellow line corresponding 
to the Case Study 2 scenario is not visible as the heat flux at the site remains 
zero. This is because the fuel load and rate of spread are not sufficient to 
create a front with sufficient height to be visible above the 3m obstruction 
after 20m of spreading, with the flame height reaching only 2.4 m. 
The progression of the flame front over the bush region between the 
freeway and obstructing wall is illustrated in Figure 3.21 for scenarios 5 to 8. 
 
39Figure 3.21. The progression of the fire front for modelling scenarios 5 through to 8. The 
yellow line represents the Case Study 2 scenario. 
 
The model of AS3959, which assumes the wildfire is established and has 
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread, estimates the time taken for the 
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ignited fire to travel from the freeway to the wall (20 m) is 30 seconds, while 
the model incorporating the acceleration of the spreading front and the 
reduced vegetation density estimates the time at 9 minutes, consistent with 
the findings of McAlpine (1988) and Kucuk, Bilgili and Baysal (2007). 
 
3.9 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s  
The case studies presented indicate potential significant over-estimation 
of radiant heat flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving 
non-combustible obstructions and point-source ignition fires for a minimum of 
20m separation from the fire front. This is significant as it is in this distance that 
wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its greatest impact (Cohen & 
Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in urban 
environments. The results demonstrate the importance of appropriately 
considering fuel geometry, wildfire behaviour, and the effect of shielding 
structures when calculating radiant heat impacts on buildings and 
emergency responders within urban environments where vegetation fuel 
bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching landscape proportions.  
Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result 
in firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as 
a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression 
efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on 
communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression thresholds are related 
to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally. 
Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that 
does not support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise 
defendable areas may be left unguarded due inappropriate evaluation of 
suppression strategies. 
When considering the suitability of fire suppression strategies, there are 
factors other than radiant heat flux that also require consideration. These are 
addressed in Sections 4-7. 




3.10 Implications for urban planners  
Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public 
open space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn, 
land that is actually suitable for development may be identified as being 
subject to overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits 
development altogether. Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a 
small unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a 
landscape scale wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting development on 
adjacent and near-by lots. 
Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant 
construction standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders 
development through either misidentification of land as being subject to 
unacceptable levels of wildfire impact, or through making development 
cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and 
construction required. 
In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation 
availability factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also 
retain the assumption of a flame emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a 
landscape scale wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater 
than 2 m, and even potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009). 
In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be 
suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note that whilst the 
vegetation factor and modified view factor model are applicable to all fuel 
types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, grassland, etc.), the point source 
acceleration model presented in this Section is suitable for treed forest and 
woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures may be 
significantly faster. 
The models presented in this Section are not intended to address the 
potential radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved 
in fire. In part, this is inherently considered within AS3959 through the 
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requirement that associated structures on the same parcel of land and within 
6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced construction standards, must also be 
constructed to that same standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the 
land development should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire 
resistance, in theory significantly reducing the potential for mass 
conflagration spreading between multiple houses. Due to the differences in 
wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models as well as the 
difference in building and structure performance once impacted by wildfire, 
it is suggested that a high level of technical expertise is required to complete 
this process. 
Section 4 – Wildfire suppression 
4.1. Introduction  
Where wildfires occur yet pose no threat to life, critical infrastructure, 
private assets or cultural and environmental areas of significance it is possible 
to simply allow the fire to self-extinguish once it runs out of available fuel or 
rainfall occurs.  Unfortunately this is rarely possible in populated areas 
common throughout developed nations and significant intervention is 
required by fire and emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise 
their impacts.  This section discusses wildfire suppression strategies and 
presents evidence and analysis of available options to assist Incident 
Controllers to make critical incident decisions during chaotic and large 
wildfire incidents.   
4.2. Strategies  
Whilst offensive strategies involve actively combatting the fire, defensive 
strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to be safely 
attacked.  Defensive strategies utilise tactics that do not involve active fire 
suppression including building containment lines and focusing on evacuation 
of people or livestock (DFES, 2012).  When attempting to suppress severe 
wildfire, a combination of strategies may be necessary depending on the fire 
behaviour, availability of resources, accessibility and fuel structure.  When 
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incorrect strategies are applied firefighting crews may find themselves 
overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover.  In such instances, unless the 
wildfire behaviour is particularly mild, the results can be fatal. 
 
4.3. Offensive tactics 
Direct firefighting attack involves firefighters (including personnel, 
firefighting appliances, machines and aircraft) directly attacking the wildfire 
using the tactics of either head attack or flank attack.  A direct head attack 
(see figures 4.1-4.3) involves firefighting efforts directly against the head fire 
before moving down either flank once the head fire is suppressed; a direct 
tail attack involves attacking the bushfire from the rear and working along 
the flanks towards the head fire; and a direct flank attack involves attacking 
the side of the fire and working around the head and tail.  The direct tail 
attack is the “preferred method of suppression” (DFES, 2012, p11) as it 
reduces the potential for crews to be caught in a burnover due to a wind 
change that turns the flank into the greater head fire.  Direct head attacks 
expose firefighters to the most severe wildfire behaviour, which reduces 
towards the tail.  All tactics require firefighters to be able to access the fire 
edge in order to extinguish the fire.  In dense forest fuels or in difficult terrain, 
this may be problematic and result in firefighters attempting to extinguish 
bushfire wherever they can in a patchwork manner.  Where this occurs 
suppression efforts are likely to be less than optimal and result in unrestrained 
wildfire propagation as well as placing firefighters in unnecessary danger.  
Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack reported in DFES (2012) 
are summarised in Table 4.1. 
15Table 4.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Minimises the area burnt. Only possible on low intensity fires 
with flame heights <1.5m to 2m. 
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Reduces the likelihood of fire gaining 
momentum with changes in weather, 
fuel or topography factors. 
Crews are more exposed to heat-
related illnesses such as heat stroke, 
heat exhaustion, heat cramps and 
smoke inhalation. 
Uses any dead edge of the fire to get 
the fire contained quickly. 
If fire behaviour changes or there is a 
weakness in the control line, the fire 
can quickly escape. 
May allow safe night work. It may produce an irregular, winding 






         (b)           (c) 
40Figure 4.1: Direct head attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
 




(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
41Figure 4.2: Direct tail attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
 




(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
42Figure 4.3: Direct flank attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c) 
Parallel attacks involve construction of control lines by personnel using 
hand tools or machines as close as possible to the flanks of the bushfire (Figure 
4.4).  The intent of the parallel attack is to establish fuel-free containment 
boundaries that the fire cannot cross.  Retardant drops by firefighting 
aircraft may be used to reduce wildfire behaviour approaching containment 
line to increase the potential for containment lines to hold.  When 
considering the establishment of parallel control lines or breaks, both the 
production rates of firefighters with hand tools and machinery, as well as the 
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required break width need to be considered as the production of control 
lines must exceed the bushfire’s rate of spread in order for the fire to be 
contained.  Whilst supporting literature regarding these factors is limited, fire 
line potential rates of construction are detailed in Tables 4.3-4.5, (McCarthy, 
Tolhurst and Wouters ,2003 cited in FESA, 2011).  Required fire break widths in 
low intensity grassfire events where spotting is a possibility are detailed in 
Table 4.6 (Cheney and Sullivan, 1997 cited in FESA, 2011).  In more extreme 
forest wildfires where flame lengths may reach 40-50m and spotting of several 
hundred meters is possible (Gould et al, 2007) control lines will likely be 
inneffective against an established headfire.  Advantages and 
disadvantages of a parallel attack reported in DFES (2012) are summarised in 
Table 4.2. 
 
16Table 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Control line may be shorter and 
straighter than in a direct attack. 
There is an increased chance of fire 
escaping. 
Crews may be less exposed to heat and 
smoke. 
Total fire area will be greater. 
 
17Table 17.3: Rates of fireline construction using handtools (adapted from FESA, 2011) 
Elevated Fuel Construction rate (meters 
per person per hour) 
Construction rate when 
0.5m flames within 5m of 
crew 
 
Low 24 16 
High 19 13 






Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
90 
 
18Table 4.4: Rates of fireline construction by machines (adapted from FESA, 2011) 
Machine Flat production 
rate (m/hr) 







700 420 No debris 
630 380 Some debris – can handle 
470 200 Some debris – can 
manage 
300 60 Substantial – D6 required 




D6-D9 900 730 Little debris 
700 550 Some debris – D4 can 
manage 
450 375 Significant debris – D6+ 
required 
350 270 Very significant debris – 
D6+ has difficulty 
 
19Table 4.5: Fireline construction rates (adapted from McCarthy, Tolhurst & Wouters, 2003) 
Method / Appliance Mean production 






13.7 per person A total of 34 incidents were reviewed and 
average firefighter experience was high 
(reported as a mean of 0.8 out of 1).  
Minimum crew of 5, maximum of 60 
firefighters. 
D4 505 A total of 34 D4 performances were 
reviewed.   
D6 640 A total of 16 D6 performances were 
reviewed. 
D7 570 A total of 9 D7 performances were 
reviewed. 
D9 560 A total of 7 D9 performances were 
reviewed. 
Notes regarding the study: 
1. Maximum flame height for the 103 incidents reviewed for the study was 5m; 
and 
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20Table 4.6: Required firebreak width for spotting vegetation (adapted from FESA, 2011) 
Fire line intensity 
(kW/m) 
Firebreak width Anticipated success 




43Figure 4.4: Parallel attack  
Identified as one of the most difficult strategies to implement properly in 
the face of wildfire impact at the urban interface, backburning is the only 
potentially successful tactic available for combatting large, fast moving or 
intense and inaccessible fires (DFES, 2012).  As illustrated in Figure 4.5, it 
involves the deliberate burning out of vegetation fuel between established 
control lines and the approaching fire front and must be undertaken with 
extreme care to avoid the creation of additional uncontrollable fire fronts.  
Advantages and disadvantages of backburning reported in DFES (2012) are 
shown in Table 4.7, however it is again noted no supporting research or 
justification was provided to substantiate the statements.  Due to the nature 
of backburning, DFES (2014) identifies several conditions that prohibit 
backburns being utilised, listed as: 
1. The fire is running under extreme conditions; 
2. Long distance spotting is occurring; 
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3. The location of the fire edge is not known; 
4. There are no adequate or existing control lines; 
5. There are insufficient resources to construct and hold the backburn; 
6. There is not enough time to allow penetration of the backburn to a  
safe depth; and 
7. The forecast weather conditions will lead to extreme fire behaviour 
before the backburn can be secured. 
 
21Table 4.7: Advantages and disadvantages of backburning 
Advantages Disadvantages 
May stop the progress of a rapidly 
moving bushfire. 
Increased total fire area. 
May be the most practicable method 
of bushfire suppression for difficult 
terrain. 
If the backburn escapes control, the 
progress of the main fire is 
accelerated. 
It can endanger the lives of firefighters 
It may produce intense fire behaviour 
at the junction between the backburn 
and the main fire front. 
It requires considerable time to 
effectively establish. 
It requires substantial resources to light 
and patrol. 
 
(a)           (b) 
44Figure 4.5: Backburning – point source ignition (a) and line ignition (b) 
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Although the use of fire through hazard reduction burns (HRB’s) and 
backburning are utilised internationally for conservation, to reduce 
uncontrolled wildfire behaviour and to enhance the potential for successful 
suppression (Boer et al., 2009; Grant & Wouters, 1993; Marsden-Smedley, 2011; 
Stratton, 2004; VBRC, 2010; Wimberly et al., 2009; Ingalsbee, 2015), the 
effectiveness of these strategies in specifically reducing wildfire impact on 
communities remains uncertain (Fernandes & Herminio, 2003; Florec, 2016; 
McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001; Oliveras & Bell, 2008; Penman et al., 2011). Even 
studies which report potential economic benefits of prescribed burn 
programs from a suppression perspective (Kuzenko, 2000; Florec, 2016; Silva 
& Gozalez-Caban, 2010), do not provide comparison of the total economic 
or life loss from wildfires where HRB’s were, or were not present.  Whilst HRB’s 
remain an essential part of Australian wildfire related risk mitigation (AFAC, 
2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001), and backburning remains an important 
aspect of wildfire suppression (DFES, 2014; Ingalsbee, 2015; Penney et al., 
2019a) the effectiveness of these programs in relation to the specific 
objective of protecting people and buildings from the effects of wildfire is 
unknown. 
Illustrated in equation 4.1, the concept of effectiveness is described as a 
product of efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002) and facilitates a numerical 
measure of effectiveness allowing firefighting measures to be quantitatively 
compared. Efficiency of HRB’s (EffHRB) can then be calculated to provide a 
numerical measure against which to evaluate HRB’s against the set 
objectives. 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 = 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦 × 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦    (4.1) 
As Thomas (2002) explains efficacy is the degree to which a 
system/process achieves an objective given it operates / is executed. The 
efficacy the process will be different depending on the objective.  For 
example, if HRB’s are intended to eliminate house damage at the rural urban 
interface (RUI) from wildfire impacts its efficacy is: 
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• One (1) if there were no houses damaged whenever prescribed 
burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would have 
otherwise impacted the houses; 
• Between zero (0) and one (1) if the rate of houses damaged 
whenever prescribed burns were present and a wildfire occurred 
that would have otherwise impacted the houses was reduced 
compared to otherwise identical situations where prescribed burns 
were not present; 
• Zero (0) if the rate of damaged houses remained the same whether 
prescribed burns were present or not; and 
• Negative if the rate of damaged houses increased when 
prescribed burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would 
have otherwise impacted the houses. 
 
HRB’s work to reduce the severity of wildfire behaviour by reducing the 
understory (and potentially bark) fuels available for consumption during a 
subsequent wildfire event.  Depending on the rate of vegetation regrowth, 
HRB’s may reduce subsequent wildfire behaviour in the same area for up to 
ten years post burn completion (McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001; Penman et al., 
2011; VBRC, 2010).  However, a HRB may potentially stop a wildfire head fire 
for only the first two years (VBRC, 2010) and even then only under certain 
conditions.  Firstly, the HRB must be suitably placed in order for the 
uncontrolled wildfire to impact it (in other words they are reliable).  
Secondly, as reported by McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001), as fire weather 
conditions worsen the probability of a HRB having any impact on an 
established wildfire significantly decreases.  As illustrated in Figure 4.6 
(McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001, Figure 6), even with a moderate overall fuel 
hazard score, once the Fire Danger Index reaches 50 the efficacy of the HRB 
slowing the wildfire head fire drops to below 0.6.  At increased overall hazard 
scores and higher Fire Danger Indices, the efficacy of a previous HRB slowing 
the wildfire head fire rapidly drops below 0.2.  During a study of a different 
area by the same authors involving 2425 wildfires on public land, the overall 
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efficacy of HRB’s assisting suppression efforts was reported to be even lower 
at 0.11. In some instances HRB’s have even been reported to have negative 
efficacy (McCormick, 2002) where 30% of forest HRB’s studied in the Blue 
Mountains in NSW had a negative effect.  This negative effect was reported 
to occur due to the curing of scrub fuels greater than 0.5m above the 
ground, even if understorey fuels below that height were consumed.  
The efficacy of a HRB in reducing spotting and new fire behaviour is 
dependent on its ability to remove bark, particularly of stringy bark fuels 
which contribute significantly to spotting behaviour and the ignition of new 
fires (Grant & Wouters, 1993). Where spotting occurs there is the potential for 
those spot fires to grow into uncontrolled wildfires having attaining a quasi-
steady rate of spread in their own right. Depending largely on vertical fuel 
understory fuel structure and wind penetration (McRae, 1999), in forest fuels 
this may take in excess of 30 minutes (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Kucuk, Bilgili 
& Baysal, 2007; McAlpine, 1988; Penney & Stevenson, 2019) and may not 
occur until a head fire width of approximately 150m is reached (Cheney & 
Gould, 1997). The potential result of this may be that whilst the size of the final 
wildfire that impacts urban areas may be less than that of the original wildfire, 
this does not necessarily mean the wildfire impacts on life or property may 
actually be reduced.  Recent work into the effect of fuel bed geometry on 
wildfire growth (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), firefighter tenability during 
wildfire suppression (Penney at al, 2019a) and critical flow rates for wildfire 
extinguishment (Penney et al., 2019b) suggests that there will be little if any 
difference in the ability for firefighters to suppress the ‘new’ headfire/s without 
substantial aerial suppression once they attain a quasi-state of spread and 
an active head fire depth of more than 2m.  In such instances the efficacy 
of the HRB’s would be close to zero if the objective was defined as reducing 
wildfire behaviour that would facilitate active suppression of the head fire by 
firefighter direct attack using machinery. 
In this same context, reliability is the probability that prescribed burns are 
in the correct place when required, in other words they are intentionally 
positioned so that they will be impacted by wildfire.  For example, if the area 
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affected by prescribed burns are always impacted by wildfires the reliability 
is one (1).  If the area affected by prescribed burns are impacted by wildfires 
only half the time then the reliability is 0.5. In a study of 114 wildfires between 
1990 to 1998, McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001) reported only 69 of all wildfires 
analysed encountered a HRB, equivalent to a reliability of 0.61.  This figure 
increased 0.92 to when only fires within “Zone 1” were assessed.  Zone 1 was 
identified as the most proximal to development where the objective was to 
protect human life, property and assets and therefore subject to significantly 
reduced overall fuel hazard scores compared to outer lying zones.  The 
same authors reported this figure dropped to less than 0.25 in Zone 1 areas 
during a study of a different area involving 2425 wildfires on public land.  This 
variance is not unexpected, with as the reliability of HRB’s is highly dependent 
on the area being examined. 
 
45Figure 4.6. Probability of previous prescribed burn slowing the headfire of a subsequent 
wildfire as a function of Overall Fuel Hazard and Fire Danger Index. (Probability of "1.0" means 
"certain", probability of "0" means "not possible".)  Reproduced with permission of the 
Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning Victoria 




Fire services throughout Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New 
Zealand consider predicted and reported wildfire behaviour including head 
fire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and flame length (LF) when determining the 
suitability of suppression strategies and tactics.  Penney et al. (2019a) 
reported that out of the literature reviewed from the various jurisdictions, only 
Western Australia utilised RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in 
forest or woodland fuel structures.  The reported thresholds were readily 
suppressed (<0.06kph); hand tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine 
attack possible (<0.4kph); direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed 
(>0.4kph); and indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).  
Even within fire services some variance exists between strategy thresholds 
as detailed in Tables 4.8 (DFES, 2014) and 4.9 (Smith, 2013) which show values 
for forest fuels.  DFES (2014, p79) also identifies that for tall eucalypt forest, 
“aerial suppression is of limited effect with fire intensities over 2000kW/m”. 
International literature revealed marked variance between jurisdictional 
thresholds.  Thresholds for the United States of America are identified in 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 (Deeming et al., 1978 cited in Hirsch and Martell, 1996; 
Andrews and Rothemel, 1982 and Rothemel, 1983, also cited in Hirsch & 
Martell, 1996).  Canadian thresholds, Alexander and DeGroot (1988) cited in 
Hirsch and Martell (1996) are shown illustrated in Table 4.12. European 
thresholds (EuroFire, 2012) are identified in Table 4.13 whilst thresholds 
adopted by New Zealand (Alexander, 2000) are detailed in Table 4.14.   
 
22Table 4.8: Fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia 
Fire Danger Flame Height (m) Intensity (kW/m) 
 
Significance 
Low 0-0.5 0-50 Fires generally self-extinguish 
Moderate 0.5-1.5 50-500 Hand tool line should hold the fire.  
Direct attack possible. 
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High 1.5-3.0 500-2000 Fire too intense for direct attack.  
Parallel attack recommended. 
Very high 3.0-10.0 2000-4000 Crown fire at upper intensities.  
Indirect attack recommended. 
Extreme >10 >4000 Crowning, spotting and major runs 
likely. Control efforts probably 
ineffective.  Defensive strategy 
recommended. 
 
23Table 4.9: Head fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia 
Rate of Spread 
(m/hr) 
Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<60 <800 Readily suppressed. 
<140 <800 Hand tool attack possible. 
<400 <2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
>400 >2000 Direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed. 
>800 >4000 or >5000* Indirect attack likely to fail. 
*both values are cited in the same table and category  
 
24Table 4.10: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Deeming et al. 1978) 
Flame Length 
(m) 
Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
0.9 <173 Behaviour associated with most prescribed burns. 
1.2 346 Limit of control for manual attack methods. 
2.4 1730 The prospects for control by any means are poor 
above this limit. 
2.8 2422 The “heat load” on people within 30 feet of the fire is 
dangerous 
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Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<1.2 <346 Manual attack on the head fire possible. 
1.2-1.4 346-1730 Machine attack on the head fire possible. 
2.4-3.4 1730-3460 Control efforts at the head fire will probably be 
ineffective. 
>3.4 >3460 Crowing, spotting and major fire runs are probable.  
Control efforts at the head fire are ineffective. 
 
26Table 4.12: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Canada  
Flame Length 
(m) 
Intensity (kW/m) Significance 
<0.2 <10 Readily suppressed. 
0.2-1.4 10-500 Direct manual attack possible. 
1.4-2.6 500-2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
2.6-3.5 2000-4000 Control efforts at head fire may fail. 
>3.5 >4000 Intermittent crown fire to active crown fire 
development (at >10000kW/m).  Suppression efforts 
must be restricted to fire flanks.  Violent fire 
behaviour at intensities >30000kW and suppression 
activities should not be attempted until burning 
conditions ameliorate.   
 




<0.5 Fires generally self extinguish. 
0.5-1.5 Direct hand tool attack possible. 
1.5-2.5 Direct machine attack possible.  Flank / parallel attack recommended. 
2.5-3.5 Too intense for direct attack. 
3.5-8 Indirect attack possible. 
>8 Extreme fire behaviour.  Defensive strategies recommended. 
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<500 Direct hand tool attack possible. 
500-2000 Direct machine attack possible. 
2000-4000 Helitanks and airtankers using chemical fire retardants. 
>4000 Very difficult if not impossible to control. 
 
Applying the Noble et al (1980) forest model, as illustrated in Figure 4.7, 
Penney et al (2019a) reported the operational RoS thresholds identified by 
Smith (2011) are exceeded in all but the sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads 
and mildest fire weather conditions associated with an FDI less than 20.  
Hand tool attack is not considered possible once available understory fuel 
loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of FDI, whilst the direct machine attack 
threshold is also rapidly exceeded once the FDI exceeds 20 for understory 
fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.  Indirect attack thresholds are exceeded 
once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory fuel loads of 15 t/ha.  At an 
understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard fuel load in AS3959 (2019), 
direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and the indirect attack 
threshold is exceeded once the FDI exceeds approximately 23.    
 




46Figure 4.7. Tactic suitability according to RoS  
When considering fire line intensity (I) thresholds, Penney et al. (2019a) 
reported whilst there is general agreement across international jurisdictions 
regarding direct attack tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel 
structures, discrepancy occurs between direct machine attack thresholds as 
well as when the head fire is considered uncontrollable.  Western Australian, 
New Zealand and Canadian thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying 
direct machine attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and indirect 
attack suitable to 3000-4000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which 
considers the headfire control limit to be 1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions 
present within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm-1 and the head 
fire to be undefendable at 3460 kWm-1.  Only Canada identified a limit for 
suppression efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher 


























Readily suppressed limit Direct machine attack limit
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Illustrated in Figure 4.8, Penney et al. (2019a) reported that once understory 
fuel loads exceed 20 t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable 
across all jurisdictions regardless of the FDI.  Utilising American thresholds, I is 
recognised as resulting in dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire 
at all FDIs once a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is exceeded.  The lower 
Canadian intensity threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire suppression 
activities can be exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once 
surface fuel loads reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as 
30 when surface fuels exceed 20 t/ha.  The higher Canadian I threshold of 

































Direct Personnel Attack (WA, NZ & Canada) Parallel Attack (WA)
Direct Machine (WA, NZ & Canada) Indirect Attack (WA, NZ & Canada)
Manual Attack (US) Direct Attack / Control Limit (US)
Dangerous within 30ft (US) Suppression Activities Limit 1 (Canada)
Suppression Activities Limit 2 (Canada)
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
104 
 
Penney et al. (2019) reported Western Australia adopted the most 
aggressive LF tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures.  Whilst 
there is again general agreement at lower flame length, there is increased 
variance as LF increases.  Western Australia’s Parallel Attack LF threshold of 3 
m is greater than both the 2.5m European limit for Parallel Attack and the 
2.8m LF the United States recognises as creating dangerous conditions within 
30ft of the head fire, whilst the Western Australian indirect attack limit of 10 m 
is almost three times greater than the head fire undefendable threshold of 
3.4m set by the United States.   
As detailed in Figure 4.9 (Penney et al, 2019a), when LF thresholds are used, 
offensive suppression strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for 
all landscape scale wildfires burning in understory fuel loads exceeding 
15t/ha regardless of fire weather conditions.  Further, fire behaviour is 
recognised as dangerous within 30ft of the head fire in all understory fuel 
loads once an FDI of 30 is attained.  There is strong agreement between 
direct personnel attack thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel 
attack / manual attack on the head fire identified as  inappropriate due to 
LF across all scenarios regardless of understory fuel loads and at all FDIs.  Only 
two jurisdictions suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire is suitable, 
and only in the mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads 
of 5 t/ha and at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).    
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Penney et al (2019a) reported little agreement between the results of the 
Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model (DEFFM) and Noble model analysis.  In 
comparison to Noble, DEFFM analysis under predicted RoS, I and LF across all 
geographic regions once fuels reached three to four years in age and a FDI 
of 30 to 40 was attained.   Applying DEFFM alone, direct machine attack 
RoS thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels 
reached four to five years of age, direct machine attack I thresholds were 
reached at five to nine years of age whilst direct machine attack LF thresholds 
were reached across all geographical jurisdictions at fuel ages between 
three to nine years.    
Comparative Nobel and DEFFM modelling across all fire weather 
conditions and utilising typical forest fuel loads in Western Australia (a sample 
of these results is illustrated for RoS in Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 4.10; I in Jarrah 
South - Figure 4.11; and LF in Jarrah East - Figure 4.12) revealed DEFFM analysis 
typically over estimated wildfire behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50, above 
this range DEFFM analysis typically significantly underestimated wildfire 
behaviour across all fuel ages and jurisdictions. Fire line intensity suppression 
thresholds were typically exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages 
reached 3 to 4 years and an FDI of 30 was reached, with the United States 
‘dangerous within 30ft’ threshold rapidly exceeded under the same 
conditions. LF suppression thresholds were typically exceeded with most 
jurisdictions considering the head fire to be undefendable due to fire 
behaviour once fuels reached 3 to 5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained.  
Only Western Australia and Europe considered head fires to be defendable 
above these limits, albeit using indirect suppression tactics. 
 




49Figure 4.10. Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and 
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50Figure 4.11. Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and 
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51Figure 4.12. Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various 
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Comparing the calculated fire behaviour outputs (RoS, IFL and LF) with the 
associated base inputs of FDI, w and fuel age and comparing the results to 
international wildfire suppression thresholds a single strategic guidance table 
can be produced (Penney et al., 2019).  As shown in Table 4.15, the result is 
that safe offensive strategies on the head fire are identified as appropriate in 
only the mildest of conditions or where fuel structure does not facilitate 
significant head fire propagation (Penney & Stevenson, 2019).  It is important 
to note this guidance is intended for established siege wildfires of significant 
proportion such as those reviewed by Keelty (2011, 2012), Ferguson (2016) 
and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010).  As discussed in 
Sections 2 and 3, smaller wildfires such as those experienced within closed 
urban environments do not achieve the same Heat Release Rates or 
produce the same behaviour outputs as established wildfires which may 
subsequently allow more aggressive offensive suppression strategies and 
tactics.  In these instances, as opposed to utilising Table 4.15, it is necessary 
to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor as appropriate when predicting 
potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining whether suppression 
and tenability thresholds are exceeded. 
 
29Table 4.15: Wildfire head fire suppression guide 
Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression  Legend 
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4.4. Defensive tactics 
Defensive tactics are utilised when fire behaviour is too intense to be safely 
or effectively attacked.  As opposed to offensive tactics, defensive tactics 
do not attempt to suppress the bushfire itself, but rather limit the 
consequences of its impacts through evacuation, community information 
and the protection in place of vulnerable communities and critical 
infrastructure.   
The protect-in-place / shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface 
(RUI) firefighting tactic is typically utilised where communities and 
infrastructure are located within or immediately adjacent to vegetation that 
will support landscape scale bushfire behaviour, (DFES, 2013).  It can be a 
high risk approach as not all homes are defensible (Cova, 2005) or 
constructed to withstand wildfire impacts.  Illustrated in Figure 4.13, RUI 
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defense essentially requires firefighting crews to position themselves between 
an identified asset and the approaching bushfire front (DFES, 2013).  As 
detailed in Penney, et al. (2019a) however, it should be noted that this type 
of suppression tactic may expose firefighters to untenable conditions well in 
advance of the wildfire front itself and may be ineffective due to insufficient 
water flow rates.  These factors are explored further in Sections 5 and 6.  As 
an alternative RUI defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where buildings 
are constructed in accordance with AS3959 (SAI Global, 2018), protection of 
houses and the sheltering population may be achieved by firefighters 
sheltering inside the buildings until after the passage of the head fire and they 
can safely extingish spot fires and reminant flames.  Where evacuations of 
large vulnerable communities are not possible, as may be the case for 
hospitals, schools, aged care facilities and trapped communities etc, the 
shelter-in-place defense remains a necessary approach.  In such instances 
sheltering in the safest possibly buildings distal from the fire front should be 
considered.  Preemptive retardent line building from fixed wing and rotary 
firefighting aircraft, coupled with enhanced direct aerial suppression of the 
section of the head fire impacting the protected structures should also be 
undertaken wherever possible. 
 




52Figure 4.13: RUI defense 
The Rural Urban Interface Model or RUIM (Penney et al., 2020 – under 
consideration) can be used when considering whether there is sufficient time 
to set up RUI defense prior to the impact of the head fire. Based on Australian 
and international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics, the RUIM 
represents the expansion of the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (AFAC, 2004) 
to the specific context of firefighting defense at the RUI. When completed, 
the RUIM assists the Incident Management Team determine whether there is 
sufficient time for taskforce’s assigned to protect life, property and critical 
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infrastructure at the RUI, subsequently known as RUI taskforce’s, to safely 
mobilise, prepare for, and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and 
the untenable conditions which can occur well in advance of the headfire 
front. deterministic analysis of Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) 
versus Required Safe RUI Preparation Time (RSRPT) can be applied: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 (4.2) 
ASRPT is calculated by: 
 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑅𝑅𝜈𝜈𝐹𝐹
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑
 (4.3) 
Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation 
between the headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate 
of spread is calculated using appropriate equations for the vegetation type 
and fuel structure involved, such as those described in (Gould et al, 2007, SAI 
Global 2018, Cruz et al., 2015). 
Illustrated in figure 4.14, RSRPT is calculated by: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (4.4) 
Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time 
(to a base, staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and 
assessment of the immediate area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken 
for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior to the arrival of untenable 
conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are included 
at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed 
separately in this manuscript.  
 
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be 
determined.  In RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either 
‘backstop defense’ or sheltering within the structures. The RUIM 
reflects this accordingly;  
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those 
in California (CAFS, 2018; USFD & CDFFP, 2003), Greece (CBS, 2018) 
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or Victoria (BCRC, 2009) required the mobilization of military, 
interstate and even international firefighting assistance.  
Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and firefighting 
crews will be drawn from many regions and are likely to be 
unfamiliar with the operational area, particularly during the 
escalation phases of the incident.  This results in greater 
uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response, 
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are 
not appropriate to the wildfire context;  
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal 
structural firefighting as structures actively on fire are identified as 
undefendable (DFES, 2013 & 2014). Therefore external suppression 
of structures only is considered in the RUIM; and 
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points or 
ASTCP to be calculated, enabling critical components of the 
response including wildfire impacts on access routes, evacuations 
and other aspects to be deterministically assessed.  This further 
enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas involving 
active wildfire. 
 
Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the 
total time to complete the required activities; 
2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the 
sequence of activities determining the minimum time required for 
the firefighting intervention; 
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration 
of mobilization and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM 
provide useful guidance for Incident Controllers when making 
operational decisions; and 
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data. 
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One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new 
head fires well in advance of the original fire front are not automatically 
considered due to the difficulty in accurately forecasting spot fire formation. 
Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance of the original head fire 
result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately.  This is not 
unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a 
new timeframe to be established.  As with any model, they are only one tool 
firefighters and Incident Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making 
process.  Field validation and current and reliable intelligence will further 
assist to increase the accuracy of predictions. 
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 4.14, separate flow 
charts and associated tables are required to be referred to in order to 
calculate the total RSRPT.  Whilst firefighters will complete property 
protection tasks prior to seeking shelter inside the building of refuge, the time 
available to complete the property protection (shaded in Figure 4.14) is 
calculated after the other stages as it is not in the critical path of completing 
RUI defense.  To calculate RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer 
should commence at Box 1 in Figure 4.15 and work their way through the 
RUIM until all time components have been calculated.  The incorporation of 
safety factors and/or percentiles into the RUIM is also essential (AFAC, 2004; 
ICC et al., 2005; SFS, 2007) due to: 
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a 
discipline based on complex science which is neither exact or 
complete (AFAC, 2004);  
2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys 
being caught in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil 
& Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al., 2014);  
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance 
of the wildfire front (Penney et al., 2019); and the complexity of 
significant wildfire events, the incorporation of a safety factors 
and/or percentiles is also required. 
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As AFAC (2004, p26) reports 
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science 
which is neither exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved, 
informed approximations and expert judgement must be employed. In 
order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are required in the analysis.” 
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency and 
other uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilizing a percentile 
approach can also be incorporated into the RUIM. The mean values 
provided in this manuscript are sourced from AFAC (2004) and are 
representative of the particular activity being completed within the stated 
duration, 50% of the time.  Due to the severity of the consequences of 
burnover, it is suitable to incorporate a greater percentile.  For reference, 
AFAC (2004) suggests a 90th percentile is suitable, meaning a particular 
activity will be completed within the stated duration 90% of the time.  
Adopting a conservative approach, the relationship between X percentile 
and k standard deviations can be expressed as: 





When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 (AFAC, 2004), however 
where the average time is at least several standard deviations greater than 
zero, it is reasonable to assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k 
= 1.28 (AFAC, 2004).  Using the example of an “officer size up” where the 
mean (μ) is 135 seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20 seconds, the 
90th percentile can then be expressed as: 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎 (4.6) 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  135 + (1.28 × 20) =  160.6 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴  
Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation 
becomes: 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎 (4.7) 
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The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As AFAC (2004) 
describes, where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound, 
a relatively small safety factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable.  In keeping 
with the recommendations of the FBIM, a safety factor of 2 should be 
considered for the RUIM.  As opposed to applying a single safety factor at 
the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety 
factors is to apply them after each individual stage.  This is demonstrated in 
the case study presented later in this section. 
 
 
53Figure 4.14: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology 
 This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch / 
turnout message and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be 
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defended.  It considers whether the taskforce is pre-assembled or must first 
mobilise to the staging area from various locations. 
 
54Figure 4.15: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 3, 
p56) 




30Table 4.16: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, 
Table E, p106) 
Box / 
diamond 
Description Time (s) 
1 This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters 
to respond to the dispatch / turnout message. It is the 
time taken from activation of the turnout signal to the 
time when the taskforce proceeds to the RUI to be 
defended. 
n/a 
2 The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to 
mobilizing to the RUI to be defended. 
n/a 
3 When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC, 
firefighters receive their briefing and crew their 
machines immediately prior to mobilizing to the RUI to 
be defended.   
60*  to 
1,200** 
4 If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then 
firefighters must first mobilize to the RUI taskforce 
staging area from their home fire stations.   
n/a 
5 If firefighters are on station then they must respond to 
the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC 
and depart.   
90* 
6 If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case 
with volunteer stations) they must first drive to the fire 
station prior to responding to the dispatch/turnout 
message.  Once on station the firefighters must respond 
to the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don 
PPC and depart.   
480*            
to 
1,200** 
7 Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of 
fire appliance travel times. 
Fig. 4.17 
8 Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in 
shaded boxes along chosen paths. 
n/a 
*Sourced from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106) 
**Suggested realistic worst case scenario  
This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual 
appliances to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble 
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prior to being briefed and dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes 
for the assembled taskforce to reached the RUI to be defended.   
 
55Figure 4.16: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 4, p60) 








9 Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce 
staging area (use greatest time).  Also the process used to 
determine the time taken for the assembled taskforce to 
reach the designated RUI. 
n/a 
10 If the response is along a defined route then the actual road 
distance can be used (Box 11).  If the route or the exact 
distance of a route is unknown then the radial distance 
multiplier (Box 12) applies. 
n/a 
11 Use the actual road distance. Actual 
route 
(km) 
12 AFAC (2004, p61) reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5 
provides a reasonable approximation of actual road distance 
to be travelled. 
Radial 
distance 
X 1.5 (km) 
13 AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5) provide typical fire service travel 
times for different Australian jurisdictions.  The average of 
these times is provided in Table 4.18 and may be used where 
other data sets are not available (AFAC, 2004, p61). 
Table 
4.18 
14 Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by 
average expected speed (Box 13) 
n/a 
 
32Table 4.18: Mean fire appliance travel times, in kph.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables 
F1-F5).   
Context Melbourne Tasmania South Australia Average 
μ σ μ σ μ σ μ σ 
Major city CBD 38.8 12.8 45.1 24.1 36.6 8.7 40.2 15.2 
Major city inner suburb 44.3 12.0 51.0 20.3 41.4 7.3 45.6 13.2 
Major city outer suburb 60.5 16.2 43.9 18.2 42.6 8.8 49.0 14.4 
Rural town centre - - 54.9 25.6 - - 54.9 25.6 
Rural country - - 55.7 23.6 - - 55.7 23.6 
Travel through site 8 - 8 - - - 8 - 
Note: other datasets from AFAC (2004) included firefighter response times which are 
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4.15 
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up 
hose lines for the RUI defense.  It provides flexibility around the individual RUI 
tactics that individual fire services utilise.    
 
56Figure 4.17: Time to set up RUI defence hose lines flow chart.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, 
Charts 7&10) 








15 Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in 
preparation for RUI defense. 
n/a 
16 The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI 
and determine which properties the taskforce will focus on.  
This is considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a 
structure fire context (AFAC, 2004, Table K) and the time taken 
to gather information in an area >10,000m2 (AFAC, 2004, Table 






17 If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18.  If high pressure 
hose reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.   
n/a 
18 Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged 
from the appliance.  Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, 
amended from AFAC (2004, Table V, p110). 
Table 
4.20 
19 Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and 
carried to position.  Guidance is provided in Table 4.20, 
amended from AFAC (2004, Table Q, p109) and is considered 




20 Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18 
or 19) along chosen path. 
n/a 
 
34Table 4.20: RUI defense activities and times.  Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables K, L, Q, V) 
Activity Time (s) 
μ σ 
Officer in Charge size up 135  - 
Remove and position high pressure hose reel*  15.8  23.1 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm 
diameter hose 
39.4**  17.4** 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm 
diameter hose 
33.3**  15.4** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter 
hose 
20.3**  13.2** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter 
hose 
18.4**  10.2** 
*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment (AFAC, 2004, Table Q) 
**Per 30m length of hose 
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek 
shelter in an appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.    
Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs 
are involved) and firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 (AFAC, 2004, Table 
Q ‘dressed in turnout uniform with equipment’) the time taken for firefighters 





Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is the 
speed of the firefighters.  In the absence of available data it is suggested 
that as a worse case credible scenario it is appropriate to consider this 
distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose consistent with the 
tactics of RUI defense (DFES, 2013 & 2014). 
 




57Figure 4.18: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.   
The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point 
in a path of travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as (Gwynne 
& Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008, Eqn 11): 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴 [(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠]⁄  (4.9) 
Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in persons, 
D is the population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1, and We 
is the effective width in metres of the component being transferred (door, 
corridor, ramp etc.).  In the absence of alternate data, We of a door can be 
assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons per m2 (Gwynne & 
Rosenbaum in DiNenno et al., 2008). 
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Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not on 
the critical path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can 
increase their resilience to wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al., 
2006). TF is calculated by: 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 −  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (4.10) 
If ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential 
for the responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in 
the open, either on route or during RUI preparation.   
 
In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice, 
and demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire 
scenario, the following case study based on recent (i.e. Margaret River 2011, 
Yarloop 2016) and potential wildfire events in Western Australia (illustrated in 
figures 4.19-4.21) is presented: 
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west 
of Western Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts 
the wildfire will impact Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 30-
34 hours post ignition.  The fire will also impact the road between the 
taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition.  For the first 
11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting 
and the construction of containment lines.  Community warnings are issued 
and residents are advised to evacuate north towards the regional city of 
Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of 80 high dependency residents 
cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications tower is also 
located in Nannup townsite.  At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a 
defend-in-place strategy is required to protect the aged care facility.  A 
request for a taskforce is issued however it is not known whether the taskforce 
will arrive too late to protect the town.  The taskforce of 30 personnel 
(including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional city of 
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Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth.  Bunbury is approximately 70km 
to the north, whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances 
measured lineally). Whilst the Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and 
ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth Taskforce is to be made up 
of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer fire 
stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km 
northeast of Perth).  The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four 
hour delay due to appliance technical issues before they can depart to the 
Perth staging area where the convoy will depart.  The IMT are situation in the 
town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup.  This is also the location of the 
RUI Taskforce Staging point.  To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is 
applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.   
 
Step One – Determining ASRPT and safety factors 
From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the 
headfire in 30-34 hours post ignition.  It is critical however to acknowledge 
the request for the taskforce is issued 12 hours post ignition, reducing the 
Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours. The Incident 
Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 22 hour 
period to be used.  
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 22 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴  
However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the 
available time before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post 
ignition.  It is equally as critical to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur 
16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce is issued.  This is termed the 
Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960 minutes.  
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety factors 
to be applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the taskforce 
staging area located well away from the fireground or any smoke impacts 
etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to be applied in all instances. 
 




Step Two – Calculating time taken for RUI taskforce to respond (TR) 
Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce, 
subsequently denoted Bunbury TF and Perth TF.  With reference to figures 
4.15-4.16, the process for determining TR for each section is detailed in tables 
6-7 from initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton staging point to receive their 
briefing and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point.  The process 
results in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the 
Perth TF as 637 minutes.  When considering the two separate taskforces are 
to join into a single taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637 
minutes is applied. 
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58Figure 4.19: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
 
59Figure 4.20: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
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60Figure 4.21: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
35Table 4.21: TR Bunbury TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.  
Proceed to step 4. 
n/a 
4 Firefighters are at their station.  Proceed to step 5. n/a 
5 Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station. 
Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7. 
1.5 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 42km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) = 
0.95 hours 
57 min 
End Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals 




36Table 4.22: TR Perth TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is not assembled.  Proceed to step 4. n/a 
4 Firefighters are not at their station.  Proceed to step 6. n/a 
6 For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress, 
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20 
minutes. 
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.   
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 7. 
 
240 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
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10 Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two 
stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km) 
and Northam (90km).  Assumption made that as all other metropolitan 
appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either 
Lancelin or Northam. 
Proceed to step 12. 
n/a 
12 Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as: 
Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and  
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km 
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’. 
Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as: 
Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes 
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.  
As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew 
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value 
used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF 
staging area in Busselton. 
156 min 
1 No action required.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging 
area in Busselton.  Proceed to step 4. 
 
4 Crews are at the Perth base.  Proceed to step 5.  
5 Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to 
step 7. 
1 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 202km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used.  Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) = 
4 hours 
240 min 
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End Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time 
to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min.  Equal to 637 




Step Three – Calculating time taken for joint taskforce to travel to RUI (TT) 
Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the 
Busselton staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be 
calculated.  With reference to figure 4.15, the process for determining TT is 
detailed in table 4.23.  Noting that the Joint TF is now proceeding to the 
fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 
2 to be applied will be in effect.  Importantly, the calculations demonstrate 
ASTCP1 of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely 
deployed to the RUI with reasonable confidence that they will not be 
impacted by the headfire during the journey.  The total TT is calculated as 
288 minutes. 
37Table 4.23: TT Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 55km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed = 
(49.0 – (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x 
23.6) = 25.5kph.  Proceed to step 14. 
n/a 




FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 288 min 
ASTCP1 For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire 
front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT).  Using the forecast time of impact of the access 
road and the calculated TR and TT: 
 ASTCP1 = 960 minutes 
TR = 288 minutes and TT = 637 minutes, therefore TR+TT = 925 minutes 
 






Step Four – Calculating time taken to set up hose lines (THL) 
Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose 
lines and establish the urban defense must be calculated.  With reference 
to figure 5, the process for determining THL is detailed in table 4.24.  The IC 
requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 2 to be applied is 
incorporated into the calculation.  The total THL is calculated as 10 minutes. 
38Table 4.24: THL Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
15 No action required.  Proceed to step 16. n/a 
16 Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135 seconds 
= 2.3 minutes.  Proceed to step 17. 
2.3 min 
17 The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose 
and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18. 
n/a 
18 Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect 65mm 
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 + (1.28 
x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm hose from 
appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x 15.4) = 53.0 
seconds.   
 
Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both 38mm 
lengths of hose.  This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) + 2(18.4+(1.28 x 
10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes 
Proceed to step 14. 
1.7 min 
20 THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes 
 
5 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 10 min 
 
 
Step Five – Calculating Time taken for firefighters to seek shelter (TS) 
With reference to figure 4.18, the process for determining TS is detailed in 
table 4.25. The required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival 
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of untenable conditions associated with the head fire are calculated in 
accordance with equations 4.8 and 4.9, where Rd is the distance of the 
firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the firefighters 
μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m; 
and D is 1.9 persons per m2.  The FS of 2 is again applied.  The total TS is 
calculated as 12.6 minutes. 
 
39Table 4.25: TS Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
21 No action required.  Proceed to step 22. n/a 
16 Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.   
∴ 𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟  
90 (𝑚𝑚)
0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴−1)
= 150 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 
 
Apply Safety factor. 
2.5 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 23. 
5 min 
18 Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7. 
 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 30 [(1 − 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]� = 38 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴.   
Apply Safety factor 
0.65 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 24. 
1.3 min 
24 TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes 
 
6.3 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 12.6 min 
 
Step Six – Deterministic analysis and calculating TF 
Equation 4.4 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for 
the taskforce to be deployed.  ASRPT was previously determined to be 22 
hours. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (637 + 288 + 10 + 12.6)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  947.6 𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 =  15.8 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴  
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∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇  
In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that 
there is sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and 
ready the defense of the nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables 
evidence based trigger points to be set by the IMT.  For instance, should 
spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access road into Nannup 
20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and 
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce 
request is submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 
minutes and the revised ASRPT of 900 minutes > RSRPT of 947.6 minutes.  
Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT are aware that without waiting 
for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours); and only 310 
minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging 
area.  This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of 
deploying a smaller taskforce to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce 
at all.  It also supports the establishment of operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger 
points to reduce the potential for responding firefighters to be caught in 
burnover. 
 
Evacuations of communities in the path of large wildfires is a growing 
problem for both land use planners and Incident Management Teams alike 
(Cova, 2005; Taylor & Freeman, 2010).  If left too late or incorrect routes are 
taken during evacuations, fatalities may result, particularly in the wake of 
significant wildfires (Haynes et al, 2008; Blanchi et al, 2014; Handmer et al, 
2010; Ronchi et al, 2019). When considering whether community evacuations 
are possible, a hydraulic model which simplifies egress behaviour and 
enables evacuation to be described by a set of equations can be used 
(Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008; ICC et al, 2005).  This subsequently 
enables deterministic analysis of Available Safe Evacuation Time (ASET) versus 
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Required Safe Evacuation Time (RSET) as described in the wildfire context by 
Ronchi et al, (2017 & 2019): 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 + 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 (4.11) 
where td is the time for the incident to be detected after ignition, tFDA is the 
time spent by the fire department assessing the situation on site, tFDI is the time 
spent by the fire department intervening and attempting to control the 
incident, tN is the time for the population to be notified once intervention has 
been deemed unsuccessful, tprep is the time for a resident to complete 
preparations after they have initially been notified, tfoot is the time for the 
population to move on foot (e.g. walk to a place of safety or to a vehicle), 
tveh is the time for the population to move into a vehicle, and finally tref is the 
time for the individual to be on-boarded at a place of safety. An additional 
consideration not inherently contained within the model is the requirement 
for assisted evacuations from schools, aged care facilities, hospitals etc. 
When considering evacuations from such places it may be more suitable to 
adopt a shelter-in-place strategy with dedicated urban firefighting 
appliances.   
As illustrated in Figure 4.22, the timing and adequacy of decisions made 
by Incident Controllers can have significant impact on the ability of the 
community to safely evacuate.  Whilst td, and tprep are often beyond the 
control of responding fire services, rapid and accurate assessment of the 
incident and subsequent selection of appropriate strategies and tactics (tFDI), 
including evacuation as a tactic, coupled with detailed and timely 
community warnings tN can increase the available time for evacuees to find 
safe refuge.  It is important to note that this approach implies various 
assumptions about human behaviour and has several limitations including 
(Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008, p3-376): 
1. Behaviours that detract from movement are not explicitly 
considered; 
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2. People are considered as a group as opposed to their own 
personal identity and attributes; 
3. Movement between egress components is considered, rather than 
within them; and 
4. The results are deterministic and will therefore remain the same 
unless changes are made to the scenario or the assumptions 
employed. 
As a result it is important to include a safety factor when considering the 
suitability of an evacuation strategy. For example, depending on the size of 
the population to be evacuated, the complexity of the situation and the 
Incident Controller’s own risk tolerance they may require ASET ˃ 2.7RSET prior 
to approving and evacuation plan.  As a point of reference, whilst AFAC 
(2004) identifies that the safety factor for a well-established discipline 
supported by robust evidence may be quite small and as low as 1.2, for 
structural firefighting efforts a factor of 2 is appropriate.  Given the relative 
infancy of wildfire engineering as a discipline, the lack of robust data and the 
potential for mass fatalities associated with evacuating people being caught 
in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi 
et al., 2014) the authors suggest a minimum safety factor of 2.5 is utilised for 
community evacuation purposes in the landscape wildfire context.  In sub-
landscape scale wildfire scenarios within the urban environment, where 
head fire suppression is possible and smaller community movements need to 
be considered, a safety factor of 1.5 may be suitable. 
 




61Figure 4.22: (a) ASET; (b) RSET with delayed community notification; (c) RSET with rapid 
community notification and early evacuation decision. 
 
tfoot and tref include movement and queuing times for all evacuees and can 
become complicated where large numbers of evacuees are moving to 
different refuges.  In such instances guidance can be found in Gwynne & 
Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008), however in simple cases flow of persons 
through a certain point (such as the doors of buildings) can be calculated 
by: 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 (4.12) 
where Fc is calculated flow (m/s), S is speed of movement(m/s), D is 
population density (persons/m2), and We is effective width of component 
being traversed such as a door or stairwell (m). 
 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽 (4.13) 
where k and a are both constants, obtained from sources including Gwynne 
& Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008, Table 3-13.2) or Vaughan and Bain (2001). 
 
The complexity of mass evacuations during natural disasters and 
emergencies requires dynamic modelling software to be used (Shiwakoti et 
al., 2013). Dynamic traffic simulation enables the comparison of different 
evacuation plans under a variety of situations (Yuan et al., 2006), however 
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there is often a trade-off between accuracy, cost, data requirements and 
the time required for simulations to be completed (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). In 
addition to recommending minimum traffic means of egress standards for 
urban design in wildfire prone areas, Cova (2005) also identifies the major 
factors that can impede community evacuation.  
Whilst accurately calculating tveh remains problematic (Cova et al, 2011; 
Intini et al, 2019; Ronchi et al, 2017), in an urban design and planning 
assessment context when a shelter in place strategy is adopted, calculation 
of tveh is not required as occupants are not leaving the site.  To improve the 
design of wildfire prone communities (including visiting tourists) in regards to 
large scale evacuation and egress, Cova (2005) recommends a number of 
safety aspects.  These recommendations are summarized in Tables 4.26-4.29. 
 
40Table 4.26: Wildfire prone road design safety aspects. Adapted from Cova (2005) 
Component Standard 
Occupant load factor 
(density) 
The density of homes along the roads in any fire-prone 
community or portion thereof should not exceed: that 
specified in Table 4.16 (reproduced with permission from 
ASCE) 
Number of exits The number of means-of-egress from any fire-prone 
community or portion thereof shall meet the minimum 
specified in Table 4.28 (reproduced with permission from 
ASCE) 
Exit capacity The total egress capacity from a fire-prone community or 
portion thereof shall meet the factors specified in Table 4.29 
(reproduced with permission from ASCE) 
Exit arrangement The closest distance between any two points along any of 
the n exits from a fire-prone community must be at least 1/n 
the maximum diagonal distance across the community. The 
maximum diagonal of a community is defined as the 
greatest Euclidean distance between any two households 
that rely on the same exit set, and the minimum distance 
between exits is defined as the shortest Euclidean distance 
between any two points along two exiting roads. 
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Maximum exist distance No household in a fire-prone community shall be further than 
3 km by road from its closest exit. The maximum exit distance 
for a community is defined as the household with the greatest 
shortest-path distance on the road network to an exit 
discharge in the most constraining bottleneck set i.e., the end 
of one of the exiting roads from the community. 
Exit vulnerability (distance to 
fuel) 
Exits in a fire-prone community shall have a 10m buffer on 




41Table 4.27: Occupant load factor (density). Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from 
ASCE 
Use Hazard Road length per 
household (m) 
Road length per 
vehicle (m) 
Residential Low 12.5 6.3 
Moderate 16.7 8.3 
High 20.0 10.0 
Residential 
& Tourism 
Low 12.5 4.2 
Moderate 16.7 5.6 
High 20.0 6.7 
 
42Table 4.28: Minimum exits. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE 
Number of 
households 




1-50 1 50 
51-300 2 150 
301-600 3 200 
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600+ 4 200 
 
43Table 4.29: Exit capacity. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE 
Use Hazard Minimum total exit 
capacity (vehicles per 
hour per household) 
Minimum evacuation 
time (hours) 
Residential Low 1 2 
Moderate 2 1 
High 4 0.5 
Residential 
& Tourism 
Low 1.5 2 
Moderate 3 1 
High 6 0.5 
 
4.5. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s  
Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019 
and early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that 
require significant interstate and international resourcing over prolonged 
durations.  When such events occur they will inevitably impact life and 
property as well as overwhelming firefighting efforts.  This section discussed 
the strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the 
evidence suggests they may be successful.  Detailed and accurate 
planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists 
to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to minimise the potential for 
firefighter injury.  When applied correctly and in the right context, the 
findings of new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s 
to achieve this. 
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As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires, 
detailed predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient.  
Care must be taken to bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning 
is operationally relevant.  The research presented in this section 
demonstrates that even in mild conditions, the head fire will often be 
unstoppable where it occurs in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry.  
This is further supported by the findings presented in Sections 5 and 6.The use 
of existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for wildfire suppression can only 
be considered opportunistic and with marginal chance of success unless the 
burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and significant in area. As climate 
change continues to result in worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters, 
IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel 
bed structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels are 
discontinuous and broken. 
 
4.6. Implications for urban planners  
By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies, 
urban planners can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of 
communities to wildfire impacts through appropriate design of development 
at the RUI.  The research and increased analysis presented in this section 
enables wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the 
design stage of RUI development.  Evidence based design that incorporates 
minimum measures for evacuations and eliminates the unrealistic 
expectation that firefighters will be able to defend every property will lead to 
more appropriate passive3 wildfire resilient design 
 
3  Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.  For instance, 
ensuring road design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without 
additional control measures is a passive measure that can be supported by 
appropriate and timely community evacuation messages.  Firefighters 
being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.  
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The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire 
Engineering Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering processes within 
the urban fire engineering profession will only further increase the standard of 
safety in bushfire prone areas.  These are detailed and complex technical 
documents however that required a high degree of technical knowledge 
and proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved. 
Section 5 – Firefighter tenability in the wildfire context 
5.1. Introduction  
Whilst the wildfire suppression thresholds discussed in Section 4 are utilised 
internationally by fire services, they fail to sufficiently consider firefighter 
tenability.  The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ICC, 2005) defines 
untenable conditions as “environmental conditions associated with fire in 
which human life is not sustainable.”  This should not be confused with the 
conditions required to facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are 
significantly milder than those able to be withstood for short periods of time. 
Therefore, improving firefighter safety during wildfire suppression by clearly 
defining fire ground environmental conditions that are considered tenable, 
or safe for firefighters is paramount.  Both the Society of Fire Safety (2014) 
and Poh (2010) identify four primary hazards associated with fires within the 
built environment that affect tenability being convected heat, radiant heat, 
toxic gases and smoke obscuration.  However, as Poh (2010) reports, there 
is no single set of related values for tenability criteria which is universally 
accepted.  This section defines and discusses firefighter tenability in the 
wildfire context to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident 
decisions during chaotic and large wildfire incidents.   
 
5.2. Defining Tenability  
Smoke obscuration is excluded as a factor affecting firefighter tenability in 
the wildfire context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with 
visual obscurity during wildfire events (Hayes et al, 2008; Penney, 2019 – risk). 
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Knight, Brown and Leonard (2001) identify the toxic gases produced during 
the thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly the interior 
vehicle componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to 
radiant heat and other factors.   The same authors do note that hydrogen 
chloride (HCl), a severe irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally 
degrade even without combustion, formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen 
cyanide (HCN) and carbon monoxide (CO) may cause significant irritation 
to occupants in the vehicle cabin, however not to the extent of affecting 
tenability.  The concentration for each of these gases that are immediately 
dangerous to life or health (IDLH) are detailed in Table 5.1.  Brown et al. 
(2003) reports fire truck cabins will generally remain tenable in regards to toxic 
gases unless there is catastrophic window failure with glass falling from the 
frame. 
44Table 5.1: IDLH concentrations 
Material IDLH (ppm) Source & Comments 
CO 1000-8000 (Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2014)  
HCHO 20-100  (Brown et al., 2003; Kent, 1998; NIOSH, 2014a)  
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation  
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema  
@100ppm – immediate death 
HCl 50-1000 (Brown et al., 2003; Hull et al., 2008; NIOSH, 2014b) 
@50ppm – barely tolerable 
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema 
HCN 50-280 (Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2016) 
@ 100 death after 1 hour 
@181 fatal after 10 minutes 
@280 immediately fatal 
 
Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of 
landscape scale bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters (Penney & 
Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Butler, 2014; Frankman et al., 2012; 
Leonard, 2010) therefore it is proposed any impacts of convective heat 
transfer, or noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat 
transfer.  Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent 
involved fuels (including burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the 
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potential to result in rapid vehicle fire involvement and untenable conditions 
in as little as 90 seconds (DFES, 2012a & 2016; Pearce et al, 2004).  Post 
burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant heat remains the 
greatest threat to firefighters (Sullivan et al., 2003) and conditions within the 
vehicle cabin may become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this 
(Linton, 2016; Johnstone, 2002; Pearce et al., 2004; WFA, 2013).  Calculated 
potential peak radiant heat flux from large wildfires can exceed 76 kWm-2, 
even at greater than 10 m separation from the head fire under mild fuel loads 
and weather conditions (Penney et al., 2019a).  By comparison experiential 
forest fire field data reported by Frankman et al. (2013) identified peak heat 
fluxes of 179 kWm-2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post the 
Springwood wildfire in New South Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham et al. 
(2014) estimated peak radiant heat fluxes experienced by houses to be as 
much as 52.5kWm-2. 
Purser (2008) cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire 
are possible, being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract 
burns.  The sensation of pain occurs prior to burns, incapacitation and 
ultimately death, however in the case of significant bushfire such events may 
be almost simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of 
hyperthermia.   
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poh (2010) 
and Purser (2008) are retained: 
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air 
temperature / or humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected) 
facial skin burns; and 
2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect 
victims from incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to 
protect them from burns to the respiratory tract.  
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and 
Equipment (PPE) are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption 
that unprotected skin thresholds are suitable for modelling purposes (and as 
a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPC 
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and PPE are worn).  Limited experimental data involving human test subjects 
is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the 
literature exists.  Although Raj (2008) suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm-
2 may occur without pain or injury in clothed subjects, Poh (2010) identifies 2.5 
kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and respiratory burns.  The Australasian 
Fire Authorities Council (2004) provides further guidance for firefighters in 
structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as 
detailed in Table 5.2, however the Society of Fire Safety (2014) suggest the 
‘Routine’ exposure threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat 
flux received whilst sunbaking may be as high as 1.1 kWm-2.  For firefighters 
sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight et al. (2001) utilise a 60 second 
radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C however 
the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted in Europe 
(2010). Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal radiation is 
provided by Purser (2008, Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 5.3. 
 










Maximum Time 25 minutes 10 minutes 1 minute < 1 minute 
Maximum Air Temperature 100°C 120°C 160°C >235°C 
Maximum Radiation 1kWm-2 3kWm-2 4-4.5kWm-2 >10kWm-2 
 
46Table 5.3: Radiant heat flux effects 
Heat Flux kWm-2 
Time to Effect (seconds) 
Pain Burn  Full Burn 
2.5 40 - - 
4.2 - 30 (blisters) - 
10.5 5 - - 
23.5 1.6 - - 
30 6 10 >15 
35 5 9.5 >15 
40 4.5 9 >15 
50 4 7 >15 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
148 
 
100 2 4 6 
150 1 2.5 4 
 
The time taken for various effects as a result of exposure to thermal radiation 







where trad is the time to reach end effect for the identified thermal radiation 
(minutes), qr is the given radiant heat flux, and r is the radiant heat exposure 
[(kWm-2)min-1] for the identified endpoint detailed in Table 5.4: 
 
 
47Table 5.4: Radiant heat exposures  
Thermal radiation [(kWm-2)min-1] Endpoint 
1.33 tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns 
10 severe incapacitation and second-degree 
burns 
16.7 fatal exposure with third-degree burns 
 
Applying Purser’s equation, Penney et al. (2019a) provided comparison of 
the various times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant 
heat flux.  This is shown in Figure 5.1 and illustrates that incapacitating burns 
can occur within relatively small timeframes at the lower end of possible 
wildfire induced radiant heat flux.  The results demonstrate fatal exposure 
occurs within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst 
incapacitating injuries occur within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 
20 kWm-2.   




62Figure 5.1: Time to effect as a function of thermal radiation 
 
 
5.3. Radiant heat flux suppression and tenability thresholds 
Penney et al. (2019) reported that when setting firefighter tenability 
thresholds, the worse cast credible scenario should be adopted.  This is 
defined as firefighters in personal protective clothing (PPC) suitable for 
wildland fire suppression are exposed to radiant heat effects of a rapidly 
advancing flame edge that is part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire 
flank or head.  This is a deliberate measure to account for burnover situations 
in appliances are disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot.  In these 
situations sheltering behind appliances and other small structures will provide 
little if any shielding from radiant heat flux (Penney & Stevenson, 2019).  
Whilst the literature identifies several potential tenable limits as previously 
















5kW/m2 10kW/m2 15kW/m2 20kW/m2 25kW/m2 30kW/m2
35kW/m2 40kW/m2 45kW/m2 50kW/m2 55kW/m2 60kW/m2
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3 kWm-2 is adopted as the threshold for suppression operations involving 
personnel (the “Suppression Threshold”).  This is less than both the “Extreme” 
limit of 4 kWm-2 (AFAC, 2004) and the acceptable 5 kWm-2 exposure in normal 
clothing reported by Raj (2008) which were considered to provide an 
insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area as 
incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the 
individual, but greater than the limit adopted by Knight et al. (2001).  As 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, the “Critical” limit of 10 kWm-2 [58] can result in 
incapacitating burns in less than one minute and is subsequently identified as 
the “Tenability Threshold”.   The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant 
heat flux the firefighters in PPC can withstand whilst being able to undertake 
suppression activities is inherently lower than the “Tenability Threshold”, being 
the radiant heat flux those same firefighters could physically survive.  Whilst 
different PPC affords firefighters various levels of protection however exposed 
skin and respiratory tracts (in the absence of closed circuit breathing 
apparatus) remain vulnerable.  As a result the thresholds reported by 
Penney et al. (2019) incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural 
firefighting PPE is worn. 
Illustrated in Table 5.5, even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire weather 
conditions, when attempting to suppress a fully developed forest head fire in 
continuous fuel structures, firefighters will need to remain at least 20 m from 
the head fire (Penney et al., 2019).  At understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and 
assuming no shielding, the Suppression Threshold is exceeded even at an FDI 
of 10 until 20 m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst tenability 
limits are exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire.  The required 
separation for the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m 
separation necessary to reach suitable conditions once an FDI of 40 is 
reached.  Conditions supportive of suppression efforts are not experienced 
within 30 m of the head fire at or above an FDI of 50.  As illustrated in Figures 
5.2 and 5.3, representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28], 
conditions worsen as fuel load increases.  For typical Woodlands fuel loads, 
depending on FDI, radiant heat flux falls below the Tenability Threshold at 15 
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m-35 m whilst 35 m-80 m separation is required for conditions to be conducive 
to safe suppression efforts.  These distances increase to 20 m to 50 m and 45 
m to >100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads.   None of the scenarios 
analysed resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the 
head fire within 10 m of the flame edge, being the typical maximum 
separation from the flaming zone for firefighters to effectively apply 
suppressants from hand held attack lines or machine monitors. 
 
48Table 5.5: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for 
suppression and tenability thresholds 





















Tenability  10 10 10 10 15 15 15 15 15 20 
Suppression 20 25 25 30 35 35 35 40 40 45 
w10 
Tenability  10 15 15 15 20 20 25 25 25 30 
Suppression 30 35 40 45 45 50 55 60 60 65 
w15 
Tenability  15 15 20 20 25 30 30 30 35 35 
Suppression 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 75 80 
w20 
Tenability  15 20 25 25 30 35 35 40 40 45 
Suppression 40 50 55 65 70 75 80 85 90 90 
w25 
Tenability  20 25 30 30 35 40 45 45 50 50 
Suppression 45 55 65 70 75 85 90 95 100 >100 
w30 
Tenability  20 25 30 35 40 45 50 50 55 60 
Suppression 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 >100 >100 >100 
 




63Figure 5.2: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between 
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64Figure 5.3: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between 
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures 
Applying Purser’ equation and assuming 10 m separation from the head 
fire, the reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes 
evident across understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5.6).  In the mildest of 
conditions, the time taken for pain tolerance thresholds to be reached and 
for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds.  In foreseeable circumstances, 
such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time is reduced 
to less than a second.  In comparison, the time taken for severe 
incapacitation to occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the 






















Separation from head fire (m)
FDI 10 FDI 20
FDI 30 FDI 40
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fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately 10 seconds.  At 10 m 
separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are also 
rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds.  At understory fuel loads 
of 25t/ha and an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table 
5.6).       
The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when 
identifying safe zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate 
wildfire suppression strategies and tactics.  When interpreting the results of 
this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation occurs a firefighter will 
likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the shorter 
time frame should be applied.   It is also important to consider the shielding 
effects of intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false 
sense of fire intensity until the flames engulf the vegetation in front of them.  
Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of landscape scale wildfire 
from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and may have 
insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such 
as sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles.   Even if protective 
systems are activated, the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially 
lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the capacity of the protective systems 
(Penney et al., 2019b; Penney et al. 2020 – under consideration) which 
suggests fatal burnovers may still occur. 
49Table 5.6: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m 
separation from the head fire 
Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 8.0 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 
w10 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 
w15 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 
w20 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 
w25 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
w30 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 117.5 94.4 78.2 66.3 57.3 50.2 44.5 39.8 35.9 32.7 
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w10 71.4 53.2 41.8 34.1 28.5 24.4 21.2 18.6 16.6 14.9 
w15 49.7 35.7 27.3 21.9 18.0 15.2 13.1 11.4 10.1 9.0 
w20 37.3 26.2 19.7 15.6 12.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 6.9 6.1 
w25 29.5 20.3 15.2 11.9 9.6 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.0 5.0 
w30 24.1 16.4 12.1 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 232.8 187.0 155.0 131.4 113.4 99.4 88.1 78.9 71.2 64.7 
w10 141.4 105.5 82.9 67.6 56.6 48.3 42.0 36.9 32.8 29.4 
w15 98.4 70.6 54.1 43.3 35.7 30.2 25.9 22.6 19.9 17.8 
w20 74.0 51.8 39.1 30.9 25.3 21.2 18.1 15.6 13.7 12.1 
w25 58.4 40.3 30.0 23.5 19.1 15.9 13.5 11.6 10.0 10.0 
w30 47.8 32.5 24.0 18.7 15.1 12.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 
As discussed in Section 3, emissivity will vary depending on the depth of 
the active fire front.  Table 5.7 illustrates the effect of emissivity on the 
Tenability and Suppression thresholds.  For Woodlands fuels, the Tenability 
Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation from the head fire 
flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved until a 
minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these distances 
increase to 40 m and 80 m respectively.  These results suggest suppression 
efforts will be ineffective against siege head fires where the flame emissivity 
exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in head fires with an 
active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m (Boulet et al., 2009;  SAI Global, 
2019;  Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011). 
50Table 5.7: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds 
– sensitivity to emissivity 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
Surface 
Fuel 
(t/ha)  Ԑ 0.6 Ԑ 0.65 Ԑ 0.7 Ԑ 0.75 Ԑ 0.8 Ԑ 0.85 Ԑ 0.9 Ԑ 0.95 
w15 
Tenability  25 30 30 30 35 35 35 35 
Suppression 60 65 65 70 70 75 75 80 
w25 
Tenability  40 40 40 45 45 50 50 50 
Suppression 80 85 85 90 95 95 100 >100 
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As illustrated in Table 5.8, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase, 
slope has a greater effect on the separation distance required to achieve 
tenable and operational conditions.  In all scenarios presented, increased 
positive slope and associated increase in fire behaviour decreases tenability 
and suppression potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning 
over flat terrain.   
 
51Table 5.8: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds 
– sensitivity to slope 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
FDI  0° Slope 5° Slope 10° Slope 15° Slope 20° Slope 
10 
Tenability  20 20 25 25 30 
Suppression 45 50 55 60 65 
20 
Tenability  25 25 30 35 45 
Suppression 55 60 70 80 85 
30 
Tenability  30 30 40 45 55 
Suppression 65 70 80 95 >100 
40 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 80 90 >100 >100 
50 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 90 100 >100 >100 
60 
Tenability  40 45 55 65 80 
Suppression 85 95 >100 >100 >100 
70 
Tenability  45 50 60 70 85 
Suppression 90 100 >100 >100 >100 
80 
Tenability  45 55 65 75 90 
Suppression 95 >100 >100 >100 >100 
90 
Tenability  50 60 70 80 100 
Suppression 100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
100 
Tenability  50 60 75 85 >100 
Suppression >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
 
5.4. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s 
It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do 
not systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I 
and LF) and the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters 
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attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.  
Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not specifically 
address the tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity of the 
flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire.  Once 
tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack 
on the head of large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all 
but the mildest of conditions. 
Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous 
defensive rural urban interface firefighting is.  Firefighters exposed to head 
fire fronts will potentially be subjected to levels of radiant heat that are 
capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as little as five seconds in 
elevated fire weather conditions and higher fuel loads.   Incident Controllers 
and fire crew leaders must therefore carefully consider whether properties 
and the occupants that shelter inside them are defendable or whether the 
credible risk to their own crews is too high.  As discussed in Section 7, 
firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of their 
commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely than 
their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from 
insuppressible wildfire fronts.  This is  potentially due to firefighters’ own 
personal expectations that they should put themselves in personal danger to 
protect and rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the responsibility of 
keeping their crews safe and potential greater reaching consequences on 
the firefighter’s family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire 
suppression operations (Penney, 2019).   
As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind 
firefighting appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be 
considered an absolute last resort only.  Instead, firefighters should seek 
refuge in suitable structures well before the expected impact of the wildfire 
front and emerge to salvage property where they are able to do so.  
Committing to a RUI defense by positioning firefighters in between a 
landscape scale forest wildfire front and private property or critical 
infrastructure with the expectation that suppression efforts will be either safe 
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or successful is at best, reckless.  Even the intervention of aerial firefighting 
suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe or effective.  
Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should be 
considered only as a contingency plan except in extreme circumstances 
where large populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing 
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the arrival of the 
wildfire front. 
5.5. Implications for urban planners 
Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia  typically set 
deemed to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’4 threshold for development at 10kW-
2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for vulnerable, critical or hazardous land 
use5 and between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) 
for standard development such as subdivision.  As detailed in this section, 
10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and 
breathing apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds.  At the 
same level, for a healthy person without protective equipment, 
incapacitating burns are predicted in approximately 60 seconds, with severe 
pain and first degree burns expected to occur after substantially less 
exposure.  By adopting these thresholds, communities are effectively being 
designed to be undefendable by firefighters.  At 29kWm-2, firefighters in 
structural PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face incapacitating 
burns in less than 30 seconds.  This realisation is also significant for firefighters 
and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened 
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed 
themselves expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable. 
The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several 
approaches that require consideration on a case by case basis: 
 
4 Planning approval will typically be provided. 
5 Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.   
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1. If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters 
during the passage of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat 
impact at any point within the development needs to be within the 
window of safe and effective wildfire suppression.  In turn, this 
arguably either requires extensive and permanent vegetation 
modification and fuel reduction around the development, or 
appropriate landscaping that forms part of a passive wildfire 
engineered design; 
2. If development does not require active firefighter defense then the 
actual level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be 
addressed by the application of enhanced wildfire resilient 
engineering construction such as that detailed in AS3959.  In turn, 
this may also allow the fire truck related road access standards to 
such as those described in existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019; 
WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012; ) to be revisited; 
3. Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire 
urban planning code, similar to that of the Building Code of 
Australia and that adopted by Tasmania (2017).  This would need 
to go beyond the existing and largely subjective planning 
guidelines and carry throughout the planning and building 
legislation and process, as is the case in Victoria (VSG, 2019); 
4. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering 
industry.  Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD) 
accreditation scheme is the first step in this process, the technical 
knowledge and expertise required of wildfire engineers arguably 
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Section 6 – Critical flow rates and deluge protection systems 
6.1. Introduction  
Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts, 
yet water remains the primary extinguishing agent (Hansen, 2012). Whilst 
prediction of water suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting 
strategies and logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of 
many previous publications (Grimwood, 2017; Barnett, 2004), the same level 
of research has yet to be applied in the field of wildfire suppression (Hansen, 
2012; Simpson et al., 2019). With fire services around the globe advocating 
offensive wildfire fighting strategies (DFES, 2012, 2014a; DBCA, 2014; Hirsch et 
al., 1996; Eurofire, 2012) heavily reliant the application of both water and 
other suppressants, it is suggested this knowledge gap and a lack of suitable 
data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant wildfires, known as 
siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services internationally.  
Existing water extinguishment models reported by Hansen (2012) have 
been validated against field data from low intensity experimental burns with 
fire line intensities of less than 1 MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m. 
These experimental conditions are far from the conditions faced during siege 
wildfire events which can include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1 and flame 
heights extending 10–20 m above the crowns of trees (Cruz et al, 2012). 
Further limiting the application of existing research to dynamic emergency 
conditions is the lack of consideration for the capabilities of firefighting 
vehicles and aircraft that have limited water capacities and may be away 
from the active fire front for considerable durations whilst they refill. 
To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this section 
applies a fire engineering analysis of water flow rates required for head fire 
suppression during wildfires. Guidance is provided in relation to critical water 
flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest 
fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The impacts of the results 
on current suppression strategies and logistics are discussed in order to 
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facilitate enhanced effectiveness and safety of operational response to 
siege wildfire incidents.   
 
6.2 Calculating critical flow rates  
The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water 
occurs by three methods (Hansen, 2012; Grimwood, 2017): 
1. Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing 
pyrolysis and the production of combustion gases; 
2. Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below 
the critical temperature; or 
3. Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the 
fuel and resulting in a reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the 
flames. 
When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires 
only surface cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is 
rapidly dispersed and will not noticeably affect the flame temperature 
(Hansen, 2012). As a result, by applying Fire Point Theory and accounting for 
external radiant and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF) in Lm−2s−1 
can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using Equation (6.1). CF is the 
flow rate of water required to extinguish a burning surface, with an infinite 
period of time available (Särdqvist, 2002). As the wildfire length and depth of 
the active flame front changes over time and is influenced by many factors 
including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and fuel geometry 
(Cruz et al., 2015, Penney & Stevenson, 2019), the CF can only be calculated 
at a specific point in time. The limitations of fire ground suppression, including 
appliance or aircraft capacity and available must be considered and are 
addressed later in the section.  
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?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0  is the critical water application rate assuming no external heat 
flux, identified as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 (Hansen, 2012), 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 is the efficiency of 
water application, representing the portion of water leaving the firefighting 
branch which actually contributes to fire extinguishment, conservatively 
assumed to be 0.7 (Hansen, 2012), 𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 is the enthalpy change of water, 





�2 × 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽�
× 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙�� (6.2) 
Where 𝐹𝐹 is fire line intensity in kWm−1, 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m, 𝛽𝛽 is depth of 
the active flame in m, 𝜏𝜏 is atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due 
to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect to the flames, 𝜏𝜏  is view 
factor, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect 
to the flames, h is the convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K 
assuming a forced convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 (Hansen, 2012), Tg 
is gas temperature of the flame, assumed to be 1090 K, representative of 
siege wildfire conditions (Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 
2003; Rossi et al., 2011; Wotton et al., 2011), Tfuel is the fuel temperature of the 
fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition surface temperature for pine-
needle fuel beds (Hansen, 2012). 
Penney et al., (2019b) completed analysis of CF using Equation (6.1) across 
variations of fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range 
of wildfire conditions and scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel 
loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1 with corresponding total fuel 
loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the canopy 
contributes 10 tha−1 reported in SAI Global (2018) is retained) were simulated, 
representing a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads (Penney et al., 2019a). Ten 
variations of FDI at increments of 10 between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th 
percentile of fire weather conditions across Australia (Dowdy et al., 2012) 
were incorporated into the simulations. Nine variants of active flame depth 
(D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–10 m, representative of 
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the optically thick head fire flame experienced during severe wildfire events 
(Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011). 
In total, 540 wildfire scenarios were analysed. Appliance and aircraft water 
suppression capabilities were derived from technical literature (DFES 2013, 
2014c, 2014d, 2016c, 2017) and discussions with technical experts (Parks, 
2018). These capabilities are summarized in Table 6.1, with maximum 
potential flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study. 
Deterministic analysis of calculated required CF to available flow rates was 
completed. For the purposes of deterministic analysis, it was assumed that 
appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m 
length of active head fire front. These values can be easily converted should 
different active head fire lengths be required. 
52Table 6.1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities. 
Type Name Water Capacity (L) Flow Rate (Ls−1) 
Aircraft-Rotary 1  Dauphin Type 2 1000–1200 ~333–400 
Aircraft-Rotary 2  Erikson S64E Aircrane 7560 ~1512 
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3  AirTractor AT802F 3150 ~1050 
Appliance 4WD 4  Light Tanker ~500 2.5 
Appliance 4WD 4,5  Heavy Tanker ~3000 3.8–7.9 
1 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8 m, drop length 
~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 3 s; 4 
Branch jet spray width ~1 m; 5 700 L water required for appliance sprinkler protection which 
activates at 3 Ls−1 from each head. 
6.3 Implications for wildfire suppression  
As reported in Penney et al. (2019 b), figure 6.1a–f illustrate critical flow (CF) 
rates per 10 m section of active head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep 
active flame front through understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through 
to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep active flame front through understorey fuels of 30 
tha−1 at an FDI of 100. As previously described, this study assumes appliances 
and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of active 
head fire front and the results are presented on this basis.  
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single 
Light Tanker cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire 
front once an active flame depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads 
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and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining a 6 m depth, in limited Light 
Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200 s in limited 
circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a 
maximum flow rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at 
10 m section of active wildfire front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5 
tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a single Heavy Tanker to 
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With 
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide 
enough flow rates to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless 
of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel load.  
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers 
cannot deliver sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of 
FDI, once the active flame depth reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of 
w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25 tha−1 [22,26]. In larger 
appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be 
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an 
FDI of 40. All aircraft reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF. 
However, they remain restricted by the inherent limitations of availability, turn 
around, restricted ability to operate at night where they may be most 
effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of 
privately operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of 
aerial suppression on safety grounds (Parks, 2018).  
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire 
emergency, Figure 6.1a–f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine 
the suitability of appliance-based suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI 
and active flame depth are known. In jurisdictions that do not rely on FDI or 
surface fuel loads, it is suggested Table 6.2 (with an appropriate safety factor) 
may be suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to 
available CF, and therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts 
are potentially suitable. Used in conjunction with existing suppression 
thresholds and newer thresholds that consider radiant heat flux and firefighter 
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tenability (Penney et al. 2019a), these results will assist provide greater 
justification for the selection of appropriate wildfire suppression strategies.  
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when 
analyzing wildfire severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In 
addition to having a significant impact on CF as shown in this study, the depth 
of the active flame front has significant effects on emissivity and 
subsequently, radiant heat flux. It is therefore proposed that active flame 
depth may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional 
measures of RoS, intensity or Lf utilized internationally. Where active flame 
depths remain less than 3 m, traditional suppression strategies may remain 
suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and due care is 
exercised.  
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with 
the assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have 
appliances consistently attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not 
in any way suggested incident logistics is as simplistic as providing a single 
suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front, it may be 
applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that 
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65Figure 6.1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s 
for Forest with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e) 
25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1. 
CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in 
Figures 6.2–6.4. This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD) 
to be expressed as equations of the corresponding the fire behaviour, 
summarized in Table 6.2. The advantages of this approach are: 
1. The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather 
conditions and understorey fuel loads. Therefore the CF can be 
rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring current 
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calculating FDI) or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary 
across the landscape.; and 
2. It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools 
to assess the potential suitability of suppression strategies.  
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the 
power functions appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths 
greater than 6m compared to using Fire Point Theory and Equation (6.1) 
directly. This may be explained however as the equations are trend lines of 
the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower 
levels of wildfire behaviour.  
53Table 6.2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length. 
Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42 
3 CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43 
4 CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44 
5 CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44 
6 CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45 
7 CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45 
8 CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45 
9 CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45 
10 CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46 
Intensity, I (kWm−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.11(I)0.33 
3 CF3 = 0.15(I)0.34 
4 CF4 = 0.12(I)0.35 
5 CF5 = 0.22(I)0.35 
6 CF6 = 0.24(I)0.36 
7 CF7 = 0.27(I)0.36 
8 CF8 = 0.30(I)0.36 
9 CF9 = 0.32(I)0.36 
10 CF10 = 0.35(I)0.36 
Flame Length, Lf (m) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.64 Lf0.62 
3 CF3 = 0.90 Lf0.63 
4 CF4 = 1.14 Lf0.65 
5 CF5 = 1.35 Lf0.65 
6 CF6 = 1.56 Lf0.66 
7 CF7 = 1.74 Lf0.67 
8 CF8 = 1.93 Lf0.67 
9 CF9 = 2.11 Lf0.68 
10 CF10 = 2.28 Lf0.68 




66Figure 6.2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of 
head fire Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1). 
 
67Figure 6.3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of 
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68Figure 6.4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of 
flame length, Lf (m) 
Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how 
they influence CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs 
were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25 tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I = 
43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel = 588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0.7, 𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 
= 2640 kJkg−1, ?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8. As the effects of 
FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships 
identified in Section 2) and flame depth are investigated throughout the 
study, sensitivity to the remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and 
increasing the subject base input by 20%, all other inputs as assumed. The 
results are summarized in Table 6.3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏, there was 
little if any change to CF as a result of a 20% to the base input. It is worth 
noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close 
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54Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis. 
Input % Change to Base Input % Change to Critical Flow (CF) 
h ±20% ±1% 
Tg ±20% ±2% 
Tfuel ±20% ±1% 
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 ±20% ±1% 
𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 ±20% ±1% 
?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ±20% ±0% 
𝜏𝜏 ±20% ±24% 
𝜏𝜏 ±20% ±24% 
 
 
6.4 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s 
The outcomes of this research are perhaps best represented using the 
following analogy: 
Imagine a small campfire less than 1m in diameter.  That is the wildfire.  
Now imagine a thimble of water.  That is a small firefighting aircraft.  Pour 
the thimble of water on the campfire.  The effect is negligible, and would 
continue to be so even if 30 thimbles were applied in rapid succession. 
However, if the vegetation fuel in the campfire is instead only one matchstick 
size portion, then that thimble of water will extinguish the fire. 
 
Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to 
landscape scale forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active 
flame depth of the head fire increases.  By understanding this concept, as 
well as how vegetation structure influences fire behaviour and fire front 
geometry, IMT’s and firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for 
suppression success.  At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists 
understand these relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire 
behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT and frontline firefighters.  
The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in this and other sections 
may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are unlikely to succeed 
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and resources would be better spent in evacuations or allowing crews more 
time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets. 
6.5 Implications for urban planners 
The data and results presented in this section reinforce the implications for 
Urban Planners discussed in Section 5.   
 
Section 7 – Vehicle protection systems during entrapment and 
burnover 
7.1. Introduction 
During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics 
[Penney et al, 2019a] or sudden changes in wind direction (Lahaye et al., 
2018) can result in firefighters being directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire, 
a situation known as entrapment.  The occurrence of wildfire flame directly 
impacting firefighters is known as burnover.  The threat posed from 
entrapment and burnover is significant and has resulted in 411 firefighter 
deaths in the USA from 1910 to 2006 (Mangan, 2007), 92 Australian firefighter 
deaths from 1901 to 2011 (Blanchi et al., 2014) and 165 Canadian firefighter 
deaths between 1941 and 2010 (Alexander & Buxton-Carr, 2011). In many 
cases multiple fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.  
The causes entrapment and burnover are well known (Wilson,1977), although 
more recent studies have increased this understanding by defining human 
factors and fire behaviour leading up to these events (Blanchi et al. 2012; 
Butler et al. 1998; Diakakis et al. 2016; Page & Butler, 2017; Lahaye et al., 2016, 
2018; Viegas et al. 2009).    
 
7.2. Vehicle Protection Systems 
In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity of 
firefighting vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for 
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entrapped occupants, Australian fire services have invested in vehicle 
protection systems (VPS). 
Vehicle protection systems include (DFES, 2016a; IDES, 2014) (figure 2):   
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets 
and personal fire blankets; 
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal 
damage, through shielding, relocation and lagging; 
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage, 
through shielding, relocation and lagging; 
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous 
enclosure of non-combustible materials through: 
i. removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin 
body aesthetic panels, side mirror mounts, door handles, 
backing plates and underbody panels; or 
ii. Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant; 
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the 
replacement of rear and side rear windows with solid panels; 
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and 
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated 





69Figure 7.1: Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed (DFES, 
2013c); (b) Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical wildfire fighting 
appliance showing position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a). 




The vehicle protection system deluge sprays designed to (DFES, 2016b): 
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;   
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and 
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition. 
 
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for a 
minimum of 5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’ sounds 
which occurs once water tank reserves reach 600L, and to have a nominal 
flow rate of 120Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of 3 bar (DFES, 2016a).  An audible 
and visual warning device alerts crews once they have reached the deluge 
system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this 
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge 
systems.  For instance Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with 
a 500L water tank, cannot be fitted with deluge systems due to insufficient 
water capacity to generate the required protection duration and existing 
vehicle weight restrictions (IDES, 2014; Knight et al, 2003). Note that existing 
design specifications do not consider water droplet size or their effect on 
thermal attenuation.   
Limited field experimentation has been completed (Cruz et al., 2016) and the 
inherent danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather 
conditions has prevented the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection 
systems being suitably quantified in full scale field experimentation.  
Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire 
engineering safety analysis [ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007].  Current external 
vehicle protection systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles 
incorporate drop down thermal shielding blankets and sprinkler deluge 
systems have been tested against fire line intensities of between 2500-
10000kWm-1 and designed to withstand 7500kWm-1 (Nichols, Gould, Knight, 
Leonard, & Brown, 2005).  In similar tests, Nichols et al. (2003) reported that 
cabin tenability was maintained when simulated fire line intensities of up to 
12000kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds when water spray 
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protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields, 
whilst Sargeant et al. (2003, p7) reported that  
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation levels 
up to 30kWm-2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity at around 
10 to 15 kWm-2” 
  By comparison forensic wildfire analysis(Cruz et al., 2012) and field 
experimentation (Cruz et al., 2011; Frankman et al., 2012) identified fire line 
intensities of up to 88MWm-1 and radiant heat fluxes in excess of 100kWm-2 
can be experienced for longer durations during landscape scale wildfires, far 
exceeding the limits of crew protection systems (Nicholas et al., 2003).   
The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an 
adequate level of fireifghter protection during burnover remains 
unquantified.  Without validation firefighters may overestimate their 
personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will be 
adequately protected.   To address this knowledge gap and provide further 
guidance the potential effectiveness of VPS in improving firefighter tenability 
during entrapment and burnover, Penney et al. (2020b) completed: 
1. Systematic analysis of historical entrapments and burnover; and  
2. Simulated wildfires encompassing the 99th percentile of weather 
conditions and fuel structures. 
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives 
and performance criteria must be defined (ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007; Yung, 
2008).  Effectiveness is defined as the product of fire safety system efficacy 
and reliability (Thomas, 2002).  The objective of vehicle protection systems is 
to increase the tenability of firefighters during vehicle entrapment and 
burnover.  For the purposes of the study the performance criteria (PC) 
required to meet this objective were subsequently defined as: 
PC1. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 7500kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS); 
PC2. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 10000kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS 
have been tested to); 
PC3. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 12000kWm-1 (maximum short duration 
intensity VPS can withstand); 
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PC4. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than the mean historical upper reported / 
calculated intensity for all entrapments resulting in fatality or 
injury; 
PC5. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant 
heat flux (RHF) is less than 15kWm-2, assuming vehicles are 
orientated side on or with the rear to the advancing headfire; 
and 
PC6. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant 
heat flux (RHF) is less than 30kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated 
front on to the advancing headfire. 
 
7.3. Historical entrapment analysis 
 
Of the 4856 reports initially reviewed in the study (Penney et al., 2020b), 
4336 were excluded as they did not meet the initial inclusion criteria.  Of the 
remaining 520 reports, 56 reports were excluded because they did not 
involve a fatality or injury; two reports were excluded because they detailed 
accidents unrelated to entrapment (one structure fire propane tank 
explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports were excluded as they related 
to controlled burns; and 392 reports were excluded because they contained 
insufficient information to extract or calculate fire line intensity.  A total of 62 
reports were included in the final study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter 
fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports containing firefighter injuries only.   
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62% 
(n=16) of fatal entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland 
7.5% (n=2).  For entrapments involving injury only, forest accounted for 
approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands 14%  (n=5), scrub 11% 
(n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).   
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for 
approximately 40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16% 
(n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland 22% (n=14).  Wildfire behaviour (lower 
and upper reported / calculated values) during entrapments and burnover 
at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table 7.1, with 
distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 7.2.  The highest RoS by 
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vegetation type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53ms-1, Scrub 7.23ms-1, Shrub 
6.73ms-1, and Grass 5.63ms-1.  The highest intensity and flame length 
occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal entrapments, with the highest 
reported intensity being 249226kWm-1, the highest calculated intensity being 
318990kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7 
to 61m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all 
entrapments was 64453kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the 
intensity threshold for Performance Criteria 4.  Acknowledging the limitations 
and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study, these figures are 
consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs (Alexander & Cruz, 
2016; Tedim et al., 2018; Penney et al., 2019a). 
 
55Table 7.1. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or 
fatality, showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and 
standard deviation (σ) 
Fatality only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 2.0 2.1 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.3 2.4 
I lower reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 1012 318990 68523 87142 
I upper reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 3113 318990 83545 85912 
LF lower reported value (m) 1.8 45.7 13.7 13.0 
LF upper reported value (m) 3.0 61 19.8 18.5 
Injury only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.2 4.5 1.5 1.4 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.2 6.7 2.2 1.8 
I lower reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 253 209250 32937 7481 
I upper reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 850 227850 50664 60349 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 8.5 10.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 11.8 15.5 
All incidents considered 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 1.8 1.8 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.2 2.1 
I lower reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 253 318990 47860 67687 
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I upper reported / calculated value 
(kWm-1) 850 318990 64453 73373 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 10.6 11.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 15.0 17.1 
 
 
(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation 
 
(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation 




(c) LF all incidents by vegetation 
70Figure 7.2: Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity; (c) LF 
Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its 
required objective, assuming it functions as intended (SFPE, 2008; Thomas, 
2002, Yung, 2008).  Table 7.2 details the efficacy of vehicle protection 
systems against Performance Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from the historical 
entrapments analysed.  Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up 
to an intensity 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy 
between 0.12 to a maximum of 0.36.  An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 
0.42 is observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance 
Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, are considered.  Vehicle protection systems 
designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.  Applying 
Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean 
historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1), efficacy of 
vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81.  By 
comparison, Yung (2008) reports the efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a 
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‘large’ fire in buildings as between 0.89 to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness 
(efficacy multiplied by reliability) of 0.77 to 0.96.  In conjunction with the 
analysis of historical entrapments, this suggests that existing vehicle 
protection systems may be unreliable in protecting vehicle occupants from 
entrapment and burnover.  Improvements in vehicle protection system 
efficacy could be achieved by increasing the performance standard they 
are required to meet, whilst further research into the reliability of vehicle 
protection systems will facilitate greater understanding of overall 
effectiveness. 
56Table 7.2. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments 
considering  
Fatality only incidents (n=26) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.19 (n=5) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.69 (n=18) 0.62 (n=16) 
Injury only incidents (n=36) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.36 (n=13) 0.22 (n=8) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=15) 0.28 (n=10) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.47 (n=17) 0.33 (n=12) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.81 (n=29) 0.67 (n=24) 
All incidents (n=62) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.29 (n=18) 0.18 (n=11) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.37 (n=23) 0.21 (n=13) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=26) 0.24 (n=15) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.76 (n=47) 0.66 (n=41) 
 
7.4. Design wildfire analysis 
Where full scale systems testing is prohibitive, fire safety systems analysis 
using simulations and modelling (International Code Council et al., 2005; 
SFPE, 2007, 2008) is required.  Assessing the effectiveness of existing VPS 
against the full scale of wildfires experienced in Australia using field testing is 
not achievable due to the inherent dangers associated with catastrophic 
wildfire events and the costs associated with the burnover of firefighting 
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appliances.  To in part address this and provide some guidance to 
firefighters, Incident Management Teams and fire safety engineers, simulated 
design fires are used for the study.  Yung (2008, p80) defines define fires as 
“prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection engineers for 
performance-based fire safety designs”.   
The approach adopted by Penney et al. (2020b) enabled vehicle 
protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6 (intensities of 
7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1, 12000kWm-1, 64453kWm-1; and radiant heat flux of 
15kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub 
and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and grassland fire danger 
indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.  
A total of 90 simulations were completed during the first phase of the study. 
As expected wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed (V) and Forest 
/ Grassland Fire Danger Indices (Figure 7.3a-j), which is consistent with the 
principles of established wildfire behaviour.  Forest simulations on flat ground 
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) and 
Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to 
20, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a 
Fire Danger Index of 20 to 30.  Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance 
threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity 
of 64453kWm-1) was not exceeded regardless of the Fire Danger Index.  By 
comparison Woodland simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity 
exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index 
of 30 to 40, intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) 
between a FDI of 40 to 50, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being 
exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 50 to 60.  Echoing the results of 
Forest simulations, Performance Criteria 4 (64453kWm-1) was not exceeded in 
Woodland regardless of the Fire Danger Index.  In Grassland under 
equivalent conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a 
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Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not 
exceeded at any Fire Danger Index. 
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. (2010) report virtually all 
house loss from wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the 
99.5th percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the 
regions considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire 
Danger Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there is little house loss 
on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  This indicates that 
vehicle protection systems designed to current performance criteria are 
unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively 
involved in the protection of houses during significant wildfire events. 
  The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub 
wildfires is illustrated in Figures 7.3g and 7.3i.  Scrub simulations on flat ground 
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between 
windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15kmh-1.  Unlike all other simulations, intensity 
exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only once 
windspeed exceeded approximately 55kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub 
simulations in equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding 
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between windspeeds of 5 to 15kmh-1, and 
Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between windspeeds of 25 to 
35kmh-1.  Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of 
windspeed in Shrub simulations. 
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing 
slope across all vegetation structures.  Simulations in each fuel structure 
were completed at 0° to 20°. When simulating the effect of increase in slope 
(Figures 7.3b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was confirmed between slope 
and wildfire intensity (Table 7.3).  This subsequently resulted in Performance 
Criteria 1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased.  
Increased slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded 
where it previously provided adequate protection.   These outcomes were 
expected given the mathematical relationship between slope, rate of 
spread and intensity detailed in Penney et al (2020b).   
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Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also 
confirmed consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W) 
load increased (Figure 7.4).  At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat 
ground, fire line intensities exceeded Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when 
Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire values (w= 10-
12.5tha-1 and W= 14-17.5tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded 
once Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5tha-1 and W= 21-24.5tha-1) of 
default design wildfire values.  Under the same conditions, Performance 
Criteria 1 was exceeded when Woodland fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9tha-
1 and W= 12.5-15tha-1) of default design wildfire values and both 
Performance Criteria 2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached 
70-80% (w= 10.5-12tha-1 and W= 17.5-20tha-1) of their default design wildfire 
values (the fuel loads assigned in AS3959).  Performance Criteria 4 was not 
exceeded in Forest or Woodland simulations at any fuel load up to 100% of 
default values detailed in AS3959.  These results indicate that whilst sparser 
fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems designed to 
existing performance criteria may still be exceeded, however vehicle 
protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 4 would provide a 
significantly higher level of firefighter protection.  
  










































(c) Woodlands headfire FDI sensitivity (d) Woodland headfire intensity slope 
sensitivity (FDI 80) 
  
(e) Grass headfire FDI sensitivity (f) Grass headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(GFDI 110) 
  





































































































































(i) Shrub headfire V sensitivity (j) Shrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(V=45) 
71Figure 7.3: Wildfire intensity by vegetation type 
57Table 7.3. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types  
Slope 
Intensity factor 








































































Understory (w) and Total (W) fuel load
Forest Woodland 7500kW/m 10000kW/m 12000kW/m
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
185 
 
Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated 
at 5m increments for 0 to 100m of separation from the headfire for Forest, 
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7.5).  
As expected, radiant heat flux at each unit of separation increases with 
slope, Fire Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) and 
windspeed (V).   
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance 
Criteria 5  (15kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) were exceeded 
for 0 to 5m separation from the wildfire front.  Historical analysis (Table 3) 
identifies the mean flame length during entrapments and burnover resulting 
in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15m, with a maximum flame length of 45.7 
to 76.2m.  This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the 
event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and 
burnover during the passage of the headfire.   
In Forest simulations (Figure 7.5a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 14m separation from the headfire at a 
Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 44m at a Fire Danger 
Index of 100.  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) 
for approximately 8m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 
10, increasing to approximately 25m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.   
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands 
fuels was slightly higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory 
fuel (15tha-1) compared to Forest (25tha-1).  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 10m separation from the 
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 30m at a 
Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7.5b).  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m separation from the 
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 17m at a 
Fire Danger Index of 100.    
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In Scrub simulations (Figure 7.5c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 8m from the headfire at a windspeed 
of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 35m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  
Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for 
approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to 
approximately 20m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  By comparison, in Shrub 
simulations (Figure 7.5d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 
(15kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-
1, increasing to approximately 25m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.  Radiant 
heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2)for approximately 4m 
from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 13m 
at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.   
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7.5e) radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 10m from the headfire at 
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 17m at a 
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at 
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a 
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.     
These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing 
vehicle protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the 
conditions Blanchi et al (2006) report are most likely to be involved in the 
defense of life and property. 
 
 





(a) Forest headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
(b) Woodland headfire RHF as a function 
of separation distance 
  
 
(c) Scrub headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
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73Figure 7.5: Radiant heat flux (RHF) as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b) 
Woodland; (c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland  
Sensitivity analysis (table 7.4) demonstrates the separation required from 
the headfire (all vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall 
below Performance Criteria 5 and 6 increases with slope.  Similarly, sensitivity 
analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in Forest/Woodland design wildfires 
(Figure 7.6a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between the separation 
required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below 
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w).  At surface fuel 
loads (w) of 30tha-1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux exceeds 
Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) until approximately 45m separation from 
the forest head fire is achieved.  Under the same conditions radiant heat flux 
exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) until separation of approximately 
25m is achieved.  The required separation from the head fire for RHF 
decreases with FDI and w, with only approximately 6m separation required 
for RHF to fall below 30kWm-2 at a FDI of 100 when w is 5tha-1; and 10m 
separation required for RHF to fall below 15kWm-2 under the same conditions. 
 
58Table 7.4. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before 
Performance Criteria 5 & 6 are achieved.   
Vegetation 
Slope 
0° 5° 10° 15° 20° 
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 35-40m 45m 55m 65m 75-80m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 25m 30m 35-40m 45-50m 55-60m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 20-25m 25-30m 30m 30-35m 35-40m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 20-25m 25-30m 
Grassland (GFDI=110) 15m 15-20m 20m 15-20m 25-30m 
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 40-45m 50-55m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 10-15m 15-20m 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 10-15m 10-15m 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 5-10m 5-10m 10-15m 10-15m 10-15m 
Grassland (GFDI=110) 5-10m 5-10m 10m 10-15m 10-15m 
 
 




(a) w = 5tha-1 (b) w = 10tha-1 
  
(c) w = 15tha-1 (d) w = 20tha-1 
  
(e) w = 25tha-1 (f) w = 30tha-1 
 
74Figure 7.6: Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the 
headfire: (a) w = 5tha-1; (b) w = 10tha-1; (c) w = 15tha-1; (d) w = 20tha-1; (e) w = 25tha-1; (f) w 
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The results identify that vehicle protection systems designed to operate in 
fire line intensities of 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably 
expected to have been successful in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments 
and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault 100% of the time (i.e. a 
reliability factor of 1.00).  An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was 
observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance 
Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, were considered.  Vehicle protection systems 
designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.  This is well below 
the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems (Yung, 2008; SFPE, 
2008).  Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle 
protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated 
intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an 
increase in efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 
to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is 
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria 
are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.  Further 
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems is also 
recommended to enable the effectiveness of each system to be determined 
as part of a detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering 
analysis.  Until this is completed the potential of unrealistic expectations of 
the safety afforded to firefighters during entrapment and burnover may 
contribute to increased injuries or fatalities during wildfire suppression.  
Radiant heat flux analysis further highlights the performance limitations of 
existing vehicle protection systems.  Whilst the 95th and 99th percentiles of Fire 
Danger Indices across Australia from 2000 to 2007 as reported by Dowdy et 
al. (2009) are illustrated in figure 2.2 (refer to Chapter 2), fire weather in 
Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change Lucas et al. 
(2007).  As Blanchi et al. (2010) report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in 
Australia occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th 
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions 
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considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger 
Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there is little house loss on days 
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  Fire line intensity simulations 
identified Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1 
and 12000kWm-1 respectively) were exceeded on flat terrain in Forest below 
a Fire Danger Index of 30; in Woodlands at Fire Danger Indices between 30 
to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of less than 50 
(equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub at 
windspeeds of less than 15kmh-1.  By comparison, the mean historical upper 
recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) 
was not exceeded in any simulation, regardless of Fire Danger Index or 
windspeed except for Scrub fuels once windspeed reached approximately 
55kmh-1.   
Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Penney et al. (2020b) 
demonstrated vehicle protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15 
kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) are likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment 
where flame immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for 
significant distances of separation from the headfire.  To increase firefighter 
safety it is recommended further research and development into vehicle 
protection systems satisfying Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire 
tests on building materials, components and structures – Part 8.2 Tests on 
elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack – 
large flaming sources,  which specifically identifies performance criteria for 
prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40kWm-2.   
7.6. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists, IMT’s and fire services  
This chapter identifies that vehicle protection systems designed to the 
existing intensity standard of 7500kWm-1 may have been successful in 0.12 to 
0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without 
fault.  An efficacy this low is highly unlikely to be tolerated in any traditional 
fire safety system.  In conjunction with research into wildfire weather in 
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Australia, the results of design wildfire analysis indicate existing vehicle 
protection systems are unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are 
most likely to be actively involved in the protection of houses during 
significant wildfire events.  In order to maximise firefighter safety during 
wildfire suppression, and to avoid providing firefighters unrealistic 
expectations regarding vehicle protection systems and other fire safety 
systems which may contribute to firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is 
recommended fire services should include training on the limitations of their 
respective systems.  
Significant improvements in firefighter safety during entrapment and 
burnover may be made by increasing the required intensity threshold of VPS.  
Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle protection 
systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 
64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an increase in 
efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81. 
Adopting this intensity threshold would also result in vehicle protection 
systems being theoretically effective in all design wildfires modelled, with the 
exception of Scrub where VPS may potentially remain effective until 
windspeeds reach 45 to 55kmh-1.  
When considering radiant heat flux, this chapter identifies that both 15 
and 30kWm-2 is likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame 
immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for significant distances 
of separation from the headfire.  To increase firefighter safety it is 
recommended fire services not only ensure wildfire suppression training 
includes analysis of the magnitude and effects of wildfire radiant heat flux, 
but include credible worse case radiant heat flux thresholds of 30kWm-2 as 
one of the mandatory performance criteria of VPS and any other wildfire 
vehicle fire safety system. 
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather 
alongside the findings of other recent research (Penney et al., 2019a, 2019b, 
2020a, 2020b) into wildfire suppression strategies and the limitations of 
firefighters and the equipment they rely on. A recurring theme within the 
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conclusions of this research is that when attempting to suppress landscape 
scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early 
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding, 
evacuations and clear communication to the community and other 
stakeholders that conditions at the head fire are not defendable.  It is 
suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances should be 
employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, 
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early 
adoption of this approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately 
tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be 
at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire.  Further, it will clearly 
articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to prevent 
unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during 
catastrophic wildfire events. 
 
Section 8 – Risk in the firefighting context 
8.1 Introduction 
Succinctly described by (Kunadharaju et al., 2011), “there is little protective 
redundancy in firefighting.” Accordingly, effective risk management is an 
essential component of dynamic firefighting operations throughout the 
world. International Standard 31000 Risk management guidelines (ISO, 2018) 
subsequently referred to as ISO31000, is the standard of risk management 
within the Australian emergency services context.   
Previous studies (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al. 2007) reported 
decisions made on the incident ground to be reactionary rather than 
considered, or to be adapted from previous experience at similar situations 
or incidents potentially without thorough analysis (Tissington & Flin, 2007). 
Dynamic risk management in the emergency rescue context is often 
restricted to a qualitative selection of tactics guided by tacit professional 
craft knowledge as opposed to quantified risk assessment and evidence 
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based practice as part of the entire risk management process (Jacobs, 2010; 
Loflin & Kipp, 1997). Buoyed by disasters of significant scale including, the 
devastating Grenfell Tower fire of June 14, 2017 (GTI, 2018) and more frequent 
siege and mega wildfires such as those experienced in California (CA Gov, 
2018; USFS & CDFFP, 2004), Greece (CBS, 2018) and Australia (Bushfire CRC, 
2009), fire services are facing increased public scrutiny and both firefighters 
Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) are being held to a higher standard of 
performance than ever before.  
In response to the changing external environment, fire services throughout 
the world are embracing new technologies and turning to research to 
support evidence based practice.  At the same time, fire services are 
collecting significant amounts of specific and information rich data. 
Probabilistic analysis of this data can subsequently facilitate improvements in 
operational risk management during emergencies and in pre-incident 
planning (Penney, 2017, 2019) ultimately resulting in a safer workplace and 
providing Incident Commanders evidence that can be used to support 
operational decisions. This chapter not only defines risk management within 
the dynamic emergency fire service context, but explores firefighters risk 
attitudes and how these may influence Incident Controllers (IC’s). 
 
8.2 Defining risk in dynamic fire and emergency situations  
Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often used incorrectly instead of, or interchangeably 
with the term ‘hazard’ within the majority of fire services literature (Penney, 
2017, 2019), risk is specifically defined as the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” (ISO, 2018). Risk is not an event (SAI Global, 2013a) such as an 
explosion, fire or other emergency. Instead, risk is expressed as the likelihood 
of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring. When applied to 
emergency response it is essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic, 
occurring within an environment subject to constant change and therefore 
the level of uncertainty and therefore risk, must be constantly reassessed. 
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Often inappropriately described, three elements must be defined in order to 
articulate risk: 
1. The objective(s) being referred to; 
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and 
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences. 
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may 
include: 
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved 
in a high speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the 
firefighters from mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards preventing all 
firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. In this statement: 
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed; 
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and 
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead 
to the consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.  
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may 
include: 
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved 
in a high speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the 
firefighters from mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards preventing all 
firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. 
 
In this statement: 
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed; 
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and 
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead 
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8.3 Risk management in the dynamic emergency 
context 
The term ‘risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework 
and process) for managing risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the 
application of that structure to the decision making process (SAI Global, 
2013a). The risk management process provides the architecture for decision 
making and must be applied in every situation, including emergency 
response, for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently 
(Penney, 2016).  Further, SAI Global (2013a,p45) provides the following 
example of how the process must be applied in even the most dynamic 
emergency situations: 
 “A military special forces section leader might have a split second in 
which to make a tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that 
of subordinates as well as the success of the mission, might depend. In that 
time the leader must recall the objectives, appreciate the external and 
internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options, review those 
against the objectives and take the appropriate action. Despite the very 
short decision making window, the quality of each of these steps must be 
of the highest standard.” 
Failure to comprehend risk or to apply the entire risk management structure 
to dynamic decision making in the emergency environment can result in 
decisions that exacerbate rather than mitigate adverse consequences. 
Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also lead to post incident 
scrutiny of the decisions made by ICs. Existing studies suggest risk assessment 
in accordance with (ISO, 2018) may not occur during frontline emergency 
response in most jurisdictions (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al., 2007; 
Penney, 2019). In contrast to these findings however, the risk management 
methodology for dynamic emergency incidents adopted by United 
Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government is comprehensive and requires specific attention.  
The first of these publications, the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health, 
safety and welfare framework for the operational environment” (DCLG, 
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2013), details a comprehensive architecture for management of dynamic 
incident risk that commences with the brigade’s senior officers and ends with 
the individual emergency responder on the incident ground. This publication 
is unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges 
Health and Safety legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency 
response, but embraces it as a pillar of dynamic emergency risk 
management. In doing so the United Kingdom Fire Services succinctly define 
both internal and external organisational risk contexts as they apply to 
frontline operations. Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic 
incident risk assessment process through the hierarchy of command but also 
provides multiple fire service specific examples for ICs and front line personnel 
of all ranks and operational roles to reference. Perhaps most importantly from 
an organisational context is the recognition that “standard operational 
procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident Commander 
to exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to 
resolve the emergency” (DCLG, 2013, p23). The flexibility for ICs and 
personnel to use ‘operational discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should 
be based on a balance in terms of risk versus benefit, and the Incident 
Commander knowing the action which they are normally required by the 
relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013 ,p23). In these 
statements the term Incident Commander and IC are interchangeable. 
The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire 
Service Operations – Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008). It is the doctrine of 
fire service dynamic incident management at all levels and embraces 
incident risk management as one of the three key elements required for 
effective incident command. Most significantly DCLG (2008, p64) recognises 
“in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational 
incidents, the organisations health and safety management must operate at 
three different levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic.” At a strategic 
level, the doctrine defines the fire service’s risk attitudes and establishes 
internal context whilst complying with relevant external contexts. This is 
achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk 
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philosophy of the fire service. Systematic risk management is completed by 
operational subject matter experts in each discipline. The results subsequently 
guide the development and implementation of operations including but not 
limited to safe work systems, procedures, equipment, training and 
supervision. Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational 
incident and encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel 
involved in the incident whilst an emergency situation is present.  
In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential 
to distinguish between time critical emergency situations, for instance where 
lives are endangered and rescue is required, and non-emergency situations 
such as body recovery. The distinction is critical as risk thresholds will vary 
accordingly as demonstrated in the “Safe Person Concept” (NZFS, 2008) and 
the philosophy of the DCLG [2008,p65], 
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters: 
• Will take some risk to save saveable lives. 
• May take some risk to save saveable property. 
• Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are 
already lost.” 
Whilst NZFS (2008) considers dynamic incident risk management in 
isolation, DCLG (2008, 2013) acknowledge it as only a part of the greater risk 
management process applicable to the fire service as a workplace.  
Through this approach the United Kingdom integrates the internal and 
external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process. 
This holistic approach empowers ICs to manage risk in accordance with 
ISO31000 regardless of the nature of the emergency encountered. 
 
Klein’s (1989) Recognition-Primed Decision and Rasmussen’s Decision 
Ladder (1976, cited in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models 
representing the decision process of experienced personnel in dynamic 
situations.  Both models are dependent on a high level of expertise from the 
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decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured 
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar, 
2010).  Neither model references the application of risk management into 
the decision making process or how prior exposure may influence risk 
tolerance and the cognitive process.  Recognition Primed Decision Making 
(RPDM) requires a level of operational maturity bordering on mastery that 
can only be achieved through significant and repeated exposures that result 
in both positive and negative consequences.  Basing training solely on 
RPDM can be problematic as it relies on teaching rookie ICs the “experience” 
of veterans and expecting them to respond as the veteran would, despite 
not having the personal library of experience to draw upon.  Alternatively, 
the cognitive processes explained by Kahneman (2012) explain how 
complex cognitive processes such as risk analysis during dynamic emergency 
situations can be expedited by the development of advanced and efficient 
cognitive processes that can be taught, practiced and mastered. Unlike 
RPDM, Kahneman’s approach supports the implementation of ISO31000 risk 
analysis during dynamic emergencies.  This is not to say that RPDM does not 
have a place in risk management during emergency operations, however to 
introduce it to inexperienced ICs as the sole means of risk analysis is not 
appropriate. 
Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the process to comprehend 
the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk (SAI Global, 2013a). The 
process of comprehension requires the risk manager to be able to 
adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner and to subsequently 
understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring. During 
even the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management 
framework and structure remains the same. Each risk analysis must be 
considered a new separate process, even if it builds upon a previously and 
recently completed analysis of the same emergency situation at an earlier 
point in time. This realisation is significant as it supports the understanding that 
dynamic risk management does not involve a changing architecture or 
process of analysis, but rather the same risk management architecture and 
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analysis process applied multiple times during a rapidly changing (dynamic) 
emergency situation.  
 Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of 
both. Qualitative analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal 
of risk as described by the assessor. It is often useful when risk treatment 
strategies involve multiple risks at different levels that cannot be accurately 
measured on the same quantitative scale and may be suitable during 
preliminary or scoping assessments. Importantly, when qualitative analysis is 
applied “there should be a clear explanation of all the terms employed and 
the basis for all criteria should be recorded” (SAI Global, 2013a, p18). Review 
of fire services literature (ACT, unknown; NZFS, 2008; DFES, 2012; SACFS, 2014) 
identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life, property 
and the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of 
terminology were largely absent from operational material. Yung (2008) 
asserts that reliance on qualitative assessment alone must be considered 
fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements cannot be verified 
and may often differ between operators. Further, the same operator may 
make different decisions given the same situation at various points in time. 
Quantitative assessment requires the analysis of numerical data to 
calculate probabilities, frequencies and distributions. Considered the 
epitome of fire risk analysis probabilistic risk analysis requires detailed and time 
consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either a function of 
incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008). 
Such analysis requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as 
the ability to numerically represent variability within defined confidence 
levels, therefore it cannot be undertaken within the parameters and 
constraints of a single emergency incident. This is supported in (ACTESA, date 
unknown, p2] by the Dynamic Risk assessment overview statement that 
“often, rescues have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines 
placed before a complete appreciation of all material facts have been 
obtained”. Whilst typical quantitative analysis, including fault tree or event 
tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning and as a 
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supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for 
completion render them impractical for incident ground completion. Review 
of available literature identified that whilst significant international statistical 
analysis of fire related fatality and injury data were available (DCLG, 2015; 
FEMA, 2011 & 2012) a total absence of statistical analysis of Australian 
firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations was 
noted in both published and internal brigade documentation.  
For risk analysis during dynamic incidents to align to ISO31000, both 
qualitative and quantitative components are arguably required. Reviews of 
historical injury data may provide quantitative probabilities pertaining to the 
effectiveness of certain personal protective equipment in reducing firefighter 
injuries. At the same time, experience may provide an IC with valuable insight 
into qualitatively assessing the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain 
situations. 
 
Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or 
other inhibitors to reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event 
occurring (ISO, 2018; SAI Global, 2013a & 2013b). Consequences of 
inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent treatment can be 
catastrophic with Ash & Smallman (2012) identifying 19% of all firefighter 
deaths in the United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of 
human error. In the context of firefighting operations, risk treatments (also 
known as controls) are subsequently presented in the contextualisation of the 
traditional hierarchy of controls. 
At the top of the hierarchy is “elimination” which refers to the removal of 
the risk source. In the firefighting context this may be viewed as pre-
operational actions such as arson prevention or road safety campaigns. 
During an emergency incident “elimination” may include the decision not to 
commit crews, but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to ‘burn out’ 
so that lives are not endangered. 
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Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the 
firefighting context because firefighters often respond to emergency 
situations where time and resourcing restrictions are encountered. It may be 
considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting strategies, as 
opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition 
for substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the 
approach to resolving the incident is specifically varied in a manner that 
reduces the potential for an adverse event to occur. 
“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source. In 
the firefighting context this may only be partially achieved because there is 
likely to be a requirement for at least several firefighters to be present within 
the ‘hot’ zone (DFES 2012, 2015a, 2015b) and this remains essential to 
resolving many dynamic emergency situations. Isolation occurs through the 
implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident 
that are the greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical 
demarcation (DFES, 2015a, 2015b). Despite the use of isolation controls at 
emergency incidents, which may reduce the potential for greater numbers 
of adverse outcomes, ICs are still required to commit sufficient firefighters into 
hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency. 
“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that 
provide organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to 
resolve a dynamic emergency situation. Extensive fire services literature in this 
area was found, however, an absence of established risk criterion or 
documented risk thresholds was also noted. No reason for this absence was 
found. 
“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of 
controls and may be considered a critical component to the contextualised 
hierarchy of controls within the firefighting environment. It may be considered 
that personnel attitudes are significantly influenced by the internal context in 
which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, 2008) and the internal context of firefighters 
is particularly influential. It is therefore surmised that the attitude of individual 
firefighters under the command of an IC must be considered in the 
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contextualised hierarchy of controls. Whilst good attitudes will afford some 
benefit for the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse outcome, poor 
attitudes will inevitably increase the potential for failure to implement or 
abide by other controls and therefore increase both the probability and 
severity of adverse outcomes on the incident ground. 
“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire 
services represents the final line of defence between personnel and an 
adverse outcome. Whilst some PPE may in fact reduce the potential for 
realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus 
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of 
combustion, it must also be considered that the presence of PPE may result 
in firefighters undertaking greater risk taking behaviour due to a perception 
that the PPE affords them complete or excessive levels of protection (Penney, 
2013). 
 
8.4 Risk attitudes amongst firefighters 
Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept 
and retain risk (risk tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an 
emergency services organisation, as reported by Ash and Smallman (2012) 
and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk management decisions being made by 
ICs that could be later considered to be inappropriate or unjustified. Further, 
Ash and Smallman (2012) identified the perception by emergency services 
personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder 
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to 
inappropriate risk management during emergency response. Further, 
inappropriate or insufficient understanding and consideration of risk may 
leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous familiarity 
with the hazards they face (Sadler et al., 2007). 
Also worth consideration is the intimate culture amongst firefighting crews 
that can affect management of risk during dynamic emergencies. 
Firefighters spend a significant amount of time together during both 
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emergency incidents and routine station life (Childs et al., 2004). In this 
environment, indoctrinated traits established by organisational culture 
invariably flourish and form a unique environment that has the capacity to 
directly influence an IC’s management of risk during dynamic emergency 
operations. Reports including NIFC (1996) and Moore-Merrell et al. (2008) 
identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters in order ‘to 
get the job done’ regardless of operational guidelines. This is supported by 
the findings of Kunadharaju et al. (2011) who reported, in contrast to most 
high hazard work, firefighting operations are actively based on hazard 
engagement, typically compounded by acute time pressures. In addition to 
these findings, Fender (2003) reported multiple firefighter specific traits that 
directly affected personal risk tolerance. These included: 
1. The age of a victim - the younger the victim the higher the threshold 
to personal injury or death; 
2. Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to 
undertake more dangerous tasks if they respected the officer 
giving a command; 
3. A sense of pride in taking risks; and 
4. Expectations of the community. 
A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters 
exposed to hazardous and toxic materials (Penney, 2013) found a tendency 
amongst firefighters to perceive potentially life threatening incidents as 
routine if they were regularly encountered without acute health effects 
becoming evident. It is suggested the cultural acceptance of personal risk 
taking amongst firefighting crews needs to be carefully understood by ICs 
who are ultimately responsible for crew safety and may well have less risk 
tolerance during incidents. 
Recent research (Penney, 2016, 2019) provides insight into the risk 
attitudes and perceptions of operational Australian firefighters.  The 
research was conducted in two phases: (1) Semistructured interviews and (2) 
subsequent in-depth structured surveys. This enabled exploration and 
documentation of the beliefs, understanding, and attitudes of fire and 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
205 
 
emergency service ICs. Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative 
interactive observation of 20 current serving professional fire and emergency 
service ICs over a three-month period. All participants were experienced ICs 
with a minimum of seven years operational experience across all fire service 
hazards, including but not limited to structure fire, bushfire, hazardous 
materials, road crash, and other rescue response. Semistructured interviews 
and subsequent in-depth structured surveys designed to identify the 
individual’s risk attitudes and beliefs were completed by all participants. The 
participation of one candidate was interrupted by an incident call out, 
resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being available for analysis. These 
represented 7% of the overall officer population from a Western Australian 
career fire service background.  
The first question asked of participants in the semistructured interview was 
“How do you define risk?” Whilst all participant responses acknowledged that 
risk is a consideration of consequences and likelihood, only one participant 
provided the answer “it is the effect of uncertainty on objectives” as defined 
in ISO31000. Approximately a quarter of participants (26%) provided answers 
that were specific to emergency response without consideration of the 
greater application of risk, and only one participant provided the restrictive 
definition “risk is the potential to injure me”. Consistent with the findings of 
Tissington and Flin (2004) and Reinhardt-Klein (2010), these answers suggest 
fire and emergency service ICs generally have a perception of risk as the 
practical consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies to a 
reactive emergency environment, rather than as a considered and 
managed process consistent with ISO31000. 
The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk 
in a dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations and 
contexts?” In response, nearly all participants identified that risk 
management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar process to risk 
management in other situations, but with limited information available and 
with restricted time frames in which to make decisions. Ten percent of 
participants expressed the opinion that dynamic risk management required 
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more “forward thinking” than risk management in other situations. These 
responses again suggest the study group has adopted a definition of risk that 
is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised to 
their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in 
ISO31000; especially when consideration is given to the example of the 
special forces soldier in a hostage situation provided in SAHB436 (SAI Global, 
2013a). 
More than half of participants (58%) also expressed that they managed 
risk in dynamic emergency environments according to how they believed 
their organisation expected them to do so, or that they managed risk in 
accordance with organisational procedures and protocols. This suggests the 
majority of fire and emergency service ICs believed they managed risk using 
the same risk attitudes as their organisation. This was despite a review of the 
literature identifying an absence of organisational risk thresholds and 
attitudes specific to dynamic emergency response environments. 
Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide 
whether risks are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were 
varied. A quarter of participants (26%) reported they relied on organisational 
procedures and protocols; almost half of participants (47%) reported they 
relied on personal prior experience to determine whether risks were 
acceptable; 16% of participants stated they simply relied on whether they 
believed the risk was acceptable to themselves personally; and 10% of 
participants responded that in the case of “life involvement” (being the fire 
services terminology for when potential consequences include the loss of 
occupant life), all risks are acceptable. The variation in answers provided by 
fire and emergency service ICs represents significant variance in the risk 
thresholds between ICs within the same organisation. Conflicts between risk 
attitudes will foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident 
because additional uncertainty is introduced when individuals work together 
to form incident management teams or when they are responsible for 
different sectors within the same emergency incident. When the answers 
provided by participants to question three are considered in conjunction with 
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the answers provided by participants to question two, the variance in risk 
thresholds between participants suggests an absence of a defined 
organisational internal risk context that may otherwise guide participants 
towards similar answers. This notion is consistent with Fender (2003) and 
reinforces the conclusion that, for risk management to be compliant with 
ISO31000, it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service 
inclusive of explicitly defined risk tolerances. 
The final question posed to fire and emergency service ICs was “Does the 
risk management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment 
compared to other situations? If yes, then how?” Responses provided by 
participants were far less varied than the responses to question three. Forty-
two percent of participants stated there was no difference in the process; 
however, half of these participants also stated the time frame available for 
completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during dynamic 
emergency environments. Interestingly, one participant also stated that risk 
tolerance is significantly higher during dynamic emergency operations 
compared to other situations, which suggests fluctuating risk thresholds 
depending on the participant’s evolving perception of the severity of an 
incident. In addition, only one participant identified that the risk 
management process had to be repeated multiple times throughout an 
emergency incident, suggesting the remaining participants did not consider 
repeated risk application of the risk management process necessary.  
More than half of participants (53%) stated that the risk management 
process did differ in the dynamic emergency environment compared to 
other situations. These participants all identified that the process changed 
due to a significant reduction in both the available information on which to 
make decisions, and the available time to gather further information. One 
participant clarified their response by adding they felt “pushed to do things 
you wouldn’t normally do due to expectations and pressure”. This indicated 
they operated at risk thresholds they personally felt were unacceptable. Only 
one participant stated the dynamic risk management process was reactive 
as opposed to being a thought out process.  
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
208 
 
These findings appear to contradict the previous findings of Ash and 
Smallman (2012), Fender (2003), and Naikar (2010), all of whom identified 
decision making during dynamic emergency incidents to be reactive and 
based on recognition of specific cues. Whilst the finding from the study 
reported may be interpreted with some caution, due to the moderate 
sample size, the finding is supported by the answers provided by the fire and 
emergency service ICs to the second question posed in the interview. One 
participant stated they were unsure whether the risk management process 
differed in the dynamic emergency environment compared to other 
situations. 
The first question in the structured survey relating to risk perceptions 
required participants to identify the severity of potential consequence for 20 
outcomes that may occur during fire and emergency incidents. From the 
answers provided, probability analysis was completed across the entire 
sample population. Conditional probability was then calculated on the basis 
that participants had, or had not, been previously injured at an incident. Nine 
participant fire and emergency service ICs had been injured at an incident 
and 10 had not been injured at an incident, and these results were 
compared to the severity assigned to the consequence in fire and 
emergency services risk literature. Full results are provided in Table 8.1. 
Analysis of the results revealed there was a conditional probability of 0.00 
(zero) for all fire and emergency service ICs assigning the same severity to a 
consequence given the event being realised. Only in a single instance did a 
subgroup completely agree on the severity of a consequence. This was the 
non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic 
severity (represented by a conditional probability of 1.00). 
Further analysis revealed there was an equal probability between the 
group that had never been injured, with a conditional probability of 0.2 that 
the survey groups’ perception of consequence severity would align with the 
severity adopted by fire and emergency services. Whilst some variance may 
be expected due to potential differences in individuals’ perception of the 
consequence realised, a conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement 
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between participants and fire and emergency services in the perception of 
consequence severity of only a single occurrence each year. It is therefore 
concluded that the internal context of risk attitudes is not harmonious 
amongst fire and emergency service ICs and may lead to conflicting risk 
management during dynamic emergency situations or post-incident 
analysis. Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 
0.612 (standard deviation of 0.142) that the entire survey group would agree 
on the severity of any given consequence. This further supports the findings 
of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes between ICs and parties 
conducting post-incident analysis. 
 
 
59Table 8.1. Consequence severity across the entire sample and the injured/never been 
injured subgroups. 
Rating Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Group 
Consequence A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.21 0.22 0.20 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.78 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 
6 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.83 0.88 0.80 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.95 0.89 1.00 
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.61 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.40 
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.60 0.11 0.11 0.00 
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.06 0.11 0.00 
15 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.56 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.68 0.44 0.90 0.26 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.33 0.50 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.10 
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.22 0.50 0.58 0.78 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.10 
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.47 0.56 0.40 
Consequences:  
1. Near miss—cut finger 
2. Near miss—broken arm 
3. Near miss—death of rescuer 
4. Near miss—exposure to acutely toxic material 
5. Near miss—exposure to hazardous material with health effects that may take 20 
years to occur 
6. Scratch or dent to a vehicle 
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7. Cut finger requiring first aid treatment 
8. Broken arm requiring hospitalization 
9. Death of a rescuer 
10. Exposure to acutely toxic hazardous material requiring hospital admission 
11. Exposure to hazardous material that results in lung damage only evident 20 years 
post-exposure 
12. Inhaling asbestos particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities 
13. Exposure to silica particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities 
14. Exposure to glass particulates and dusts as a result of rescue activities 
15. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $1000 damage 
16. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $20,000 damage 
17. Damage to the environment that does not result in long term impact 
18. Damage to the environment resulting in long term impact 
19. Lung tissue damage without respiratory impairment 
20. Lung tissue damage that limits physical activity 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency 
response whilst working under a different IC  
 
An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal 
context of the risk management process (SAI Global, 2013a). To investigate 
how this may be a factor in risk management during dynamic emergency 
operations, the second question of the survey required participants to state 
their agreement to four statements regarding external and personal risk 
attitudes and expectations using a Likert scale. The statements were: 
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk 
their own lives to save others. 
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk 
their own lives to save property. 
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk 
their own lives to save the environment. 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
211 
 
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put 
themselves at a higher level of risk than the general public in the 
course of their duties. 
Full results are provided in Table 8.2. Analysis of these results reveals that 
the overwhelming majority of the entire study group (74%), as well as the both 
subgroups (injured 77% and never injured 70%), believed there were external 
expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to 
save others. By comparison, only 52% of the entire study group, 78% of the 
injured subgroup, and 30% of the never injured subgroup believed there were 
external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own 
lives to save property. This difference in attitudes between the injured and 
never injured populations appears to suggest personnel who had a higher 
personal risk threshold may be more likely to be injured during emergency 
operations; however, further research is required to confirm this hypothesis. 
Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that 
emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to save the 
environment” was less conclusive but appeared to suggest a less strongly 
held belief amongst the study group of fire and emergency service ICs that 
this was the case (37% of the total study group stating they either disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with the statement). 
 
60Table 8.2. Incident controller perceptions and expectations across the entire sample and 
the injured/never been injured subgroups. 
Response Strongly  
Disagree 
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1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives 
to save others. 
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives 
to save property. 
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives 
to save the environment.  
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a 
higher level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties. 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency 
response whilst working under a different IC  
 
To further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group, 
participants were required to identify whether potential scenarios were either 
acceptable or unacceptable when the probability of realisation of the 
consequence was low, moderate, and high. Participants were required to 
answer the question in two contexts: First, that they were personally exposed 
to the risk source and, second, that they were responsible for other 
responders and it was these other responders who were exposed to the risk 
source. The scenarios presented were: 
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where the 
consequence is being severely injured or killed. 
2. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being 
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
3. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where the 
consequence is developing cancer. 
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being 
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
5. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where the 
consequence is being severely injured or killed. 
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6. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where the 
consequence is being severely injured or killed. 
7. Entering a burning building to save the property where the 
consequence is being severely injured or killed. 
Full results are provided in Table 8.3. Analysis of results revealed a 
probability of certainty (where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study 
group of only 0.143. This means there was a probability of 0.857 that 
participants did not collectively agree on risk tolerance attitudes or 
thresholds. Further analysis revealed a probability of only 0.286 that all 
participants shared the same risk tolerance across the presented scenarios. 
This probability increased to 0.381 amongst the “injured” population, whilst 
there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst the “never 
injured” population compared to all participants. One potential explanation 
for the increased consensus of risk acceptance amongst the “injured” 
population may be that those participants who had been previously injured 
held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were more likely to undertake 
hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “never injured” 
group.  
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study 
population and both injured and never injured subpopulations where life 
involvement was present. Participants would typically put both their own 
safety and the safety of personnel under their command at increased risk to 
facilitate occupant rescue (from all risk sources). This risk acceptance with 
limited certainty increased marginally where rescue was of a colleague, 
particularly when risk was transferred from the participant to those under the 
participant’s control. Marginal increase in risk threshold was observed 
between personal and personnel exposure where rescue involved a child 
compared to an adult. It is hypothesised that this increase may be a 
consequence of perceived community expectations and/or due to an 
innate willingness to permit great risk to save a child. Further investigation is 
required to explore this hypothesis. 
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Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection 
of property, whilst the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the 
realisation of potential consequences increased. For example, the certainty 
regarding risk acceptance involving immediate impacts, such as trauma, 
was generally higher compared to those involving delayed impacts, such as 
cancer or lung disease. This suggest participants were more likely to be 
concerned with impacts they can witness immediately and is supported by 
the findings of previous research (Penney, 2013). 
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.529 
(standard deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group would agree on 
the acceptability of any given situation where the risk was personal in nature. 
By comparison, a mean probability of 0.449 (standard deviation of 0.321) was 
found that the entire survey group would agree on the acceptability of any 
given situation where the risk was to personnel under the participant’s 
command. This further supports the findings that participants were more likely 
to accept risk when they believed the consequences were limited to 
themselves. 
 
61Table 8.3. Risk tolerance to the participant themselves compared to those under their 
command. 
 
Risk to Participant Themselves Risk to Personnel Under the  
Command of the Participant 
Risk Tolerance Acceptable  Unacceptable Acceptable  Unacceptable 
Group 
Context & Risk 
A B C A B C A B C A B C 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 
3 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.95 1.00 0.90 
4 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.21 0.11 0.30 
5 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 
6 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
7 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
8 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
9 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.74 0.78 0.80 
10 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.74 1.00 0.60 0.26 0.00 0.40 
11 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.68 0.78 0.60 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
12 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
13 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.53 0.67 0.40 0.47 0.33 0.60 
15 0.21 0.11 0.30 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.89 0.89 0.90 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 
17 0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
18 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
19 0.84 0.78 0.90 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.32 0.33 0.30 
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20 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Context and Risk:  
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
2. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a moderate 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
3. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a high probability 
of being severely injured or killed 
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
5. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
6. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage. 
7. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low probability 
of developing cancer. 
8. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a moderate 
probability of developing cancer. 
9. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a high probability 
of developing cancer. 
10. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
11. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
12. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being 
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage. 
13. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or killed 
14. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a moderate 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
15. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or killed. 
16. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a low probability 
of being severely injured or killed. 
17. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a moderate 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
18. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a high 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
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19. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a low probability 
of being severely injured or killed. 
20. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a moderate 
probability of being severely injured or killed. 
21. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a high probability 
of being severely injured or killed. 
Group:  
A. Total study population 
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response 
whilst working under a different IC  
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency 
response whilst working under a different IC  
 
8.5 Probability of firefighter injury during emergency 
response 
To determine the probability of firefighter injury during emergency 
response, a retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire service safety and 
incident reports between January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was 
conducted (Penney, 2019). A retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire 
service safety and incident reports between January 1st 2001 and January 1st 
2015 was conducted.  Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional 
probability given a reportable incident occurs, and likelihood on the basis of 
activity, risk source and nature of injury reported. The results are detailed in 
Tables 8.4-8.6. Each table is ordered from highest to lowest frequency. 
 
62Table 8.4. Analysis by activity. 
Activity (A) Count P(A|B) Occurrence per 
year 
Likelihood 
Firefighting 327 0.491 21.800 Almost 
certain 
RCR 110 0.165 7.333 Almost 
certain 
Bushfire fighting 99 0.149 6.600 Almost 
certain 
Rescue 36 0.054 2.400 Almost 
certain 
Driving 30 0.045 2.000 Almost 
certain 





20 0.030 1.333 Almost 
certain 
Suicide Response 15 0.023 1.000 Almost 
certain 
Hazmat 12 0.018 0.800 Moderate 
Environmental 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
DBA 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Not reported 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Storm 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
 
63Table 8.5. Analysis by risk source. 




Physical Strain 215 0.323 14.333 Almost certain 
Exposure - asbestos 120 0.180 8.000 Almost certain 
Exposure - 
psychological 
95 0.143 6.333 Almost certain 
Impact 49 0.074 3.267 Almost certain 
Exposure - smoke 37 0.056 2.467 Almost certain 
Exposure - biohazard 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Exposure - hazmat fire 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Equipment failure 21 0.032 1.400 Almost certain 
Exposure - chemical 20 0.030 1.333 Almost certain 
Thermal 16 0.024 1.067 Likely 
Operator error 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Animal 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Communications 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Environmental 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Impaired Vision 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Other person 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Blast/Explosion 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Entrapment 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Exposure - noise 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Violence 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Electrical 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
Not reported 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
 
 
64Table 8.6. Analysis by injury. 
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Inhalation 163 0.245 10.867 Almost certain 
Psychological 96 0.144 6.400 Almost certain 
Nil 70 0.105 4.667 Almost certain 
Back 56 0.084 3.733 Almost certain 
Knee 42 0.063 2.800 Almost certain 
Eye 32 0.048 2.133 Almost certain 
Heat illness 30 0.045 2.000 Almost certain 
Shoulder 26 0.039 1.733 Almost certain 
Leg 16 0.024 1.067 Almost certain 
General 15 0.023 1.000 Likely 
Head / spinal 13 0.020 0.867 Likely 
Ankle  11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Arm 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Finger 9 0.014 0.600 Moderate 
Face 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Foot 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Multiple 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Neck 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Hand 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Elbow 6 0.009 0.400 Moderate 
Ear 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Absorption 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Not reported 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Wrist 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Chest 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Groin 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Hip  3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Abdominal 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Ingestion 2 0.003 0.133 Rare 
Thermal 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
 
By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a 
reportable event compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8 
times per year. Road crash rescue (RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable 
events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in 6.6 reportable incidents per 
year. This result suggests additional attention should be provided in training 
personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities 
most likely to give rise to a reportable incident, for example, firefighting, RCR 
and bush firefighting. 
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In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result 
in a reportable event compared to other risk sources. This is consistent with 
the physically demanding nature of firefighting (DFES, 2013) and is 
comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates in United States firefighters 
(FEMA, 2011).  
Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards 
collectively accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225 
incidents with a conditional probability of 0.338). Such exposures are 
impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of all hazards emergency 
response. However, the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be partly 
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures. Such an approach is 
best illustrated using a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al., 2010) as shown in 
Figure 8.1. In this manner both pre-exposure and post exposure controls or 
barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the likelihood and severity 
of adverse consequences. The bow tie analysis also facilitates the illustration 
of relationships between various barriers. Figure 7.1 provides a simple 
example of this in the firefighting context. Where a relationship exists between 
barriers, the influence of the preceding barrier may be either agonistic or 
antagonistic on the effectiveness of the following barrier. For example, 
inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to inappropriate 
organisational policy. This, in turn, can result in inappropriate training which 
will ultimately weaken risk management at all operational and organisational 
levels. The combined effect of the barriers and intrinsic relationships can 
ultimately affect the severity of realised consequences. 
 




75Figure 8.1. Simplified bow tie analysis contextualized to firefighting operations 
 
Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also 
psychologically demanding with exposure to psychological trauma 
identified as the second most common risk source resulting in reportable 
events. Other researchers (Carll, 2007; Trappler, 2014) concur that care must 
be taken in addressing risks arising from exposures of a psychological nature 
in firefighting which are unique to the emergency service profession. Just as 
education, awareness and resilience training is important prior to exposure to 
events of a psychological nature, specific psychological management 
programs and counselling are required post exposure.  
Analysis by injury yields results that, in limited circumstances, appear to 
conflict with other available data sets. Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most 
probable of all classified injuries to occur. However, this may be explained by 
the fact that all reported incidences of “inhalation” of smoke or other 
chemicals were captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury 
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occurred. Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported 
injury and this is consistent with the analysis of risk source data. Surprisingly 
thermal injuries, being those resulting from heat transfer were the least 
probable (0.002 conditional probability). This conflicts with data reported by 
FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher thermal injury 
occurrence rate. The number of thermal injuries reported in this study may be 
lower than the true number of injuries because many incidents may remain 
unreported. The probability of “Nil” injuries occurring represents “Near Misses” 
where no injury was actually sustained and is the third highest amongst 
reported injuries sustained. Again, this figure may be lower than the true 
number of near misses that occur during incidents because of a lack of report 
completion when near misses occur. 
Table 8.7 reports the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring 
given an injury occurs during the specified activity.  Across all activities, the 
“Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is prevalent. This is consistent with previous findings 
and suggests a large number of incidents occur with the potential to cause 
injury, but do not actually cause injury in the specific case reported. 
Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports, 
particularly where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for 
instance Road Crash Rescue and Suicide Response). In the case of reported 
injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested it is likely the “Not Reported” 
values should also be psychological injuries even though they have not been 
documented as such in the relevant reports. 
 
65Table 8.7. Conditional probability of specific injury during incident operations. 






Head / spinal 0.100 
Heat illness 0.100 
Neck 0.100 
Ankle 0.050 




































Firefighting operations Inhalation 0.434 
Back 0.092 
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Not reported 0.200 
 
Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant 
conditional probability of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only. No 
thermal burns are reported during Bushfire or other response. This is in stark 
contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries reported in United States 
statistics (FEMA, 2012). However, it is hypothesised that this may be due to 
under reporting of thermal injuries, or due to thermal injuries being referred to 
as injuries to specific body parts without reference to the burn trauma, or due 
to differences in firefighting tactics between Australia and the United States 
which may result in different mechanisms and frequencies of injury.  
For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which 
is considered surprising given the significant respiratory protection available 
to responding crews(DFES, 2013, 2014 & 2015a). Analysis of descriptions with 
the reports suggests a significant proportion of inhalation exposures may be 
due to partial-face fitting respiratory protection masks that do not completely 
prevent ingress of smoke and other products of combustion. This has been 
rectified since the study commenced, through the implementation of full 
face respirators available for firefighting personnel. The conditional 
probability of heat illness occurrence also warrants attention with prevalence 
amongst all operations and responses that require the responder to wear 
structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Wearing PPE 
requires significant physical effort. 
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Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above should assist 
incident controllers having enhanced evidence based awareness of 
potential consequences and likelihoods prior to their occurrence during an 
emergency incident. Analysis of the conditional probability of injury given an 
injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the 
review and improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief 
requirements; the potential effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the 
potential development of targeted prophylactic physical training programs. 
Table 8.8 provides useful data to facilitate the development of evidence 
based risk mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground. Physical 
Strain recurrently accounts for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source 
giving rise to a reportable incident across almost all activities. This finding is 
consistent with the previous results of both this study and FEMA (2011) and 
reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in nature. By 
comparison, Moore-Merrill et al. (2008) reported that physical strain was the 
second highest contributing factor to firefighter injury in the United States (the 
first being a lack of situational awareness). 
 
66Table 8.8. Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during incident 
operations. 
Operation Injury Conditional Probability 
Breathing apparatus 
operations 
Physical Strain 0.550 
Impact 0.150 
Entrapment 0.100 
Equipment failure 0.100 
Communications 0.050 
Electrical 0.050 
Bushfire fighting operations Physical Strain 0.515 
Exposure - smoke 0.253 
Exposure - chemical 0.061 
Impact 0.051 
Thermal 0.051 
Exposure - asbestos 0.030 
Equipment failure 0.020 
Exposure - psychological 0.010 




Firefighting operations Physical Strain 0.358 
Exposure - asbestos 0.315 
Impact 0.104 
Exposure - hazmat fire 0.073 
Exposure - smoke 0.037 
Thermal 0.034 
Equipment failure 0.024 
Communications 0.012 
Exposure - chemical 0.009 
Exposure - psychological 0.009 
Blast/Explosion 0.006 
Exposure - noise 0.006 
Operator error 0.006 
Not reported 0.003 
Violence 0.003 
Hazardous material operations Exposure - chemical 0.583 
Exposure - asbestos 0.333 
Physical Strain 0.083 
Road crash rescue operations Exposure - psychological 0.600 
Physical Strain 0.209 
Exposure - biohazard 0.164 
Exposure - asbestos 0.018 
 Impact 0.009 
Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations 
Exposure - psychological 0.306 
Physical Strain 0.278 
Exposure - asbestos 0.194 
Exposure - biohazard 0.111 
Impact 0.056 
Equipment failure 0.028 
Exposure - chemical 0.028 
 
Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly 
amongst incident response involving human life and trauma including Road 
Crash Rescue and Suicide Response. This again supports previous findings of 
the study. 
Exposure to various contaminants was also prevalent throughout the 
majority of fields. This may be significant as potential effects may be 
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mitigated through appropriate strategic and tactical response; appropriate 
PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015 & 2015a). 
Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all 
firefighting activities. These operations involve the use of self-contained 
breathing apparatus in atmospheres not conducive to life due to the 
presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency and/or excessive temperature 
[28]. During Breathing Apparatus operations, teams of two firefighters will 
work in close proximity to, or inside, burning structures. Typically they rely on 
a single line of firefighting hose for fire protection. The margin for error is 
therefore understandably narrow and the severity of potential 
consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table 7.9). Breathing 
apparatus operations are extremely physical in nature and this is represented 
by a conditional probability of 0.55 that the responsible risk source for the 
reportable event will be Physical Strain. Analysis also revealed a conditional 
probability of Impacts being the responsible risk source for the reportable 
incident of 0.15. It is suggested Impacts (as compared with Explosion / Blasts) 
are more likely to occur within a burning structure. Subsequently, this figure 
may be reduced through the defining of organisational risk acceptance 
thresholds. In turn, this would facilitate a reduction in the potential for incident 
controllers committing crews to internal firefighting in the absence of life 
involvement because of a perceived internal or external obligation to do so. 
Table 8.9 provides the comparisons between actual reported 
consequence severity and potential consequence severity for each Activity. 
Analysis reveals the conditional probability of moderate to catastrophic 
potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported consequence 
severity across all Activity groups. In part this may be explained by the lack 
of subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a 
long period of latency (for instance psychological exposures, or exposures to 
contaminants), or for injuries that are initially reported but worsen over time. 
Results of this analysis also support previous findings of the prevalence of “Nil” 
reported injuries in that there is a high conditional probability of ‘near misses’ 
within the incidents reported. 




67Table 8.9. Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
operations 
Operation Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Breathing apparatus 
operations 
Insignificant 0.300 0.000 
Minor 0.700 0.150 
Moderate 0.000 0.400 
Major 0.000 0.250 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.200 
Bushfire fighting 
operations 
Insignificant 0.818 0.000 
 Minor 0.131 0.505 
Moderate 0.040 0.101 
Major 0.010 0.212 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.182 
Driving operations Insignificant 0.967 0.133 
Minor 0.033 0.100 
Moderate 0.000 0.100 
Major 0.000 0.167 
Catastrophic - - 
Firefighting operations Insignificant 0.933 0.031 
Minor 0.034 0.147 
Moderate 0.021 0.199 
Major 0.012 0.098 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.526 
Hazardous materials 
operations 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.083 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.917 
Road crash rescue 
operations 
Insignificant 0.973 0.000 
Minor 0.018 0.073 
Moderate 0.009 0.218 
Major 0.000 0.027 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.682 
Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations 
Insignificant 0.972 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.111 
Moderate 0.028 0.306 
Major 0.000 0.056 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.528 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 





Minor 0.000 0.133 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.000 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.867 
 
Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there 
was a conditional probability of zero (0.000) for a consequence of 
catastrophic severity occurring across the entire Activity range. This result is 
not consistent with numerous international studies (FEMA, 2011 & 2012; 
Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and whilst acknowledging the differences in 
incidents responded to in different jurisdictions, this result potentially suggests 
Western Australian firefighting strategies are safer than those utilised by 
international counterparts. By comparison, a mean potential consequence 
of catastrophic severity revealed a conditional probability across all Activities 
of 0.408 (standard deviation of 0.328). These results represent a significant 
potential for increased severe injury, permanent disability and even death 
amongst the study group, and should be considered in the establishment of 
the internal context for risk management during dynamic emergency 
operations. 
 
8.6 Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s 
In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this 
chapter provides important qualitative and quantitative data that can be 
used to improve risk management during dynamic emergency operations. 
When considered together with literature reviewed, the results of the first 
study explicitly reject any notion of the validity of “dynamic risk 
management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during 
emergency situations. For best practice to be realised, the architectural 
structure or process of risk management as defined in ISO31000 cannot 
change. The context in which risk management is completed may vary in 
dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms; 
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that 
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only further requires the risk management process to be completed in its 
entirety each and every time risk is assessed and subsequently managed.  
The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory 
and critical incident related risk trends across all activity groups.  These 
trends are significant because they are associated with greater potential for 
serious consequences of hospitalisation or long term disability compared to 
less severe, but more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries.  In 
terms of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these results 
suggest Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate 
thermoregulatory related and physical strain related risks.  Proactive 
management may include enhanced mobilisation and rotation of personnel 
at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst the risks may be reactively 
managed through implementation of active recovery procedures and 
medical monitoring of crews at incidents by qualified medical practitioners 
to ensure it is safe for them to continue working.   Both during and post the 
emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure crew 
mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological events.   
During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or 
catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.   The potential consequence is 
consistently greater than the actual consequence realised in the data 
analysed.  This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event 
barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel 
involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that 
led to them being close to the impact, as opposed to being in the direct line 
of impact.  In light of this finding it is important that incident controllers and 
operational personnel remain vigilant to the potentially ‘normalising’ effect 
of recurrent exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low frequency, 
situations.     
8.7 Implications for urban planners 
Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable 
communities. Through careful and appropriate urban design that considers 
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potential wildfire behaviour, defendability of communities, evacuation 
requirements and firefighter tenability using evidence based fire engineering 
analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of communities in areas 
prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them. 
Section 9 - Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This section details the key outcomes from each Section. 
9.2 Key outcomes for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s 
1. Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and 
severity of wildfires.  During periods of elevated fire weather 
conditions, mega-wildfires in through continuous vegetation 
structures (particularly in forest and woodlands), no amount of 
resources or water (see Sections 4-6) will be able to suppress the 
head fire.  Firefighting strategies in these situations should 
therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation 
structure, particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are 
limited and the vegetation geometry does not support a 
continuous wildfire front.  The removal of fuel immediately 
adjacent to assets and communities through ‘dry’ firefighting 
strategies such as backburning (see Section 4) may need to be 
considered early in firefighting campaigns. 
1. Section 2 covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and 
behaviour.  As the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged 
against these inputs it is essential that all firefighters, fire behaviour 
specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the presented 
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models, but are effective in accurately applying them.  Incorrect 
predictions may result in inappropriate strategies being devised, 
leaving frontline personnel exposed to overwhelming wildfire 
conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see Sections 5 and 
7).  Whilst fire behaviour specialists are required to accurately and 
competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel from 
firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby 
increasing the margin for safety for both firefighters and the 
community. 
1. When considering the defendability of urban areas where the 
geometry of vegetation fuel beds prevents landscape scale 
wildfire behaviour: 
i. The case studies presented in Section 3 indicate potential 
significant over-estimation of radiant heat flux using the 
approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving non-
combustible obstructions and point-source ignition fires for a 
minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is 
significant as it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation 
is considered to have its greatest impact (Cohen & Butler, 
1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in 
urban environments. The results demonstrate the importance 
of appropriately considering fuel geometry, wildfire 
behaviour, and the effect of shielding structures when 
calculating radiant heat impacts on buildings and 
emergency responders within urban environments where 
vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching 
landscape proportions.  
ii. Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, 
in turn, result in firefighters not being deployed to suppress 
wildfires and defend homes as a result of over-estimation of 
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wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not 
suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on 
communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression 
thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour parameters 
throughout jurisdictions internationally. Where inappropriate 
predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does 
not support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, 
otherwise defendable areas may be left unguarded due 
inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies. 
1. Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in 
late 2019 and early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and 
complex disasters that require significant interstate and 
international resourcing over prolonged durations.  When such 
events occur they will inevitably impact life and property as well as 
overwhelming firefighting efforts.  Section 4 discussed the 
strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the 
evidence suggests they may be successful.  Detailed and 
accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and fire 
behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable 
and to minimise the potential for firefighter injury.  When applied 
correctly and in the right context, the findings of new research 
including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s to achieve this. 
2. As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega 
wildfires, detailed predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in 
itself is insufficient.  Care must be taken to bridge the theory – 
practice gap and ensure planning is operationally relevant.  The 
research presented in this section demonstrates that even in mild 
conditions, the head fire will often be unstoppable where it occurs 
in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry.  This is further 
supported by the findings presented in Sections 5 and 6.The use of 
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existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for wildfire suppression 
can only be considered opportunistic and with marginal chance 
of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and 
significant in area. As climate change continues to result in 
worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters, IMT’s and fire 
behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel bed 
structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels 
are discontinuous and broken. 
1. It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression 
thresholds do not systematically or quantifiably take account of 
wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF) combined with the associated 
potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters attempting 
suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.  
Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not 
specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in 
the proximity of the flaming zone where firefighters are often 
working to suppress the fire.  Once tenability thresholds are 
considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of 
large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the 
mildest of conditions. 
2. Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous 
defensive rural urban interface firefighting is.  Firefighters exposed 
to head fire fronts will potentially be subjected to levels of radiant 
heat that are capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as 
little as five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions and higher 
fuel loads.   Incident Controllers and fire crew leaders must 
therefore carefully consider whether properties and the occupants 
that shelter inside them are defendable or whether the credible risk 
to their own crews is too high.  As discussed in Section 7, firefighters 
have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of their 
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commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more 
likely than their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending 
occupants from insuppressible wildfire fronts.  This is  potentially 
due to firefighters’ own personal expectations that they should put 
themselves in personal danger to protect and rescue civilians, whist 
officers also consider the responsibility of keeping their crews safe 
and potential greater reaching consequences on the firefighter’s 
family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire 
suppression operations (Penney, 2019).   
3. As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or 
behind firefighting appliances during the passage of a wildfire front 
should be considered an absolute last resort only.  Instead, 
firefighters should seek refuge in suitable structures well before the 
expected impact of the wildfire front and emerge to salvage 
property where they are able to do so.  Committing to a RUI 
defense by positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale 
forest wildfire front and private property or critical infrastructure 
with the expectation that suppression efforts will be either safe or 
successful is at best, reckless.  Even the intervention of aerial 
firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this 
approach safe or effective.  Given the extreme danger 
associated with RUI firefighting, it should be considered only as a 
contingency plan except in extreme circumstances where large 
populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing 
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the 
arrival of the wildfire front. 
1. The outcomes of this section are perhaps best represented using 
the following analogy: 
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Imagine a small campfire less than 1m in diameter.  That is the wildfire.  Now 
imagine a thimble of water.  That is a small firefighting aircraft.  Pour the 
thimble of water on the campfire.  The effect is negligible, and would 
continue to be so even if 30 thimbles were applied in rapid succession. 
However, if the vegetation fuel in the campfire is instead only one matchstick 
size portion, then that thimble of water will extinguish the fire. 
 
2. Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to 
landscape scale forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as 
the active flame depth of the head fire increases.  By 
understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation structure 
influences fire behaviour and fire front geometry, IMT’s and 
firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for suppression 
success.  At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists understand 
these relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire 
behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT and frontline 
firefighters.  The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in 
this and other sections may assist IMT’s determine that suppression 
strategies are unlikely to succeed and resources would be better 
spent in evacuations or allowing crews more time to prepare to 
defend vulnerable assets. 
3. The findings of this section should also be a reminder to firefighters 
of the limitations of vehicle mounted sprinkler protection systems.  
Whilst vehicle protection systems including sprinklers may be 
successful in increasing the survivability of mild burnovers against 
which they’ve been tested, existing specifications are unlikely to 
afford sufficient protection against the wildfires modelled in Section 
5. An unrealistic expectation of vehicle protection system 
performance may contribute to firefighters having a false sense of 
safety and security, and thereby being more likely to commit to 
suppression strategies in untenable circumstances. 
4. The solution to these issues may, in part, rest with: 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
237 
 
i. Updated wildfire suppression training for firefighters clearly 
identifying the limitations of vehicle protection systems and 
effects of vehicle orientation during burnover events; 
ii. Greater acknowledgement by IMT’s of the physical limits of 
wildfire suppression and an earlier consideration of defensive 
firefighting strategies with opportunistic ‘surgical’ offensive 
tactics; 
iii. Increased fire services investment in wildfire appliance 
design with a focus on passive design protection elements 
that mirror AS3959, particularly surrounding glazing and 
cabin construction. 
 
1. In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, 
this section provides important qualitative and quantitative data 
that can be used to improve risk management during dynamic 
emergency operations. When considered together with literature 
reviewed, the results of the first study explicitly reject any notion of 
the validity of “dynamic risk management” being a stand-alone 
process for managing risk during emergency situations. For best 
practice to be realised, the architectural structure or process of risk 
management as defined in ISO31000 cannot change. The context 
in which risk management is completed may vary in dynamic 
emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms; 
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency 
situations that only further requires the risk management process to 
be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed 
and subsequently managed.  
2. The data presented in this section identified recurrent 
thermoregulatory and critical incident related risk trends across all 
activity groups.  These trends are significant because they are 
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associated with greater potential for serious consequences of 
hospitalisation or long term disability compared to less severe, but 
more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries.  In terms 
of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these 
results suggest Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to 
mitigate thermoregulatory related and physical strain related risks.  
Proactive management may include enhanced mobilisation and 
rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst 
the risks may be reactively managed through implementation of 
active recovery procedures and medical monitoring of crews at 
incidents by qualified medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for 
them to continue working.   Both during and post the emergency 
phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure crew 
mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to 
psychological events.   
3. During almost all types of operational response the potential for 
major or catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.   The 
potential consequence is consistently greater than the actual 
consequence realised in the data analysed.  This may be 
explained by the mitigating effects of post event barriers (PPE, 
physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel 
involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of 
events that led to them being close to the impact, as opposed to 
being in the direct line of impact.  In light of this finding it is 
important that incident controllers and operational personnel 
remain vigilant to the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent 
exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low frequency, 
situations.     
9.3 Implications for fire behaviour specialists and urban 
planners 
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1. To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the 
accuracy of modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended: 
i. Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative 
descriptors should not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model 
applied to the scenario without due consideration of the wildfire 
behaviour expected to occur through the vegetation.  Using 
the case study previously provided as an example, whilst the 
vegetation could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or 
Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble et al wildfire behaviour 
model to either of these options without modifying the deemed 
fuel loads would significantly result in over-estimation of wildfire 
outputs.  In urban areas where vegetation geometry restricts 
wildfire growth, a more appropriate and accurate approach is 
to assess the fuel load utilizing Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores and 
apply the correct vegetation availability factor.  Further 
guidance on this can be found in Sections 2 and 3; and 
ii. Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning 
perspectives) involved in modelling wildfire and calculating 
potential impacts require a sound understanding of the 
respective models and their limitations.  Caution should be 
applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex equations, 
models or engineering concepts in standards, guidance 
material or documents for use by lay persons or in land use 
planning decisions.  The profession of wildfire engineering is in its 
infancy and job titles do not necessarily equate to the 
knowledge and skills required to complete the required 
technical analysis or make informed and accurate decisions.  
This can be in part be remedied by professionalization / 
accreditation of the sector and greater recognition of the role 
of fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds in it. 
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1. Perhaps the greatest implications of Section 2 for urban planners 
applies to assessments of potential wildfire behaviour in urban 
areas where the landscape scale wildfire behaviour assumed in 
AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is not possible.  
Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Section 1) 
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to section 
2.3 of this section), as reported in recent studies (Penney & 
Stevenson, 2019), failure to adequately adjust inputs may result in 
the significant over-calculation of potential wildfire behaviour.  
This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances to 
suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds 
that can provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level of 
fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions. 
1. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, 
public open space, road reserves, and residential areas within 
urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for development 
may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire 
impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether. 
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small 
unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a 
landscape scale wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting 
development on adjacent and near-by lots. 
2. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire 
resistant construction standards of affected dwellings and 
structures that hinders development through either 
misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels 
of wildfire impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive 
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as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and 
construction required. 
3. In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the 
vegetation availability factor previously discussed, the 
methodologies proposed also retain the assumption of a flame 
emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape scale 
wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater than 2 m, 
and even potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009). 
In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it 
may also be suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note 
that whilst the vegetation factor and modified view factor model 
are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, 
grassland, etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in 
Section 3 is suitable for treed forest and woodland structures only, 
as fire growth in other fuel structures may be significantly faster. 
4. The models presented in Section 3 are not intended to address the 
potential radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being 
involved in fire. In part, this is inherently considered within AS3959 
through the requirement that associated structures on the same 
parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced 
construction standards, must also be constructed to that same 
standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land development 
should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire 
resistance, in theory significantly reducing the potential for mass 
conflagration spreading between multiple houses. Due to the 
differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation 
models as well as the difference in building and structure 
performance once impacted by wildfire, it is suggested that a high 
level of technical expertise is required to complete this process. 
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1. By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression 
strategies, urban planners can significantly influence the 
defendability and resilience of communities to wildfire impacts 
through appropriate design of development at the RUI.  The 
research and increased analysis presented in this section enables 
wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the 
design stage of RUI development.  Evidence based design that 
incorporates minimum measures for evacuations and eliminates 
the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be able to defend 
every property will lead to more appropriate passive 6  wildfire 
resilient design 
2. The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire 
Engineering Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering 
processes within the urban fire engineering profession will only 
further increase the standard of safety in bushfire prone areas.  
These are detailed and complex technical documents however 
that required a high degree of technical knowledge and 
proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved. 
1. Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia  
typically set deemed to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’7 threshold for 
development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for 
 
6  Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.  For instance, 
ensuring road design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without 
additional control measures is a passive measure that can be supported by 
appropriate and timely community evacuation messages.  Firefighters 
being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.  
7 Planning approval will typically be provided. 
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vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use8 and between 19kWm-2 
to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard 
development such as subdivision.  As detailed in this section, 
10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural 
PPC and breathing apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 
seconds.  At the same level, for a healthy person without 
protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted in 
approximately 60 seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns 
expected to occur after substantially less exposure.  By adopting 
these thresholds, communities are effectively being designed to be 
undefendable by firefighters.  At 29kWm-2, firefighters in structural 
PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face incapacitating 
burns in less than 30 seconds.  This realisation is also significant for 
firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of 
threatened communities who must consider whether they are 
expected to, or are indeed themselves expecting to do the 
impossible and un-survivable. 
2. The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several 
approaches that require consideration on a case by case basis: 
i. If development is required to be actively defendable by 
firefighters during the passage of a wildfire front, the 
maximum radiant heat impact at any point within the 
development needs to be within the window of safe and 
effective wildfire suppression.  In turn, this arguably either 
requires extensive and permanent vegetation modification 
and fuel reduction around the development, or appropriate 
landscaping that forms part of a passive wildfire engineered 
design; 
ii. If development does not require active firefighter defense 
then the actual level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in 
 
8 Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.   
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theory, be addressed by the application of enhanced 
wildfire resilient engineering construction such as that 
detailed in AS3959.  In turn, this may also allow the fire truck 
related road access standards to such as those described in 
existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 
2012; ) to be revisited; 
iii. Development of an evidence based performance based 
wildfire urban planning code, similar to that of the Building 
Code of Australia and that adopted by Tasmania (2017).  
This would need to go beyond the existing and largely 
subjective planning guidelines and carry throughout the 
planning and building legislation and process, as is the case 
in Victoria (VSG, 2019); 
iv. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering 
industry.  Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design 
(BPAD) accreditation scheme is the first step in this process, 
the technical knowledge and expertise required of wildfire 
engineers arguably requires greater accreditation and 
regulation.  
1. The data and results presented in this section reinforce the 
implications for Urban Planners discussed in Section 5.   
1. Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable 
communities. Through careful and appropriate urban design that 
considers potential wildfire behaviour, defendability of 
communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability 
using evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can 
enhance the safety of communities in areas prone to wildfire and 
the firefighters that protect them. 
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Chapter 3 – Firefighter tenability and its influence on wildfire 
suppression 
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. (2019a). 
Firefighter tenability and its influence on siege wildfire suppression. Fire Safety 
Journal, 106, pp38-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.firesaf.2019.03.012 
3.1 Abstract 
This paper provides analysis of international fire service siege wildfire 
suppression thresholds and reports on the effect of forest fuel structure, fire 
weather condition and terrain on the suitability of suppression strategies.   
Further, this study applies a fire engineering approach whereby siege wildfire 
behaviour is deterministically assessed against firefighter tenability thresholds.   
This research is significant as it is the first study to consider human tenability as 
a factor in determining appropriateness of wildfire suppression strategies and 
tactics.  The results clearly demonstrate offensive siege wildfire suppression 
involving direct head fire attacks by personnel and appliances exposes 
firefighters to untenable conditions well in advance of the head fire edge.  
Accordingly fire services may need to consider earlier instigation of defensive 
strategies and increased reliance on aerial wildfire suppression.     
 
3.2 Introduction 
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies throughout the 
world respond to siege wildfires of significant scale in forest and woodland 
vegetation structures that require vast resources and extended suppression 
efforts over days or weeks.   In doing so they expose themselves to a large 
number of hazards including heat illness, smoke inhalation, significant burns 
and even death [1-3].  Perhaps the most frightening prospect a firefighter 
can face is a ‘burnover’ whereby personnel and/or equipment are caught 
in the direct path and overrun by the fire [4].  When such an event occurs 
during a period of intense fire behaviour the environmental conditions are 
often unsurvivable for people caught in the open or seeking refuge in a 
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vehicle [5].   This places firefighters in precarious situations and in addition to 
firefighters being fit, appropriately trained and equipped, requires the careful 
and informed selection of appropriate suppression strategies in order to 
minimise the potential for such an event.  The international literature from 
Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New Zealand [6-12] considers head 
fire rate of spread (RoS), fire line intensity (IFL) and flame length (LF) when 
determining the suitability of suppression strategies and tactics, however 
there is a dearth of literature that considers the fire ground environmental 
limitations for firefighters as a factor influencing the selection of suppression 
strategies. This shortcoming may not only contribute to inappropriate and 
inefficient deployment of resources during wildfire suppression, but more 
importantly, may be unintentionally contributing to firefighter injuries and 
deaths. The aim of this research is to develop a fire engineering approach to 
the analysis of forest and woodland wildfire suppression strategies that not 
only compares international suppression thresholds, but considers firefighter 
tenability as a key factor for determining the suitability of suppression 
strategies. 
3.3 Wildfire suppression strategies and tactics 
The Department of Fire and Emergency Services [6, p75-76] identifies both 
offensive and defensive strategies as being suitable for fighting wildfires 
depending on fire behaviour and resourcing, however “wherever possible, 
the Incident Controller should use offensive strategies / methods of attack to 
attack and control the fire to minimise the adverse impact from both the fire 
and the fire suppression activities.”   Offensive strategies include direct 
head fire or flank fire attack (Figure 1) and typically require firefighters to be 
within 10 m of the flame zone in order to apply suppressants from hand held 
attack lines or machine monitors. An alternate offensive strategy is the 
parallel attack is where firefighters fall back some safe distance, construct 
containment lines parallel to the fire line then burn out the intervening piece. 
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Defensive strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to 
be safely attacked and utilise tactics that do not involve active fire 
suppression including building containment lines, backburning, defending 
properties and focusing on evacuation of people and livestock.  The 
international literature [6-12] reveals considerable variation between 
suppression strategy RoS, IFL and LF thresholds, further, all jurisdictions were 
consistent in that they failed to considered firefighter tenability as part of the 




76Figure 1: Direct attack on the head fire (left) vs direct attack on the flank (right) (Source: 
[11] p10-11) 
3.4 Modelling wildfire behaviour  
Understanding how wildfire fuels are represented in fire behavior models is 
critical to calculating potential fire behaviour and subsequently determining 
whether suppression thresholds will be breached. The term wildfire fuel is 
broadly applied to the vegetation potentially consumed by a fire burning in 
vegetation, regardless of the active fire area itself [13-18]. Wildfire fuel is 
defined by its physical structure and properties which are represented by 
numerical inputs relevant to the appropriate model being applied. For the 
purposes of this paper, wildfire fuel is considered to be the fine fuels, typically 
less than 6mm in diameter, that will be consumed by the approaching flame.  
Four main fuel strata layers and one contributing element are considered 
when describing wildfire fuel structures [19]. These are: canopy; bark (the 
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contributing element); elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels. A 
description of the main fuel layers is provided in the list below [17-19]: 
• Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown 
encompasses the leaves and fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees 
in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may lead to erratic 
and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances. 
• Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches 
that contributes to transference of surface fires into the canopy, 
embers and firebrands, and subsequent spot fires. 
• Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants 
up to 2–3m in height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can 
be included when there is no identifiable separation between the 
canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel components 
generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable 
in ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and 
rate of spread of a fire whilst also contributing to crown 
involvement by providing vertical fuel structure. 
• Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath, 
sometimes containing suspended components of leaves, bark, 
and twigs. This layer can vary from a few centimeters to up to 0.6m 
in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture of 
orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous 
or have large gaps in ground coverage and influences both the 
rate of spread of a fire and flame height. 
• Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor. 
Surface fuel (or litter) components are generally horizontally 
layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the greatest to fuel 
quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil 
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and 
flame depth as well as contributing to the establishment of a fire 
post initial ignition. 
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Pyrolysis of vegetation and combustion of turbulent diffusion flames of a 
bushfire front is extremely complex. In Australia, this is highly simplified by 
existing models and relies heavily on the assumption that radiation is 
overwhelmingly responsible for heat transfer between the flame and the 
receiving body [20-23]. It is considered that the fire front is geometrically 
represented by a uniform parallelepiped the width of the head fire, with 
sufficient flame depth for the flame emissivity to reach 0.95 (identified as 
being greater than 5m and potentially deeper than 10m) [24,25], and flame 
length dependent on associated fire modelling that assumes the fire has 
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread ( RoS ) [20,26,27]. The RoS  (kmh-1) flame 
length fL  (m) and fire line intensity I (kWm-1) for forest, woodland, and 
rainforest are given by: 
)069.0exp(0012.0 effwFDIRoS θ×××=  
( ) 2/24.013 WRoSLf +=  
I = HWRoS 
where FDI is the fire danger index, w is the surface fuel load (t/ha), θeff is the 
effective slope (slope of land under the vegetation or fuel bed, W is the 
overall fuel load (tha-1), and H is the heat of combustion (kJkg-1). The 
assumed flame geometry is commonly known as the “radiant heat panel”, 
with the horizontal position of the panel considered to be located below the 
midpoint between the base and tip of the flame front [20,26]. Both the flame 
temperature and emissivity are assumed to be consistent across the panel, 
whilst the receiving body is assumed to be aligned perpendicular to the 
approaching fire front [28]. 
Landscape scale wildfire shapes have numerous components as illustrated in 
Figure 2. 




77Figure 2. Wildfire components (source: Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report). 
The forward RoS  and intensity of an active front of a fire, known as the head 
fire, is dependent on the fuel available for consumption in the active flaming 
front [29,30]. This is incorporated into existing empirical wildfire models 
[14,15,17,28-34] through the consideration of available fuels expressed as 
tons per hectare within the active fire area directly behind the head fire [19]. 
Typically driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a 
wildfire contributing to the RoS  and fire behaviour intensity.  
In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, the 1ha area of assessment used for 
empirical models falls within the greater active fire area, whilst in sub-
landscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the 
1ha assessment area [19]. This is illustrated in Figure 3.  Where wildfire occurs 
at a sub-landscape scale, application of a Vegetation Availability Factor [19] 
is required to correct fire behaviour outputs   and subsequently determine 
whether suppression thresholds are likely to be exceeded. 
 







78Figure 3. (a) Landscape scale wildfire scenario; and (b) sub-landscape scale wildfire 
scenario. [19] 
 
Of the literature reviewed [6-12], only Western Australia [6,7] reported utilising 
RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in forest or woodland fuel 
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structures.  The reported thresholds were readily suppressed (<0.06kph); 
hand tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine attack possible 
(<0.4kph); direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed (>0.4kph); and 
indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).  No explanation was provided from 
other jurisdictions for the absence of reported RoS thresholds. 
 
Whilst there is general agreement across jurisdictions regarding IFL Direct 
Attack tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures, discrepancy 
occurs between Direct Machine Attack thresholds as well as when the head 
fire is considered uncontrollable.  Western Australian [6,7,11], New Zealand 
[10] and Canadian [8] thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying Direct 
Machine Attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and Indirect Attack 
suitable to 3000-4000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which considers 
the Headfire Control Limit to be 1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions present 
within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm-1 and the head fire to be 
undefendable at 3460 kWm-1.  Only Canada identified a limit for suppression 
efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher than the 
undefendable threshold set by the United States [8].    None of the literature 
reviewed considered any correlation between the identified IFL thresholds 
and other fire behaviour parameters including RoS, LF or tenability as a 
function of separation distance from the fire edge. 
 
Western Australia again adopts the most aggressive LF tactical thresholds in 
forest or woodland fuel structures.  Whilst there is again general agreement 
at lower flame length (United States adopts 1.2 m for Direct Attack [8], 
Canada utilises 1.4 m [8], Western Australia alongside Europe use between 
1.5 m [6,9] to 2 m [12], there is increased variance as LF increases.  Western 
Australia’s Parallel Attack LF threshold of 3 m is greater than both the 2.5 m 
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European limit for Parallel Attack and the 2.8 m LF the United States recognises 
as creating dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire, whilst the 
Western Australian [6,12] Indirect Attack limit of 10 m is almost three times 
greater than the head fire undefendable threshold of 3.4m set by the United 
States.  Again, none of the literature considered any correlation between 
the identified LF thresholds and other fire behaviour parameters including rate 
of spread, intensity or tenability as a function of separation distance from the 
fire edge. 
 
3.5 Firefighter tenability in the Wildland Context 
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines [35] define untenable conditions 
as “environmental conditions associated with fire in which human life is not 
sustainable.”  This should not be confused with the conditions required to 
facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are significantly milder than 
those able to be withstood for short periods of time. Therefore, improving 
firefighter safety during wildfire suppression by clearly defining fire ground 
environmental conditions that are considered tenable, or safe for firefighters 
is paramount.  Both the Society of Fire Safety [36] and Poh [37] identify four 
primary hazards associated with fires within the built environment that affect 
tenability being convected heat, radiant heat, toxic gases and smoke 
obscuration.  However, as Poh [37] reports, there is no single set of related 
values for tenability criteria which is universally accepted.  The current study 
excludes smoke obscuration as a factor affecting tenability in the bushfire 
context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with visual 
obscurity during bushfire events [2,3].   Each of the remaining hazards and 
their relevant thresholds as accepted by various jurisdictions is subsequently 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Knight, Brown and Leonard [38] identify the toxic gases produced during the 
thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly the interior vehicle 
componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to radiant heat 
and other factors.   The same authors do note that hydrogen chloride (HCl), 
a severe irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally degrade even without 
combustion, formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and carbon 
monoxide (CO) may cause significant irritation to occupants in the vehicle 
cabin, however not to the extent of affecting tenability.  The concentration 
for each of these gases that are immediately dangerous to life or health 
(IDLH) are detailed in Table 1.  Brown et al. [39] reports fire truck cabins will 
generally remain tenable in regards to toxic gases unless there is catastrophic 
window failure with glass falling from the frame.  Tenability within fire 
appliance cabins subject to high intensity wildfire impact and the effects of 
Vehicle Protection Systems identified as a potential subject of future 
research.   
68Table 1: IDLH concentrations 
Material IDLH (ppm) Source & Comments 
CO 1000-8000 [39,40]  
HCHO 20-100  [39,41,42] 
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation  
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema  
@100ppm – immediate death 
HCl 50-1000 [39,43,44] 
@50ppm – barely tolerable 
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema 
HCN 50-280 [39,45] 
@ 100 death after 1 hour 
@181 fatal after 10 minutes 
@280 immediately fatal 
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Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of 
landscape scale bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters [19,28,46-
48] therefore it is proposed any impacts of convective heat transfer, or 
noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat transfer.  
Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent involved fuels 
(including burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the potential to result 
in rapid vehicle fire involvement and untenable conditions in as little as 90 
seconds [49-51].  Post burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant 
heat remains the greatest threat to firefighters and conditions within the 
vehicle cabin may become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this 
[4,52-54].  Calculated potential peak radiant heat flux from large wildfires 
can exceed 76 kWm-2, even at greater than 10 m separation from the head 
fire under mild fuel loads and weather conditions [55].  By comparison 
experiential forest fire field data reported by Frankman [21] identified peak 
heat fluxes of 179 kWm-2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post 
the Springwood wildfire in New South Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham 
[22] estimated peak radiant heat fluxes experienced by houses to be as 
much as 52.5kWm-2. 
Purser [56] cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire are 
possible, being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract burns.  
The sensation of pain occurs prior to burns, incapacitation and ultimately 
death, however in the case of significant bushfire such events may be almost 
simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of hyperthermia.   
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poh [37] and 
Purser [56] are retained: 
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air 
temperature / or humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected) facial 
skin burns; and 
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2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect victims 
from incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to protect them 
from burns to the respiratory tract.  
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and 
Equipment (PPE) are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption 
that unprotected skin thresholds are suitable for modelling purposes (and as 
a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPC 
and PPE are worn).  Limited experimental data involving human test subjects 
is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the 
literature exists.  Although Raj [57] suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm-2 
may occur without pain or injury in clothed subjects, Poh [37] identifies 2.5 
kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and respiratory burns.  The Australasian 
Fire Authorities Council [58] provides further guidance for firefighters in 
structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as 
detailed in Table 2, however the Society of Fire Safety [36] suggest the 
‘Routine’ exposure threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat 
flux received whilst sunbaking may be as high as 1.1 kWm-2.  For firefighters 
sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight, Brown and Leonard [38] utilise 
a 60 second radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C 
however the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted 
in Europe [59]. Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal 
radiation is provided by Purser [56, Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 3. 
 










Maximum Time 25 minutes 10 minutes 1 minute < 1 minute 
Maximum Air Temperature 100°C 120°C 160°C >235°C 
Maximum Radiation 1kWm-2 3kWm-2 4-4.5kWm-2 >10kWm-2 
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70Table 3: Summarised radiant heat flux effects 
Heat Flux kWm-2 
Time to Effect (seconds) 
Pain Burn  Full Burn 
2.5 40 - - 
4.2 - 30 (blisters) - 
10.5 5 - - 
23.5 1.6 - - 
30 6 10 >15 
35 5 9.5 >15 
40 4.5 9 >15 
50 4 7 >15 
100 2 4 6 
150 1 2.5 4 
 





Where trad is time to reach end effect for identified thermal radiation 
(minutes); qr is the given radiant heat flux; r is the radiant heat exposure dose 
[(kWm-2).min] required for the identified endpoint: 
1.33 (kWm-2).min (tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns); 
10 (kWm-2).min (severe incapacitation and second-degree burns); and 
16.7 (kWm-2).min (fatal exposure with third-degree burns). 
Applying Purser’s [56] equation, Figure 4 provides comparison of the various 
times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant heat flux and 
illustrates that incapacitating burns can occur within relatively small 
timeframes at the lower end of possible wildfire induced radiant heat flux.  
The results demonstrate fatal exposure occurs within 1 minute once radiant 
heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst incapacitating injuries occur within 1 
minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2.   




79Figure 4: Time to effect 
This study assumes the worst case credible scenario being firefighters in 
personal protective clothing suitable for wildland fire suppression are 
exposed to radiant heat effects of a rapidly advancing flame edge that is 
part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire flank or head.  This is a 
deliberate measure to account for burnover situations in appliances that are 
disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot.  In these situations 
sheltering behind appliances and other small structures will provide little if any 
shielding from radiant heat flux [19].  Whilst the literature identifies several 
potential tenable limits as previously discussed, this study adopts the AFAC 
[58] “Hazardous Condition” limit of 3 kWm-2 as the threshold for suppression 
operations involving personnel (the “Suppression Threshold”).  This is less than 
both the  “Extreme” limit of 4 kWm-2 [58] and the acceptable 5 kWm-2 
exposure in normal clothing reported by Raj [57] which were considered to 
provide an insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area 
as incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the 
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4, the “Critical” limit of 10 kWm-2 [58] can result in incapacitating burns in less 
than one minute and is subsequently identified as the “Tenability Threshold” 
for the study.   The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux the 
firefighters in Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) can withstand whilst being 
able to undertake suppression activities is inherently lower than the 
“Tenability Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux those same firefighters 
could physically survive.  As previously identified, different PPE affords 
firefighters various levels of protection however exposed skin and respiratory 
tracts (in the absence of closed circuit breathing apparatus) remain 
vulnerable.  As a result the thresholds adopted in this study incorporate an 
inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPE is worn. 
 
3.6 Study Phase One – Wildfire behaviour threshold analysis 
International literature and fire service doctrine was reviewed to establish 
wildfire suppression thresholds (see above).  Subsequently, analysis of RoS, IFL 
and LF using both McArthur [14,28] and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model 
(DEFFM) [17,32] empirical models was deterministically compared to 
documented thresholds.  Acknowledging the limitations of empirical models 
discussed by Cruz et al. [60], the models selected are those currently used by 
fire services across Australia [32] as well as the Australian Building Codes 
Board [61,62] by adopting Australian Standard 3959 [28], and are therefore 
considered suitable for the study.  
 
McArthur model analysis utilised forest understory fuel loads (w) between 5-
25t/ha and Forest Fire Danger Indices (FDI) between 10-100, representing a 
broad spectrum of forest fuel loads [55] and up to the 99.9th percentile of fire 
weather conditions [63] across Australia.  Terrain was assumed to be flat for 
all scenarios with sensitivity to slope assessed in Phase Two of the current 
study. 
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Analysis using DEFFM was completed using the Fire Behaviour Calculator [64] 
incorporating fuel loads and weather datasets from the south west of 
Western Australia, ambient temperature of 20°C, relative humidity of 20% and 
open wind speed at 10 m of 20 kph.  The results from the DEFFM analysis were 
compared to the McArthur model for the same fuel load (w) datasets at FDI’s 
between 10-100.  Finally, results from the DEFFM modelling were compared 
against the fuel load variations identified by [16] for the mid-range 
associated fuel hazard scores (ignoring bark) within each geographical area. 
 
Results for the McArthur model analysis are illustrated in Figure 5. The 
operational RoS thresholds identified by Smith [7] are exceeded in all but the 
sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads and mildest fire weather conditions 
associated with an FDI less than 20.  Hand tool attack is not considered 
possible once available understory fuel loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of 
FDI, whilst the direct machine attack threshold is also rapidly exceeded once 
the FDI exceeds 20 for understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.  Indirect 
attack thresholds are exceeded once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory 
fuel loads of 15 t/ha.  At an understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard 
fuel load in AS3959 [28], direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and 
the indirect attack threshold is exceeded once the FDI exceeds 
approximately 23.   The results demonstrate that offensive strategies (direct 
attack) are not suitable and unlikely to succeed against an established 
landscape scale wildfire front in 62% of simulated wildfire conditions.    




80Figure 5: Tactic suitability according to RoS 
 
Whilst there is general consistency between Western Australian, New Zealand 
and Canadian thresholds, reduced thresholds adopted by the USA further 
restrict the suitability of direct wildfire suppression tactics to all but the mildest 
conditions.  As illustrated in Figure 6, once understory fuel loads exceed 20 
t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable across all jurisdictions 
regardless of the FDI.  Utilising American thresholds, IFL is recognised as 
resulting in dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire at all FDIs once 
a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is exceeded.  The lower Canadian intensity 
threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire suppression activities can be 
exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once surface fuel loads 
reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as 30 when surface 
fuels exceed 20 t/ha.  The higher Canadian IFL threshold of 30,000 kWm-1 is 
breached once surface fuels exceed 20 t/ha and the FDI exceeds 80. In 
higher fuel loads, this limit can be exceeded when the FDI reaches as low as 
40.  Analysis of the data illustrated in Figure 4 identified that offensive 
suppression strategies are suitable in only 22% of simulated wildfire scenarios 
utilising thresholds from Western Australia, New Zealand and Canadian 
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81Figure 6: Tactic suitability according to Fire Line Intensity 
 
As detailed in Figure 7, when LF thresholds are used, offensive suppression 
strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for all landscape scale 
wildfires burning in understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha regardless of fire 
weather conditions.  Further, fire behaviour is recognised as dangerous 
within 30 ft of the head fire in all understory fuel loads once an FDI of 30 is 
attained.  There is strong agreement between direct personnel attack 
thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel attack / manual attack 
on the head fire identified as  inappropriate due to LF across all scenarios 
regardless of understory fuel loads and at all FDIs.  Only two jurisdictions 
suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire is suitable, and only in the 
mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and 
at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).     Thresholds are the most 
conservative in American and Canadian jurisdictions, with offensive 
strategies considered suitable in only 2-8% of the wildfire scenarios modelled.  
By comparison, offensive strategies were considered suitable in 55% of the 
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European thresholds.  No LF threshold was identified for New Zealand fire 
services. 
 
82Figure 7: Tactic suitability according to Flame Length 
 
The second phase of the study revealed little agreement between the results 
of the DEFFM and McArthur model analysis.  In comparison to McArthur, 
DEFFM analysis under predicted RoS, IFL and LF across all geographic regions 
once fuels reached three to four years in age and a FDI of 30 to 40 was 
attained.   Applying DEFFM alone, Direct Machine Attack RoS thresholds 
were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels reached four 
to five years of age, Direct Machine Attack IFL thresholds were reached at 
five to nine years of age whilst Direct Machine Attack LF thresholds were 
reached across all geographical jurisdictions at fuel ages between three to 




















Direct Attack (WA & Europe) Parallel Attack (WA)
Indirect Attack (WA) Parallel Attack (Europe)
Parallel Aerial Attack (Europe) / Head Fire Undefendable (Canada) Indirect Attack (Europe)
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Comparative McArthur modelling across all fire weather conditions and 
utilising the identified fuel loads (a sample of these results is illustrated for RoS 
in Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 8; IFL in Jarrah South - Figure 9; and LF in Jarrah East - 
Figure 10) revealed DEFFM analysis typically over estimated wildfire 
behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50, above this range DEFFM analysis typically 
significantly underestimated wildfire behaviour across all fuel ages and 
jurisdictions.  .  Fire line intensity suppression thresholds were typically 
exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages reached 3 to 4 years and an 
FDI of 30 was reached, with the United States ‘dangerous within 30ft’ 
threshold rapidly exceeded under the same conditions. LF suppression 
thresholds were typically exceeded with most jurisdictions considering the 
head fire to be undefendable due to fire behaviour once fuels reached 3 to 
5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained.  Only Western Australia and Europe 
considered head fires to be defendable above these limits, albeit using 
indirect suppression tactics. 
 
3.7 Phase Two – Suppression and tenability threshold analysis 
Empirical wildfire behaviour and radiant heat modelling was completed in 
accordance with the methodology detailed in AS3959 Annexure B [28].  
Radiant heat flux as a function of separation distance at 5 m increments from 
0-100 m from the head fire front was calculated for each scenario with the 
results deterministically assessed against the defined tenability criteria.  A 
total of 600 iterations were completed across the wildfire scenarios.  The 
calculated radiant heat flux for each iteration was subsequently used as an 
input for Purser’s [56] equation to calculate the time for pain and burns to 
occur to a person 10 m from the head fire. 
 
Analysis again utilised forest understory fuel loads (w) between 5-25 t/ha and 
Fire Danger Indices (FDI) between 10-100.  A flame temperature of 1090 K 
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was selected, being within the wildfire flame temperature ranges reported 
[25,28,65,66].  Heat of combustion of 18,600 kJ/kg was applied, being within 
ranges reported in AS3959 [28] and the SFPE Handbook [67, Table 1-5.3].  
Emissivity (ԑ) of 0.8 was applied with sensitivity analysis between 0.6 to 0.95 
undertaken at Forest and Woodland fuel loads as defined in AS3959 [28] 
across the FDI range.  These values were within emissivity ranges reported 
[25,28,66,68] and reflects the optically thick flame of a significant wildfire 
head fire.  Head fire width of 100 m was applied, being consistent with that 
required for radiant heat flux modelling of siege wildfire reported in AS3959 
[28] and Penney & Stevenson [19]. Positive slope (aligned with wind direction) 
was assumed to be 0° with sensitivity analysis between 0° to 20° undertaken 
at Forest fuel loads as defined in AS3959 [28] across the FDI range.  Radiant 
heat flux as a function of separation distance from 0 m to 100 m from the 
head fire front for each scenario were completed with the results 
deterministically assessed against the defined tenability criteria. 
The results (Table 4) identify that even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire 
weather conditions, when attempting to suppress a fully developed forest 
head fire in continuous fuel structures, firefighters will need to remain at least 
20 m from the head fire.  At understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and assuming no 
shielding, the Suppression Threshold is exceeded even at an FDI of 10 until 20 
m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst tenability limits are 
exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire.  The required separation for 
the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m separation necessary 
to reach suitable conditions once an FDI of 40 is reached.  Conditions 
supportive of suppression efforts are not experienced within 30 m of the head 
fire at or above an FDI of 50.  As illustrated in Figures 11 and 12, 
representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28], conditions 
worsen as fuel load increases.  For typical Woodlands fuel loads, depending 
on FDI, radiant heat flux falls below the Tenability Threshold at 15 m-35 m whilst 
35 m-80 m separation is required for conditions to be conducive to safe 
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suppression efforts.  These distances increase to 20 m to 50 m and 45 m to 
>100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads.   None of the scenarios 
analysed resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the 
head fire within 10 m of the flame edge, whilst only 8.3% of the scenarios 
assessed provided tenable conditions for firefighters within the same 
separation. 
 
83Figure 8: Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and various 
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84Figure 9: Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and various 
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85Figure 10: Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various 






























FDI 20 FDI 30
FDI 40 FDI 50
FDI 60 FDI 70
FDI 80 FDI 90
FDI 100 US1&2 Direct Attack
Canada Direct Attack WA & Europe Direct Attack
US1&2 Control Limit Europe Parallel Machine Attack
US1 Dangerous within 30ft of Headfire WA Parallel Attack Limit
US2 Head fire undefendable Europe Parallel Air Attack Limit & Canada Headfire Undefendable
Euro Indirect Attack Limit WA Indirect Attack Limit
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71Table 4: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for 
suppression and tenability thresholds 





















Tenability  10 10 10 10 15 15 15 15 15 20 
Suppression 20 25 25 30 35 35 35 40 40 45 
w10 
Tenability  10 15 15 15 20 20 25 25 25 30 
Suppression 30 35 40 45 45 50 55 60 60 65 
w15 
Tenability  15 15 20 20 25 30 30 30 35 35 
Suppression 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 75 80 
w20 
Tenability  15 20 25 25 30 35 35 40 40 45 
Suppression 40 50 55 65 70 75 80 85 90 90 
w25 
Tenability  20 25 30 30 35 40 45 45 50 50 
Suppression 45 55 65 70 75 85 90 95 100 >100 
w30 
Tenability  20 25 30 35 40 45 50 50 55 60 




86Figure 11: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between 
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87Figure 12: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between 
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures 
 
Applying Purser’ equation [56] and assuming 10 m separation from the head 
fire, the reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes 
evident across understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5).  In the mildest of 
conditions, the time taken for pain tolerance thresholds to be reached and 
for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds.  In foreseeable circumstances, 
such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time is reduced 
to less than a second.  In comparison, the time taken for severe 
incapacitation to occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the 
head fire is approximately 120 seconds, whilst at an FDI of 60 and understory 
fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately 10 seconds.  At 10 m 
separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are also 
rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds.  At understory fuel loads 
of 25t/ha and an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table 






















Separation from head fire (m)
FDI 10 FDI 20 FDI 30
FDI 40 FDI 50 FDI 60
FDI 70 FDI 80 FDI 90
FDI 100 Suppression Threshold Tenability Limit
Window of safe & 
effective wildfire 
suppression 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
295 
 
The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when 
identifying safe zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate 
wildfire suppression strategies and tactics.  When interpreting the results of 
this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation occurs a firefighter will 
likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the shorter 
time frame should be applied.   It is also important to consider the shielding 
effects of intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false 
sense of fire intensity until the flames engulf the vegetation in front of them.  
Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of landscape scale wildfire 
from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and may have 
insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such 
as sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles.   Even if protective 
systems are activated, the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially 
lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the capacity of the protective systems 
[69] which suggests fatal burnovers may still occur. 
72Table 5: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m separation 
from the head fire 
Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 8.0 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 
w10 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 
w15 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 
w20 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 
w25 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
w30 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m 
separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
w5 117.5 94.4 78.2 66.3 57.3 50.2 44.5 39.8 35.9 32.7 
w10 71.4 53.2 41.8 34.1 28.5 24.4 21.2 18.6 16.6 14.9 
w15 49.7 35.7 27.3 21.9 18.0 15.2 13.1 11.4 10.1 9.0 
w20 37.3 26.2 19.7 15.6 12.8 10.7 9.1 7.9 6.9 6.1 
w25 29.5 20.3 15.2 11.9 9.6 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.0 5.0 
w30 24.1 16.4 12.1 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation  
w/FDI 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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w5 232.8 187.0 155.0 131.4 113.4 99.4 88.1 78.9 71.2 64.7 
w10 141.4 105.5 82.9 67.6 56.6 48.3 42.0 36.9 32.8 29.4 
w15 98.4 70.6 54.1 43.3 35.7 30.2 25.9 22.6 19.9 17.8 
w20 74.0 51.8 39.1 30.9 25.3 21.2 18.1 15.6 13.7 12.1 
w25 58.4 40.3 30.0 23.5 19.1 15.9 13.5 11.6 10.0 10.0 
w30 47.8 32.5 24.0 18.7 15.1 12.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 
As emissivity affects the receiver’s total radiant heat flux it was expected 
lower emissivity values resulting in reduced radiant heat exposure.  The 
results of the sensitivity analysis (Table 6) reveal that for Woodlands fuels, the 
Tenability Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation from the 
head fire flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved 
until a minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these 
distances increase to 40 m and 80 m respectively.  These results suggest 
suppression efforts will be ineffective against siege head fires where the flame 
emissivity exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in head fires 
with an active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m [25, 66,68].    
73Table 6: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds – 
sensitivity to emissivity  
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
Surface 
Fuel 
(t/ha)  Ԑ 0.6 Ԑ 0.65 Ԑ 0.7 Ԑ 0.75 Ԑ 0.8 Ԑ 0.85 Ԑ 0.9 Ԑ 0.95 
w15 
Tenability  25 30 30 30 35 35 35 35 
Suppression 60 65 65 70 70 75 75 80 
w25 
Tenability  40 40 40 45 45 50 50 50 
Suppression 80 85 85 90 95 95 100 >100 
 
As illustrated in Table 7, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase, slope 
has a greater effect on the separation distance required to achieve tenable 
and operational conditions.  This result was expected due to the relationship 
in empirical modelling between rate of spread of which understory fuel load, 
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FDI and slope are direct inputs, and the subsequent empirical radiation 
model used to calculate radiant heat flux as described by Penney and 
Stevenson [19].  In all scenarios presented, increased positive slope and 
associated increase in fire behaviour decreases tenability and suppression 
potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning over flat terrain.   
74Table 7: Separation required for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity to slope 
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data) 
FDI  0° Slope 5° Slope 10° Slope 15° Slope 20° Slope 
10 
Tenability  20 20 25 25 30 
Suppression 45 50 55 60 65 
20 
Tenability  25 25 30 35 45 
Suppression 55 60 70 80 85 
30 
Tenability  30 30 40 45 55 
Suppression 65 70 80 95 >100 
40 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 80 90 >100 >100 
50 
Tenability  35 40 50 60 70 
Suppression 75 90 100 >100 >100 
60 
Tenability  40 45 55 65 80 
Suppression 85 95 >100 >100 >100 
70 
Tenability  45 50 60 70 85 
Suppression 90 100 >100 >100 >100 
80 
Tenability  45 55 65 75 90 
Suppression 95 >100 >100 >100 >100 
90 
Tenability  50 60 70 80 100 
Suppression 100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
100 
Tenability  50 60 75 85 >100 




By comparing the calculated fire behaviour outputs (RoS, IFL and LF) with the 
associated base inputs of FDI, w and fuel age and comparing the results to 
international wildfire suppression thresholds a single strategic guidance table 
can be produced (Table 8).  The result is that safe offensive strategies on the 
head fire are identified as appropriate in only the mildest of conditions or 
where fuel structure does not facilitate significant head fire propagation [19].  
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It is important to note this guidance is intended for established siege wildfires 
of significant proportion such as those reviewed by Keelty [70,71], Ferguson 
[72] and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission [73].  Smaller wildfires such 
as those experienced within closed urban environments do not achieve the 
same Heat Release Rates or produce the same behaviour outputs as 
established wildfires [19] which may subsequently allow more aggressive 
offensive suppression strategies and tactics.  In these instances, as opposed 
to utilising Table 8, it is necessary to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor 
[19] when predicting potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining 
whether suppression and tenability thresholds are exceeded.  
Of concern is that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not 
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, IFL and 
LF) combined with the associated potential radiant heat flux received by 
firefighters attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire 
scenario.  Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not 
specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity 
of the flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire.  
Once tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct 
attack on the head of large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters 
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75Table 8: Wildfire head fire strategic and tactical suppression guide 
Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression  Legend 
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Validation of predictive modelling of large scale, chaotic and turbulent 
wildfire is inherently problematic [19].  The scale of wildfires such as those 
described in [49-51,79,80] combined with the ethical implications of human 
experimentation [57] facilitates little if any available, reliable and relevant 
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data. As a result, many of the wildfire models currently used by fire services 
[14,17,31-34] have only been validated during low to mid intensity wildfire 
experiments with their application extrapolated to wildfires of significantly 
greater intensity.  It must also be acknowledged that as this research relies 
on the McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire models, it inherits their 
associated potential weaknesses.  Whilst this research attempts to address 
this by comparing the results of the two models, future research using a 
greater number of models may be of some benefit.  
 
This research excludes the tenability within fire appliance cabins during a 
wildfire burnover.  Whilst Knight, Brown and Leonard [39] provide some 
insight into this area, the tenability of fire appliance cabins and the efficacy 
of vehicle protective systems is identified as an area for future research. Whilst 
advanced computer simulation may provide advanced analysis of the 
potential performance of vehicle protective systems, the identified issue of 
field validation would not be solved through such an approach.  It is 
suggested the solution may lie in the installation of telemetry specifically 
designed to capture radiant heat flux and GPS onto wildfire suppression 
appliances coupled with real time accurate aerial fire line mapping.  This 
would not only allow existing models to be validated in the field, but would 
also allow greater accuracy of investigations when burnovers occur. 
 
Whilst there have been some advancements in the analysis of wildfire 
suppression [25,49, ,69,74,75] and modelling at the urban interface  [19,76-
78], further research is required.  It is suggested this should occur through 
greater investment by fire services completing research during active wildfire 
suppression and enhanced analysis of wildfire models against actual wildfire 
events. The potential difficulty and expense in completing the identified 
research is acknowledged, however it should be considered an essential 
component of enhancing wildfire suppression strategies and improving the 
safety of frontline firefighters. 





This research in part addresses the several of the critical shortfalls of existing 
research identified by Butler [49] in that it will assist improve firefighter 
understanding of tenability in the wildland context, and that it provides 
additional guidance regarding required firefighter safety zones. Through 
analysis of international thresholds and analysis of forest fire behaviour using 
both McArthur and DEFFM empirical models, this study identifies that even in 
moderate forest understory fuel loads of 15 t/ha, an established siege wildfire 
will result in untenable conditions at all FDIs within 10 m separation of the head 
fire.   Within this 10 m separation from the headfire, conditions potentially 
resulting in incapacitating burns within 60 seconds of exposure have been 
shown to occur in 95% of wildfire scenarios assessed. This will inherently place 
firefighters attempting to suppress the head of a siege wildfire in grave 
danger in almost all circumstances and represents a significantly greater 
“dead man zone” than is considered in current literature.   It is important to 
note that while these findings apply to all fires, small urban wildfires do not 
usually achieve the same Heat Release Rates, active flame depths or 
produce the same behaviour outputs as large established wildfires [19] which 
may facilitate more aggressive offensive suppression strategies and tactics 
within the urban environment.  When calculating wildfire behaviour in small 
urban settings, the Vegetation Availability Factor detailed in [19] must be 
applied before utilising the guidance provided by this research. 
 
When attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more 
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or 
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear 
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at 
the head fire are not defendable.  It is suggested offensive strategies 
involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after 
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
302 
 
use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early adoption of this approach will 
assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous 
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little 
if any impact on the fire.  Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the 
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community 
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events. 
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Chapter 4 - Calculation of Critical Water Flow Rates for Wildfire 
Suppression 
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M., Carter, M. 
(2019b).  Calculation of Critical Water Flow Rates for Wildfire Suppression. 
Fire, 2 (3), 1-12, DOI: doi:10.3390/fire2010003 
4.1. Abstract  
Predicting water suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting 
strategies and logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of 
many previous studies, however the same level of research has yet to be 
applied in the realm of wildfire suppression. To work towards addressing this 
knowledge gap, this paper provides guidance for Incident Controllers in 
relation to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across 
a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. 
This is achieved through mathematical empirical analysis of water flow rates 
required for head fire suppression during 540 simulated wildfires in forest 
vegetation. This research applies a fire engineering approach to wildfire 
suppression logistics and deterministically assess the suitability of appliance 
and aircraft based head fire suppression. The results highlight the limitations 
of offensive wildfire suppression involving direct head fire attacks by 
appliances once wildfires attain a quasi-steady state in forest fuels. 
 
4.2. Introduction 
Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts, yet 
water remains the primary extinguishing agent [1]. Whilst prediction of water 
suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting strategies and 
logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of many previous 
publications [2,3], the same level of research has yet to be applied in the field 
of wildfire suppression [1]. With fire services around the globe advocating 
offensive wildfire fighting strategies [4–9,10] heavily reliant the application of 
both water and other suppressants, it is suggested this knowledge gap and 
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a lack of suitable data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant 
wildfires, known as siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services 
internationally.  
One of the major differences affecting data collection from major urban 
structure fires and siege wildfires is that structure fires are inherently contained 
and last a matter of hours whereas siege wildfires routinely consume 
thousands of hectares of vegetation, multiple structures and last days if not 
weeks. Using recent fires of note for comparison, even the devastating 
Grenfell Tower fire of 14 June 2017 [11] did not result in the same scale of 
destruction or require the extent of fire suppression resourcing of recent and 
more frequent siege wildfires such as those experienced in California [12,13], 
Greece [14] or Victoria [15] which required the mobilization of military or 
international firefighting assistance.  
For Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) and Incident Controllers (IC’s) to 
develop and execute successful and safe suppression strategies it is critical 
they are able to appropriately analyse and manage risk [16]. This not only 
requires a comprehensive knowledge of wildfire behaviour, but also the 
abilities and limitations of both firefighting personnel, appliances and aircraft. 
Hindering the ability of the IMT’s and IC’s is a lack of formal evidence to 
support operational decisions [10,17,18,19], with decision makers having to 
rely on personal experience [16,20] and empirical wildfire behaviour or 
suppression models which also have inherent limitations [1,21–23].  
Existing water extinguishment models [1] have been validated against field 
data from low intensity experimental burns with fire line intensities of less than 
1 MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m. These experimental conditions 
are far from the conditions faced during siege wildfire events which can 
include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1 and flame heights extending 10–20 
m above the crowns of trees [24]. Further limiting the application of existing 
research to dynamic emergency conditions is the lack of consideration for 
the capabilities of firefighting vehicles and aircraft that have limited water 
capacities and may be away from the active fire front for considerable 
durations whilst they refill. 
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To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this paper builds 
upon previous research [1] by applying a fire engineering deterministic 
analysis of water flow rates required for head fire suppression during wildfires. 
The aim of this study is to provide guidance for Incident Controllers in relation 
to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide 
range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The 
impacts of the results on current suppression strategies and logistics are 
discussed in order to facilitate enhanced effectiveness and safety of 
operational response to siege wildfire incidents. In doing so, this paper 
provides the critical connection between firefighting theory and practice 
that is essential within the firefighting profession [19]. 
4.3. Materials and Methods 
The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water 
occurs by three methods [1,2]: 
1. Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing 
pyrolysis and the production of combustion gases; 
2. Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below 
the critical temperature; or 
3. Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the 
fuel and resulting in a reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the 
flames. 
When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires 
only surface cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is 
rapidly dispersed and will not noticeably affect the flame temperature [1]. As 
a result, by applying Fire Point Theory and accounting for external radiant 
and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF) in Lm−2s−1 (i.e. Litres per 
square meter per second) can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using 
Equation (1) [1]. CF is the flow rate of water required to extinguish a burning 
surface, with an infinite period of time available [19]. As the wildfire length 
and depth of the active flame front changes over time and is influenced by 
many factors including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and fuel 
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geometry [21], the CF can only be calculated at a specific point in time. The 
limitations of fire ground suppression, including appliance or aircraft capacity 
and available must be considered and are addressed later in the report.  




where ?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0  is the critical water application rate assuming no external 
heat flux, identified as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 [1]; 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝  is the efficiency of water 
application, representing the portion of water leaving the firefighting branch 
which actually contributes to fire extinguishment, conservatively assumed to 
be 0.7 [1]; 𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 is the enthalpy change of water, identified as 2640 kJkg−1; 
?̇?𝑞”𝐸𝐸 is external heat flux, calculated using Equation (2),  
?̇?𝑞”𝐸𝐸 = �
0.27 × 𝐹𝐹
�2 × 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽�
× 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙�� (2) 
Where 𝐹𝐹  is fire line intensity in kWm−1 calculated using Byram’s fire line 
intensity equation [25], calculated using Equation (3); 𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m, 
calculated using Equation (4); 𝛽𝛽 is depth of the active flame in m; 𝜏𝜏  is 
atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the 
unburned fuel in respect to the flames; 𝜏𝜏 is view factor, assumed to be 1 due 
to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect to the flames; h is the 
convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K assuming a forced 
convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 [1]; Tg is gas temperature of the flame, 
assumed to be 1090 K, representative of siege wildfire conditions [22,26–29]; 
Tfuel is the fuel temperature of the fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition 
surface temperature for pine-needle fuel beds [1]. 





Where H is effective heat of combustion, assumed to be 18,600 kJkg−1 [22,26] 
(noting this will vary with vegetation type); W is total fuel load in tha−1, 
considering fine fuels typically less than 6 mm in diameter [22]; RoS is the 
forward Rate of Spread corrected for slope in kmh−1, calculated using 
Equation (5). Noting that terrain influences RoS, slope is assumed to be flat for 
the purposes of the study. 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012(𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹)𝑤𝑤 (5) 
Where FDI is Forest Fire Danger Index, a dimensionless factor incorporating 
the chance of a fire starting, its Rate of Spread, its intensity and the difficulty 
of its suppression, according to various combinations of air temperature, 
relative humidity, wind speed and both the long- and short-term drought 
effects [26]; w is understorey fuel load and W is total fuel load in tha−1, 
considering fine fuels typically less than 6mm in diameter [22]. 
Analysis included spreadsheet calculation of CF using Equation (1) across 
variations of fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range 
of wildfire conditions and scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel 
loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1 with corresponding total fuel 
loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the canopy 
contributes 10 tha−1 [26] is retained) were simulated, representing a broad 
spectrum of forest fuel loads [22]. Ten variations of FDI at increments of 10 
between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th percentile of fire weather conditions 
across Australia [22,30] were incorporated into the simulations. Nine variants 
of active flame depth (D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–
10 m, representative of the optically thick head fire flame experienced during 
severe wildfire events [22,26–28]. In total, 540 wildfire scenarios were 
analysed. Calculations were confirmed using separate spreadsheets by the 
research team. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities were 
derived from technical literature [31–35] and discussions with technical 
experts [36]. These capabilities are summarized in Table 1, with maximum 
potential flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study. 
Deterministic analysis of calculated required CF to available flow rates was 
completed. For the purposes of deterministic analysis, it is assumed that 
appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m 
length of active head fire front [4–6,31–36]. These values can be easily 
converted should different active head fire lengths be required. 
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Incident Controllers utilise a number of wildfire behaviour thresholds including 
Rate of Spread (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) to assess the suitability 
and potential success of suppression strategies. However there is some 
discrepancy between these thresholds and identification of suitable 
suppression strategies [23]. In order to provide further guidance for Incident 
Controllers and provide connection between firefighting theory and 
practice, the findings were subsequently analysed to determine CF as 
functions of these parameters. 
76Table 1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities. 
Type Name Water Capacity (L) Flow Rate (Ls
−1) 
Aircraft-Rotary 1 [36] Dauphin Type 2 1000–1200 ~333–400 
Aircraft-Rotary 2 [36] Erikson S64E Aircrane 7560 ~1512 
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3 [36] AirTractor AT802F 3150 ~1050 
Appliance 4WD 4 [32–34] Light Tanker ~500 2.5 
Appliance 4WD 4,5 [31,33–
35] Heavy Tanker ~3000 3.8–7.9 
1 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8 
m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length 
~30 m, full deployment in 3 s; 4 Branch jet spray width ~1 m; 5 700 L water 
required for appliance sprinkler protection which activates at 3 Ls−1 from 
each head. 
4.4. Results 
Illustrated in Figure 1a–f, critical flow (CF) rates per 10 m section of active 
head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep active flame front through 
understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep 
active flame front through understorey fuels of 30 tha−1 at an FDI of 100. Note: 
As described above, this study assumes appliances and aircraft can apply a 
uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of active head fire front and the 
results are presented on this basis.  
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single 
Light Tanker cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire 
front once an active flame depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads 
and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining a 6 m depth, in limited Light 
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Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200 s in limited 
circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a 
maximum flow rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at 
10 m section of active wildfire front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5 
tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a single Heavy Tanker to 
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With 
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide 
enough flow rates to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless 
of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel load. Whilst Figure 1a–f may assist 
Incident Controllers to determine the suitability of wildfire suppression 
strategies, the full application of these findings, including the impacts on the 
logistics of siege wildfire suppression is explored in the Discussion section of 
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88Figure 1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s 
for Forest with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e) 
25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1. 
 
CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in 
Figures 2–4. This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD) to 
be expressed as equations of the corresponding the fire behaviour, 
summarized in Table 2. The advantages of this approach are: 
1. The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather 
conditions and understorey fuel loads. Therefore the CF can be 
rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring current 
or predicted fire weather conditions (an essential component for 
calculating FDI) or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary 
across the landscape. Both these inputs are required for 
calculating CF refer to Equations (1)–(5); and 
2. It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools 
to assess the potential suitability of suppression strategies.  
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the 
power functions appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths 
greater than 6m compared to using Fire Point Theory and Equation (1) 
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the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower 
levels of wildfire behaviour.  
77Table 2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length. 
Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42 
3 CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43 
4 CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44 
5 CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44 
6 CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45 
7 CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45 
8 CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45 
9 CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45 
10 CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46 
Intensity, I (kWm−1) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.11(I)0.33 
3 CF3 = 0.15(I)0.34 
4 CF4 = 0.12(I)0.35 
5 CF5 = 0.22(I)0.35 
6 CF6 = 0.24(I)0.36 
7 CF7 = 0.27(I)0.36 
8 CF8 = 0.30(I)0.36 
9 CF9 = 0.32(I)0.36 
10 CF10 = 0.35(I)0.36 
Flame Length, Lf (m) 
Active Flame Depth (m) Function 
2 CF2 = 0.64 Lf0.62 
3 CF3 = 0.90 Lf0.63 
4 CF4 = 1.14 Lf0.65 
5 CF5 = 1.35 Lf0.65 
6 CF6 = 1.56 Lf0.66 
7 CF7 = 1.74 Lf0.67 
8 CF8 = 1.93 Lf0.67 
9 CF9 = 2.11 Lf0.68 
10 CF10 = 2.28 Lf0.68 




89Figure 2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of head 
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90Figure 3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of 
intensity, I (kWm−1). 
 
91Figure 4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of flame 
length, Lf (m) 
4.5. Sensitivity 
Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how 
they influence CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs 
were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25 tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I = 
43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel = 588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0.7, 𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 
= 2640 kJkg−1, ?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8. As the effects of 
FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships 
identified in Equations (3)–(5)) and flame depth are investigated throughout 
the study, sensitivity to the remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and 
increasing the subject base input by 20%, all other inputs as assumed. The 
results are summarized in Table 3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏, there was 
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noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close 
proximity, both 𝜏𝜏  and 𝜏𝜏 should be set at 1 [1]. 
 
78Table 3. Sensitivity analysis. 
Input % Change to Base Input % Change to Critical Flow (CF) 
h ±20% ±1% 
Tg ±20% ±2% 
Tfuel ±20% ±1% 
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 ±20% ±1% 
𝜈𝜈𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 ±20% ±1% 
?̇?𝑚”𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝,0 ±20% ±0% 
𝜏𝜏 ±20% ±24% 




Validation of predictive suppression modelling against large scale, chaotic 
and turbulent wildfire is inherently problematic. The scale of wildfires such as 
those described in [12–15] combined with the limited suitability of suppression 
strategies [23] and lack of technology available to capture both the 
efficiency and total application of water [31,32,35,36] during wildfire 
suppression facilitates little if any available, reliable and relevant data. As a 
result, like many of the wildfire studies and models currently used by fire 
services [21,37–42], validation of the methodology applied in this study has 
been only completed for low-intensity wildfire experiments [1]. 
Hansen [1] reported that whilst experimental values matched ‘very well’ the 
calculated CF for red pine needles, however in balsam fir slash and black 
spruce slash the calculated and experimental values did not align well. One 
of the reasons identified for this occurrence was the variance in flame length 
and active flame depth through slash compared to that experienced in the 
fine fuels of pine needles. It should be noted that Equations (3)–(5) applied in 
this study assume fine fuel involvement only. Another reason for the potential 
disagreement between experimental slash values and calculated values 
was identified as the inability of Byram’s active flame depth equation [1]. The 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
325 
 
methods applied in this report require visual identification of active flame 
depth which may assist eliminate this issue. 
In order to further validate this study during large wildfires the following is 
recommended: 
1. real time fire appliance and aircraft telemetry that records active 
fire suppression time, water application rates and location; 
2. enhanced quantitative measurement of wildfire behaviour such as 
that available through aerial intelligence and analysis [36]; 
3. further experimental study in scaled controlled wildfires through 
natural vegetation structures with a specific focus on CF 
requirements. 
The potential difficulty and expense in completing the identified research is 
acknowledged, however it should be considered an essential component of 
enhancing wildfire suppression strategies and thereby reducing the impacts 
of wildfire on the greater community. 
4.7. Discussion 
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers 
cannot deliver sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of 
FDI, once the active flame depth reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of 
w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25 tha−1 [22,26]. In larger 
appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be 
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an 
FDI of 40. All aircraft reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF. 
However, they remain restricted by the inherent limitations of availability, turn 
around, restricted ability to operate at night where they may be most 
effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of 
privately operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of 
aerial suppression on safety grounds [36].  
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire emergency, 
Figure 1a–f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine the suitability of 
appliance-based suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI and active 
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flame depth are known. In jurisdictions that do not rely on FDI or surface fuel 
loads, it is suggested Table 2 (with an appropriate safety factor) may be 
suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to available CF, 
and therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts are potentially 
suitable. Used in conjunction with existing suppression thresholds and newer 
thresholds that consider radiant heat flux and firefighter tenability [23], these 
results will assist provide greater justification for the selection of appropriate 
wildfire suppression strategies.  
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when 
analyzing wildfire severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In 
addition to having a significant impact on CF as shown in this study, the depth 
of the active flame front has significant effects on emissivity and 
subsequently, radiant heat flux [22,23]. It is therefore proposed that active 
flame depth may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional 
measures of RoS, intensity or Lf utilized internationally. Where active flame 
depths remain less than 3 m, traditional suppression strategies may remain 
suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and due care is 
exercised.  
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with 
the assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have 
appliances consistently attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not 
in any way suggested incident logistics is as simplistic as providing a single 
suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front, it may be 
applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that 
have the potential to grow into siege wildfire dimensions.  
4.8. Conclusions 
This study provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to CF required 
to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire 
weather and active fire front depths. Perhaps the greatest ramification of the 
results is the need to reexamine the use of aerial and appliance suppression 
in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground based appliances remains 
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vital in suppression of wildfires. However, in both forest and woodland fuel 
structures, and when faced with siege wildfire behavior with active flame 
depths across the head fire greater than 3 m, increased reliance on aerial 
suppression may be required to deliver the CF necessary to impact the head 
fire and have any effect on the forward Rate of Spread. In reality of this will 
require greater investment to ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near 
congregations of high value assets are prevented from reaching the 
thresholds that support this level of fire intensity. Fire services investment in 
improved technologies that supports night time aerial suppression operations 
during periods of reduced fire behaviour is also suggested. Where aerial 
resourcing is limited, strategies such as guiding head fire direction and pre-
emptive line building adjacent to existing fuel breaks such as major roads, 
supported by appliance based suppression may provide enhanced 
outcomes compared to reliance on head fire suppression alone.  
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Chapter 5 - Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and 
burnover: an analysis of vehicle protection systems. 
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. (under review). 
Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and burnover: an analysis 
of vehicle protection systems. Fire Safety Journal  
 
5.1. Abstract 
When attempting to suppress severe wildfire the possibility for firefighting 
crews to be overrun by wildfire, known as entrapment and burnover, 
remains a catastrophic and all too common occurrence. While 
improvements have been made to vehicle protection systems to increase 
the safety of firefighters caught in burnover, the potential effectiveness of 
these systems remains limited.  This study involved systematic analysis of 62 
historical entrapment and burnover reports from the USA, Australian and 
New Zealand from 1978 to 2020 (Phase 1), and 135 simulated wildfires 
encompassing the 99th percentile of Australian fire weather conditions, fuel 
structures and terrain (Phase 2).  Analysis of historical entrapments 
identified existing vehicle protection systems have failure points well below 
the reported Fire Danger Index associated with the majority of house loss 
during wildfire events in Australia.  Increasing the performance threshold of 
vehicle protection systems to the historical mean fire line intensity identified 
at the point of entrapment increased efficacy, and, prevented vehicle 
protection systems being overwhelmed in simulations regardless of Fire 
Danger Index and up to windspeeds of 55 kmh-1.  In order to further 
improve firefighter protection during entrapment and burnover it is 
recommended the radiant heat flux performance threshold of vehicle 
protection systems are increased..    
5.2. Introduction 
Firefighters are regularly required to protect life, property and areas of 
natural significance from destructive wildfires.  A combination of offensive 
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and defensive strategies are usually necessary, selected depending on the 
fire behaviour, availability of resources, access to the fire, and fuel structure 
itself [1-13].  Offensive strategies include direct head fire or flank fire attack 
(Figure 1) and typically require firefighters to apply suppressants from hand 
held attack lines or machine monitors.  An alternate offensive strategy, the 
parallel attack, is where firefighters fall back some safe distance, construct 
containment lines parallel to the fire line and then burn out the intervening 
vegetation. Defensive strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too 
intense to be safely attacked with active fire suppression.  Defensive 
strategies include building containment lines, backburning, defending 
properties and focusing on evacuation of people and livestock [6,12,13]. 
 
92Figure 1. Direct attack on the head fire (left) vs direct attack on the flank (right) (Source: 
DFES, 2014, p10-11). 
During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics [10] 
or sudden changes in wind direction [14,15] can result in firefighters being 
directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire, a situation known as entrapment.  
The occurrence of wildfire flame directly impacting firefighters is known as 
burnover.  The threat posed from entrapment and burnover is significant 
and has resulted in 411 firefighter deaths in the USA from 1910 to 2006 [16], 92 
Australian firefighter deaths from 1901 to 2011 [17] and 165 Canadian 
firefighter deaths between 1941 and 2010 [18]. In many cases multiple 
fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.  The causes 
entrapment and burnover are well known [19], although more recent studies 
have increased this understanding by defining human factors and fire 
behaviour leading up to these events [14,15,20-24].   
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In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity 
of firefighting vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for 
entrapped occupants, Australian fire services have invested in vehicle 
protection systems (VPS). 
Vehicle protection systems include [25,26] (figure 2):   
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets 
and personal fire blankets; 
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal 
damage, through shielding, relocation and lagging; 
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage, 
through shielding, relocation and lagging; 
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous 
enclosure of non-combustible materials through: 
i. removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin 
body aesthetic panels, side mirror mounts, door handles, 
backing plates and underbody panels; or 
ii. Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant; 
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the 
replacement of rear and side rear windows with solid panels; 
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and 
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated 





93Figure 2. Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed 
(DFES, 2013c); (b) Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical 
wildfire fighting appliance showing position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a). 
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The vehicle protection system deluge sprays are designed to [25]: 
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;   
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and 
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition. 
 
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for 
a minimum of 5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’ 
sounds which occurs once water tank reserves reach 600 L, and to have a 
nominal flow rate of 120 Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of 3 bar [25].  An audible 
and visual warning device alerts crews once they have reached the deluge 
system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this 
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge 
systems.  For instance Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with 
a 500 L water tank, cannot be fitted with deluge systems due to insufficient 
water capacity to generate the required protection duration and existing 
vehicle weight restrictions [26,27].  
Limited field experimentation has been completed [28,29] and the 
inherent danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather 
conditions has prevented the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection 
systems being suitably quantified in full scale field experimentation.  
Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire 
engineering safety analysis [30-33].  Current external vehicle protection 
systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles incorporate drop down 
thermal shielding blankets and sprinkler deluge systems have been tested 
against fire line intensities of between 2,500-10,000 kWm-1 and designed to 
withstand 7,500 kWm-1 [33].  In similar tests, Nichols et al. [34] reported that 
cabin tenability was maintained when simulated fire line intensities of up to 
12,000 kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds when water spray 
protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields, 
whilst Sargeant et al. [35, p7] reported that  
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation 
levels up to 30 kWm-2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity 
at around 10 to 15 kWm-2” 
Greg Penney PhD Thesis 
335 
 
  By comparison forensic wildfire analysis [36] and field experimentation 
[37,38,39] identified fire line intensities of up to 88,000 kWm-1 and radiant heat 
fluxes in excess of 100 kWm-2 can be experienced for longer durations during 
landscape scale wildfires, far exceeding the limits of crew protection systems 
[34].   
The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an 
adequate level of fireifghter protection during burnover remains 
unquantified.  Without validation firefighters may overestimate their 
personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will be 
adequately protected.   The objective of this study is to address this 
knowledge gap and provide further guidance the potential effectiveness of 
vehicle protection systems in improving firefighter tenability during 
entrapment and burnover.  This is achieved by systematic analysis of 
historical entrapments and burnover (Phase 1) and simulated wildfires 
encompassing the 99th percentile of weather conditions and forest fuel loads 
(Phase 2).  
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives 
and performance criteria must be defined [30,31,40].  Effectiveness is 
defined as the product of fire safety system efficacy and reliability [41].  
Efficacy is the degree to which a system achieves its objective, a factor of 
1.00 signifies the system achieves all objectives.  Reliability is the probability 
that the system operates as required, a factor of 1.00 signifies 100% reliability.  
The objective of vehicle protection systems (VPS) is to increase the tenability 
of firefighters during vehicle entrapment and burnover.  For the purposes of 
the study the performance criteria (PC) required to meet this objective were 
subsequently defined as: 
PC1. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 7,500 kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS); 
PC2. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 10,000 kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS 
have been tested to); 
PC3. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than 12,000 kWm-1 (maximum short duration 
intensity VPS can withstand); 
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PC4. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line 
intensity (I) is less than the mean historical upper reported / 
calculated intensity for all entrapments resulting in fatality or 
injury; 
PC5. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant 
heat flux (RHF) is less than 15 kWm-2, assuming vehicles are 
orientated side on or with the rear to the advancing headfire; 
and 
PC6. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant 
heat flux (RHF) is less than 30 kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated 
front on to the advancing headfire. 
 
5.3. Phase 1 – Historical burnover analysis 
International safety reports and coronial inquiries were reviewed to identify 
occurrences of firefighter injury or fatality during wildfire suppression and 
extract wildfire behaviour at the time of impact.  Wildfire behaviour at the 
time of impact was subsequently deterministically evaluated against defined 
VPS fire line intensity and radiant heat flux performance thresholds.   
To increase the number of burnover events for analysis, inclusion criteria for 
initial investigation were broad, with the search terms of entrapment; fire; 
firefighter; burnover; wildfire; or bushfire (being the Australian term for wildfire) 
applied.  Databases were searched as far back as electronic records 
permitted.  The full text of the studies identified by the searchers were 
retrieved, references were screened for additional papers and a further 
selection process undertaken (Table 1).  During the second review of the 
selected reports, the search terms fatality; injury; intensity; spread; rate; flame; 
and length were applied to refine results.  As the research specifically 
related to entrapment and burnover during wildfire suppression incidents 
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Coroner Court of New South Wales 1979-
2020 [42] 
560 14 0 
Coroner Court of Queensland 2004-2020 
[43] 
802 17 0 
Coroners Court of Victoria 2008-2020 [44] 1760 50 0 
Coroners Court of Tasmania 2015-2018 
[45] 
307 7 0 
Coroners Court of South Australia 2016-
2020 [46] 
678 1 0 
Coroners Court of Western Australia 2014-
2019 [47] 
323 5 1 (F) 
Fire Sciences Lab Merged Entrapment 
Database [48] 
415 415 25 (F) 
186 (Inj) 
Fire services literature, ResearchGate and 
referenced papers 
11 11 2 (F) 
Note: (F) indicates incident with fatality; (INJ) indicates incident with injury 
only 
 
Data pertaining to fire line intensity (I), headfire rate of spread (RoS) and 
flame length (Lf) was extrapolated from each report. Where intensity was not 
directly reported at the point of entrapment and burnover, but either rate of 
spread or flame length was reported, intensity was calculated using 
equations (1) to (8) as appropriate and fuel load values detailed in Australian 
Standard AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas [49], 
subsequently referred to as AS3959.  Heat of combustion of 18,600 kJkg-1 was 
selected for the analysis, being within the values detailed in table 2. Reports 
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were excluded if insufficient detail regarding fire line intensity, head fire rate 
of spread or flame length to extract or calculate wildfire intensity was 
available.  All reports included in the study are detailed in Appendix 1.  
Performance Criteria 1 to 4 were deterministically assessed against fire line 
intensity at the point of entrapment and burnover.   
 
The assumptions associated with the modelling are: 
1. The term wildfire fuel is broadly applied to the vegetation 
potentially consumed by a fire burning in vegetation, regardless of 
the active fire area itself [50-57]. Wildfire fuel is defined by its 
physical structure and properties which are represented by 
numerical inputs relevant to the appropriate model being applied 
and classified into set vegtation categories [50,51]. For the 
purposes of this research, wildfire fuel is considered to be the fine 
fuels, typically less than 6mm in diameter, that will be consumed by 
the approaching headfire.  Vegetation categories are defined in 
accordance with AS3959 [49] as Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub 
and Grass;   
2. Pyrolysis of vegetation and combustion of turbulent diffusion flames 
of a bushfire front is extremely complex. Existing empirical models 
rely heavily on the assumption that radiation is overwhelmingly 
responsible for heat transfer between the flame and the receiving 
body [38,39,50,57,58].  It is assumed the fire front is geometrically 
represented by a uniform parallelepiped the width of the head fire 
(figure 3), with sufficient flame depth for the flame emissivity to 
reach at least 0.8 (identified as being greater than 5 m and 
potentially deeper than 10 m) [13,59,60], and flame length 
dependent on associated fire modelling that assumes the fire has 
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS) [1,57,61]. The assumed 
flame geometry is commonly known as the “radiant heat panel”, 
with the horizontal position of the panel considered to be located 
below the midpoint between the base and tip of the flame front 
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(fig 3) [13,57,61]. Both the flame temperature  and emissivity are 
assumed to be consistent across the panel, whilst the receiving 
body is assumed to be aligned perpendicular to the approaching 
fire front [49,50].  Radiant heat flux is the radiation in kWm-2 
received by a body at a specified distance from the radiant heat 
panel, considering any shielding and the spectral properties of 
both the fire and the firefighter, vehicle, house etc. [13,50,62] 
3. Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie [63] describe wildfires as eruptive and 
unstable combustion involving a process of dynamic interaction 
between rate of spread, flame length and fire line intensity. The 
mathematical relationship between wildfire behaviour, flame 
geometry and radiant heat flux described in AS3959 [49] is 
explained and expanded in equations (1) to (9); and 
4. A critical component of the fireline intensity is the heat of 
combustion (H), defined as the amount of heat released when a 
unit quantity of fuel is oxidized completely to yield stable end 
products [32].  Values for H for common types of vegetation are 
identified in Table 2.  Australian Standard 3959 [49] details that 
intensity (I), in kWm-1 and corrected for slope, is calculated using 
Byram’s fireline intensity equation. 
 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)/36 (1) 
Where H is the heat of combustion (kJkg-1), shown in table 1, W is total fuel 
load (tha-1) and RoS is the head fire rate of spread in kmh-1.   
 
80Table 2. Heat of Combustion. 
Fuel Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg) Source 
Wood (European Beech) 19500 (SFPE,2008, Table 1-5.3) 
(SFPE,2008, Table 1-5.3) Wood (Ponderosa Pine) 19400 
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We rearrange equation 1 and substituting it for RoS provides: 
𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 =











For scrub and shrub vegetation structures, Lf is calculated by: 
𝜈𝜈𝑓𝑓 = 0.0775𝐹𝐹0.46 (5) 
















We rearrange this equation, enabling I to be calculated by: 








Radiant heat flux is calculated for all vegetation structures using the 
equation:  
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 (9) 
where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity, 
𝐸𝐸 is the flame emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜏𝜏 is the view factor.  
 





94Figure 3. Geometrical representation of the wildfire headfire. The radiant heat 
panel (left) and flame geometry (right) 
Of the 4,856 reports initially reviewed, 4,336 were excluded as they did not 
meet the initial inclusion criteria.  Of the remaining 520 reports, 56 reports 
were excluded because they did not involve a fatality or injury; two reports 
were excluded because they detailed accidents unrelated to entrapment 
(one structure fire propane tank explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports 
were excluded as they related to controlled burns; and 392 reports were 
excluded because they contained insufficient information to extract or 
calculate fire line intensity.  A total of 62 reports were included in the final 
study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports 
containing firefighter injuries only.   
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62% 
(n=16) of fatal entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland 
7.5% (n=2).  For entrapments involving injury only, forest accounted for 
approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands 14%  (n=5), scrub 11% 
(n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).   
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for 
approximately 40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16% 
(n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland 22% (n=14).  Wildfire behaviour (lower 
and upper reported / calculated values) during entrapments and burnover 
at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table 3, with 
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distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 4.  The highest RoS by 
vegetation type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53 ms-1, Scrub 7.23 ms-1, 
Shrub 6.73 ms-1, and Grass 5.63 ms-1.  The highest intensity and flame length 
occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal entrapments, with the highest 
reported intensity being 249,226 kWm-1, the highest calculated intensity being 
318,990 kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7 
to 61 m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all 
entrapments was 64,453 kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the 
intensity threshold for Performance Criteria 4.  Acknowledging the limitations 
and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study, these figures are 
consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs [1,64]. 
 
81Table 3. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or 
fatality, showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and 
standard deviation (σ). 
Fatality only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 2.0 2.1 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.3 2.4 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 1012 318990 68523 87142 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 3113 318990 83545 85912 
LF lower reported value (m) 1.8 45.7 13.7 13.0 
LF upper reported value (m) 3.0 61 19.8 18.5 
Injury only incidents 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.2 4.5 1.5 1.4 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.2 6.7 2.2 1.8 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 253 209250 32937 7481 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 850 227850 50664 60349 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 8.5 10.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 11.8 15.5 
All incidents considered 
Wildfire behaviour min max μ σ 
RoS lower reported value (ms-1) 0.1 7.2 1.8 1.8 
RoS upper reported value (ms-1) 0.1 8.3 2.2 2.1 
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 253 318990 47860 67687 
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 850 318990 64453 73373 
LF lower reported value (m) 0.6 45.7 10.6 11.9 
LF upper reported value (m) 1.2 76.2 15.0 17.1 
 




(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation 
 
(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation 
 




(c) LF all incidents by vegetation 
95Figure 4. Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity; 
(c) LF 
Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its 
required objective, assuming it functions as intended [32,40,41].   Table 4 
details the efficacy of vehicle protection systems against Performance 
Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from the historical entrapments analysed.  
Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity 7,500 kWm-
1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy between 0.12 to a maximum 
of 0.36.  An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 is observed when vehicle 
protection systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1, 
are considered.  Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an 
intensity of 12,000 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an 
efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.  Applying Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. 
performance threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded / 
calculated intensity of 64453 kWm-1), efficacy of vehicle protection systems 
increases to between 0.62 to 0.81.  By comparison, Yung (2008) reports the 
efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a ‘large’ fire in buildings as between 0.89 
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to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness (efficacy multiplied by reliability) of 0.77 
to 0.96.  In conjunction with the analysis of historical entrapments, this 
suggests that existing vehicle protection systems may be unreliable in 
protecting vehicle occupants from entrapment and burnover.  
Improvements in vehicle protection system efficacy could be achieved by 
increasing the performance standard they are required to meet, whilst further 
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems will facilitate greater 
understanding of overall effectiveness. 
 
82Table 4. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments considering 
lower and upper recorded / calculated intensity.  
Fatality only incidents (n=26) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.19 (n=5) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.31 (n=8) 0.12 (n=3) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.69 (n=18) 0.62 (n=16) 
Injury only incidents (n=36) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.36 (n=13) 0.22 (n=8) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=15) 0.28 (n=10) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.47 (n=17) 0.33 (n=12) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.81 (n=29) 0.67 (n=24) 
All incidents (n=62) 
Performance Criteria lower intensity upper intensity 
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)  0.29 (n=18) 0.18 (n=11) 
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1) 0.37 (n=23) 0.21 (n=13) 
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1) 0.42 (n=26) 0.24 (n=15) 
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1) 0.76 (n=47) 0.66 (n=41) 
 
5.4. Phase 2 – Design wildfire analysis 
Where full scale fire safety systems testing is prohibitive (e.g. testing vehicle 
protection systems against an out of control wildfire in elevated fire weather 
conditions), fire safety systems analysis using design fire simulation is required 
[30-32].   Design fires are prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection 
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engineers for performance-based fire safety designs [40].  Parameters and 
justification for the design wildfire simulated in the study are detailed in Table 
6.  Modelling was completed using the methodology described in AS3959 
Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas Annexure B [49] which 
details the calculation of wildfire Rate of Spread (RoS), intensity (I) and 
radiant heat flux (RHF) for multiple vegetation structures. This approach 
enabled vehicle protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6 
(i.e. intensities of 7,500 kWm-1, 10,000 kWm-1, 12,000 kWm-1, 64,453 kWm-1; and 
radiant heat flux of 15 kWm-2 and 30 kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest, 
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and 
grassland fire danger indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.   
 
83Table 6. Design wildfire specifications AS3959 Annexure B simulations 
Component Model / Value Justification 
Wildfire 
models 
AS3959 Annexure B  
Acknowledging the limitations of empirical models [65] the 
models selected are those currently used by fire services 
across Australia [10,65] as well as the Australian Building 
Codes Board [67,68] by adopting Australian Standard 3959 
[49]. They have also been successfully utilised in recent 
related research [10,50], and are therefore considered 
suitable for the study.   
Vegetation  
Forest, Woodland, 
Scrub, Shrub & 
Grassland 
Captures all fuel structures associated with historical 
entrapment and burnover.  Understory fuel loads (w), total 
fuel loads (W), vegetation heights (VH) and wind speed (V) 
sourced AS3959 [49] Table B3: 
Forest: w = 25tha-1; W = 35tha-1; 
Woodland: w = 15tha-1; W = 25tha-1; 
Scrub: w = 25tha-1; W = 25tha-1; VH = 3m; V = 45kmh-1; 
Shrub: w = 15tha-1; W = 15tha-1; VH = 1.5m; V = 45kmh-1; 
Grassland: w = 4.5tha-1; W = 4.5tha-1 
Sensitivity analysis completed for W at 10% increments for 
Forest and Woodland, assuming flat slope and FDI = 80. 
Additional radiant heat flux sensitivity analysis was 
completed for Forest and Woodland for w at 5tha-1 




Assessed at increments of 10.  Represents the 99th 
percentile of fire weather conditions [69] across Australia. 





Represents the 99th percentile of fire weather conditions 
[69] across Australia. Note: only applicable to Grassland. 
GFDI distribution in accordance with AS3959 [49] default 
values. 













Within the wildfire flame temperature ranges reported 
[49,59,60] 
Emissivity (ε) 0.95 
Within emissivity ranges reported [49,59,60,70] (and reflects 




Consistent with that required for radiant heat flux 
modelling of wildfire reported in AS3959 [49] and Penney 




Average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) in the 
open AS3959 [49]. Sensitivity analysis at 10kmh-1 
increments. Note: only applicable to Scrub and Shrub fire 
models. 
Slope 0° 
Positive slope (aligned with wind direction) assumed to be 
0° with sensitivity analysis at 5° increments across Forest 
and Woodland vegetation at FDI = 80; Grassland at GFDI 
=110 (equivalent to FDI of 80); at 45kph-1 windspeed for 




Radiant heat flux (RHF) diminishes with separation of the 
receiver from the radiant heat panel.  RHF is calculated at 
5m increments from 0 to 100m separation.   
 
 
Applying the parameters detailed in Table 6, a total of 90 simulations were 
completed.  As expected wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed 
(V) and Forest / Grassland Fire Danger Indices (Figure 5a-j), which is consistent 
with the principles of established wildfire behaviour.   
Forest simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding 
Performance Criteria 1 (7,500 kWm-1) and Performance Criteria 2 (10,000 
kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to 20, and Performance Criteria 3 
(12,000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 20 to 30.  
Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean 
historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1) was not 
exceeded regardless of the Fire Danger Index.  By comparison Woodland 
simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding Performance 
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Criteria 1 (7,500 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 30 to 40, intensity 
exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10,000 kWm-1) between a FDI of 40 to 50, 
and Performance Criteria 3 (12,000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire 
Danger Index of 50 to 60.  Echoing the results of Forest simulations, 
Performance Criteria 4 (64,453 kWm-1) was not exceeded in Woodland 
regardless of the Fire Danger Index.  In Grassland under equivalent 
conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a Grassland 
Fire Danger Index of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded at 
any Fire Danger Index. 
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. [71] report virtually all house 
loss from wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the 99.5th 
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions 
considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger 
Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there is little house loss on days 
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  This indicates that vehicle 
protection systems designed to current performance criteria are unlikely to 
be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in 
the protection of houses during significant wildfire events. 
  The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub 
wildfires is illustrated in Figures 5g and 5i.  Scrub simulations on flat ground 
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between 
windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15 kmh-1.  Unlike all other simulations, intensity 
exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only once 
windspeed exceeded approximately 55 kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub 
simulations in equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding 
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between windspeeds of 5 to 15 kmh-1, and 
Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between windspeeds of 25 to 35 
kmh-1.  Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of 
windspeed in Shrub simulations. 
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing 
slope across all vegetation structures.  Simulations in each fuel structure 
were completed at 0° to 20°. When simulating the effect of increase in slope 
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(Figures 5b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was confirmed between slope and 
wildfire intensity (Table 8).  This subsequently resulted in Performance Criteria 
1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased.  Increased 
slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded where it 
previously provided adequate protection.   These outcomes were 
expected given the mathematical relationship between slope, rate of 
spread and intensity detailed in equations 1-8.   
Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also 
confirmed consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W) 
load increased (Figure 6).  At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat 
ground, fire line intensities exceeded Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when 
Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire values (w= 10-12.5 
tha-1 and W= 14-17.5 tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded once 
Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5 tha-1 and W= 21-24.5 tha-1) of default 
design wildfire values.  Under the same conditions, Performance Criteria 1 
was exceeded when Woodland fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9 tha-1 and W= 
12.5-15 tha-1) of default design wildfire values and both Performance Criteria 
2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached 70-80% (w= 10.5-12 
tha-1 and W= 17.5-20 tha-1) of their default design wildfire values (the fuel 
loads assigned in AS3959).  Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded in 
Forest or Woodland simulations at any fuel load.  These results indicate that 
whilst sparser fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems 
designed to existing performance criteria may still be exceeded, however 
vehicle protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 4 would provide 
a significantly higher level of firefighter protection.  




(a) Forest headfire intensity FDI sensitivity (b) Forest headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(FDI 80) 
  
(c) Woodlands headfire FDI sensitivity (d) Woodland headfire intensity slope 
sensitivity (FDI 80) 
  



































































































































(g) Scrub headfire V sensitivity (h) Scrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(V=45) 
  
(i) Shrub headfire V sensitivity (j) Shrub headfire intensity slope sensitivity 
(V=45) 
96Figure 5. Wildfire intensity by vegetation type 
 
84Table 7. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types  
 Slope 
Intensity factor 






















































































97Figure 6. Sensitivity to fuel load - Forest & Woodland  
 
Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated 
at 5 m increments for 0 to 100 m of separation from the headfire for Forest, 
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7).  As 
expected, due to the mathematical relationships established in Equations (1) 
to (9), radiant heat flux at each unit of separation increases with slope, Fire 
Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) and windspeed (V).   
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance 
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) were exceeded 
for 0 to 5m separation from the wildfire front.  Historical analysis (Table 3) 
identifies the mean flame length during entrapments and burnover resulting 
in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15 m, with a maximum flame length of 45.7 
to 76.2 m.  This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the 
event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and 
burnover during the passage of the headfire.   
In Forest simulations (Figure 7a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 14 m separation from the headfire at 





















Understory (w) and Total (W) fuel load
Forest Woodland 7500kW/m 10000kW/m 12000kW/m
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Index of 100.  Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-
2) for approximately 8 m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index 
of 10, increasing to approximately 25 m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.   
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands 
fuels was slightly higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory 
fuel (15 tha-1) compared to Forest (25 tha-1).  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 10m separation from the 
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 30m at a 
Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7b).  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for approximately  5 m separation from 
the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 17 m 
at a Fire Danger Index of 100.    
In Scrub simulations (Figure 7c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance 
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 8 m from the headfire at a windspeed 
of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 35 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.  
Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for 
approximately 5 m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh-1, increasing 
to approximately 20 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.  By comparison, in Shrub 
simulations (Figure 7d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5 
(15 kWm-2) for approximately 5 m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh-
1, increasing to approximately 25 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.  Radiant 
heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2)for approximately 4m 
from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh-1, increasing to approximately 13 
m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.   
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7e) radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 10 m from the headfire 
at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 17 m at 
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.  Radiant heat flux exceeded 
Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at 
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a 
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.     
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These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing 
vehicle protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the 
conditions Blanchi et al [71] report are most likely to be involved in the 




(a) Forest headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
(b) Woodland headfire RHF as a function 
of separation distance 
  
 
(c) Scrub headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
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(e) Grass headfire RHF as a function of 
separation distance 
 
98Figure 7. RHF as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b) Woodland; 
(c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland 
Sensitivity analysis (table 9) demonstrates the separation required from the 
headfire (all vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall below 
Performance Criteria 5 and 6 increases with slope.  Similarly, sensitivity 
analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in Forest/Woodland design wildfires 
(Figure 8a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between the separation 
required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below 
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w).  At surface fuel 
loads (w) of 30 tha-1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux 
exceeds Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) until approximately 45 m 
separation from the forest head fire is achieved.  Under the same conditions 
radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) until separation 
of approximately 25m is achieved.  The required separation from the head 
fire for RHF decreases with FDI and w, with only approximately 6 m separation 
required for RHF to fall below 30 kWm-2 at a FDI of 100 when w is 5 tha-1; and 
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85Table 8. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before Performance Criteria 
5 & 6 are achieved.  
Vegetation 
Slope 
0° 5° 10° 15° 20° 
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 35-40m 45m 55m 65m 75-80m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 25m 30m 35-40m 45-50m 55-60m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 20-25m 25-30m 30m 30-35m 35-40m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 20-25m 25-30m 
Grassland (GFDI=110) 15m 15-20m 20m 15-20m 25-30m 
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm-2) exceeded 
Forest (FDI=80) 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 40-45m 50-55m 
Woodland (FDI=80) 10-15m 15-20m 20-25m 25-30m 30-35m 
Scrub (V=45kmh-1) 10-15m 10-15m 15-20m 15-20m 20-25m 
Shrub (V=45kmh-1) 5-10m 5-10m 10-15m 10-15m 10-15m 




(a) w = 5tha-1 (b) w = 10tha-1 
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(e) w = 25tha-1 (f) w = 30tha-1 
 
99Figure 8. Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the 
headfire: (a) w = 5tha-1; (b) w = 10tha-1; (c) w = 15tha-1; (d) w = 20tha-1; (e) w = 25tha-
1; (f) w = 30tha-1  
 
5.5. Discussion 
The results of Phase 1 of the study identify that vehicle protection systems 
designed to operate in fire line intensities of 7,500 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 1) could reasonably be expected to be effective in 0.12 to 0.36 of 
historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault 
100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00).  An increase in efficacy from 
0.12 to 0.42 was observed when vehicle protection systems performing to 
Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1, were considered.  Vehicle 
protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12,000 kWm-1 
(i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.  
This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems 
[32,40].  Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle 
protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated 
intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an 
increase in the efficacy of vehicle protection systems to between 0.62 to 0.81. 
To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is 
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are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.  Further 
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems is also 
recommended to determine the effectiveness of each system as part of a 
detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis.  This will 
help a better assessment of the required safety systems for firefighters during 
entrapment and burnover and will reduce injuries or fatalities during wildfire 
suppression.  
The results of Phase 2 of the study further highlight the performance 
limitations of existing vehicle protection systems.  Whilst the 95th and 99th 
percentiles of Fire Danger Indices across Australia from 2000 to 2007 as 
reported by Dowdy et al. [69] are illustrated in figure 9, fire weather in 
Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change Lucas et al. 
[72].  As Blanchi et al. [71] report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in 
Australia occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th 
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions 
considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger 
Index greater than 100.  Further, they report there is little house loss on days 
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50.  The simulations completed 
in the study demonstrated Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7,500 
kWm-1, 10,000 kWm-1 and 12,000 kWm-1 respectively) were exceeded on flat 
terrain in Forest below a Fire Danger Index of 30; in Woodlands at Fire Danger 
Indices between 30 to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 
less than 50 (equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub 
at windspeeds of less than 15 kmh-1.  By comparison, the mean historical 
upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance 
Criteria 4) was not exceeded in any simulation, regardless of Fire Danger 
Index or windspeed except for Scrub fuels once windspeed reached 
approximately 55 kmh-1.   




100Figure 9. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the Fire 
Danger Index. (image from Dowdy et al. [69], used with permission from the Bureau 
of Meteorology)  
Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Phase 2 demonstrated that 
vehicle protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15 kWm-2 and 
30kWm-2) are likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame 
immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for significant distances 
of separation from the headfire.  To increase firefighter safety further 
research and development is recommended into vehicle protection systems 
satisfying Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire tests on building 
materials, components and structures – Part 8.2 Tests on elements of 
construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack – large 
flaming sources [73],  which specifically identifies performance criteria for 
prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40 kWm-2.   
This study investigates the efficacy of vehicle protection systems as 
currently fitted to Australian wildfire appliances. Whilst it does not investigate 
impacts of specific designs or the effects of various water sprays and droplet 
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size on attenuation, the study does identify suitable performance criteria for 
future vehicle protection systems to be assessed against.  Building on 
findings and recommendations by Roberts [74], Turco et al., [75] and SAI 
Global [73,77] future research into specific components of vehicle protection 
system design may further improve the effectiveness of various systems and 
ultimately improve firefighter safety.  Whilst data was collected across three 
countries and over 40 years, it is also acknowledged that incidents in some 
jurisdictions and fuel types are limited, particularly from Australia and New 
Zealand and in shrub and grassland fuel structures. For this reason, care 
should be taken when interpreting the findings in these specific areas until 
further data becomes available for analysis.  
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather 
alongside the findings of other recent research [10-13] into wildfire 
suppression strategies and the limitations of firefighters and the equipment 
they rely on. A recurring theme within the conclusions of this research is that 
when attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more 
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or 
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear 
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at 
the head fire are not defendable.  It is suggested offensive strategies 
involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after 
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased 
use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early adoption of this approach will 
assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous 
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little 
if any impact on the fire.  Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the 
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community 
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events. 
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5.10. Table A1 – Entrapments and Burnover Fatalities 
Report Vegetation Country 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/oaklandberkeley-hills-1991 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/south-canyon-fire-fa Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dude-1990 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/thirtymile-fire-fata Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/rainbow-springs-1984 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/california-1990 Forest USA 
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https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/station-fire-fatalities-2009 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/blue-ribbon-fire-fatalities-2011 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mound-house-fire-1983 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/golden-gates-estates-fire-1985 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cedar-mountain-1994 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/daddy-ridge-fatality Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/panther-fire-fatality-2008 Forest USA 
http://royalcommission.vic.gov.au/getdoc/1ef74588-457f-47ce-baa2-1c98f9fe10f2/TEN.132.001.0001.pdf Forest Australia 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cramer-fire-entrapment-2003 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/yarnell-hill-entrapm Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/point-fire-1995 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/kates-basin-2000 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/esperanza-fire-fatal Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/glen-allen-entrapment-1993 Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cedar-2003 Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/tuolumne-fire-entrap Scrub USA 
https://www.dfes.wa.gov.au/publications/MajorIncidentReports/Major% 20Incident%20Review%20-
%20Black%20Cat%20Creek%20Fire%20 (October%202012).pdf Scrub Australia 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298346129_Fire_behaviour _and_firefighter_ 
safety_implications_associated_with_the_Bucklands_Crossing_fire_burnover _of_24_March_1998 Scrub 
New 
Zealand 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/county-road-u-fire-f Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/shaw-fire-entrapment-fatality-2018 Shrub USA 
 
 
5.11. Table A2 – Entrapments and Burnover Injuries 
Report Vegetation Country 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/blue-cut-2002 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hochderffer-hills-1996 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dano-1996 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/calabasas-1996 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/pechanga-2000 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mendocino-fire-complex-injuries-and Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/shrimp-fire-burn-inj Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/seven-oak-fire-2007 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/lauder-1987 Forest USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hyatt-1998 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/deadman-flat-no-1298-1979 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/jackson-burnover-2008 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/grizzly-canyon-1981 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/wagon-box-1999 Grass USA 
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https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/clubhouse-2006 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/nicolaus-fire-2008 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dutch-flat-1996 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/klamathon-entrapment-2018 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/davin-road-fire-2010 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/bull-fire-entrapment Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/new-york-peak-2006 Grass USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/pine-fire-dozer-entrapment-2007 scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/holloway-fire-entrap Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/tanner-railroad-1999 Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/indians-fire-2008 Scrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/ridgetop-fire-entrapment-2012 Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/sadler-1999 Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mackenzie-1994 Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/canyon-fire-entrapment-2016 Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/grassy-ridge-fire-shelter-deploymen Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/old-topanga-1993 Shrub USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/maple-road-1987 Woodland USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/smokey-hill-wind-far Woodland USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/jesusita-fire-2009 Woodland USA 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hyde-1988 Woodland USA 
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Chapter 6 – RUIM: a fire safety engineering model for Rural Urban 
Interface firefighter taskforce deployment 
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. RUIM – a fire safety 
engineering model for Rural Urban Interface firefighter taskforce 
deployment. Fire Safety Journal. 113, DOI: 10.1016/j.firesaf.2020.102986  
 
6.1. Abstract:  
Firefighting at the rural urban interface remains one of the most 
dangerous activities undertaken by fire services internationally.  Whilst there 
is a significant volume of literature and describing methods for fire 
engineering safety analysis in the urban environment, a significant gap 
remains in the context of the rural urban interface.  To address this, this 
article presents the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM). An adaptation of 
the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM), the RUIM enables systematic 
analysis of firefighter safety during catastrophic and dynamic wildfire events.  
When applied correctly, the RUIM assists the Incident Controller and Incident 
Management Team determine whether there is sufficient time to establish 
defenses at the Rural Urban Interface, and,  provides additional guidance 
regarding the suitability and safety of defensive firefighting strategies.  
Ultimately, the inclusion of the RUIM as part of operational fire ground 
analysis may reduce the potential for fatalities or injuries arising from 
firefighting taskforces being caught in wildfire burnover. 
 
6.2. Introduction 
The suppression of devastating wildfires at the rural urban interface (RUI) is 
an all too common problem encountered by fire services internationally. 
During these disasters, significant intervention is required by fire and 
emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise their impacts at the 
RUI [1,2,3]. When planning to suppress severe wildfire, a combination of 
strategies may be necessary depending on the fire behaviour, availability of 
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resources, accessibility and fuel structure [1,4-6].  The application of 
incorrect strategies or sudden changes in fireground conditions can result in 
firefighting crews being overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover [1,7-9].  In 
such instances, unless the wildfire behaviour is mild, the risk of firefighter injury 
or fatality is unacceptably high [7,9-13].  Whilst offensive strategies involve 
actively combatting the fire, defensive strategies are employed when the fire 
behaviour is too intense for an offensive strategy [1] or people cannot be 
safely evacuated.   
The protect-in-place/shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface (RUI) 
firefighting tactic is typically utilised where communities and infrastructure are 
located within or immediately adjacent to vegetation that will support 
landscape scale wildfire behaviour [4,14].  It can be a high risk approach as 
not all structures are defensible [4,15] or constructed to withstand wildfire 
impacts.  ‘Backstop’ RUI defense, whereby firefighters have their backs 
‘against the walls’ of the structures they are attempting to protect, essentially 
requires firefighting crews to position themselves between an asset and the 
approaching bushfire front as illustrated in figure 1.  However, as we 
reported previously [1,2] this type of suppression tactic may expose 
firefighters to untenable conditions well in advance of the wildfire front itself, 
and may be ineffective due to insufficient water flow rates.  As an 
alternative RUI defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where structures are 
constructed to be more resilient to the impacts of wildfire [16,17], protection 
of the sheltering population may be achieved by firefighters sheltering inside 
the structure until after the passage of the head fire and they can safely 
extingish spot fires and reminant flames.  Where evacuations of vulnerable 
people or communities are not possible, for example the inhabitants of 
hospitals, schools, aged care facilities and other trapped communities, the 
shelter-in-place defense is a necessary approach.   
 




101Figure 1. RUI defense 
 
A fundamental component of a fire engineering safety analysis is 
understanding fire service intervention [18]. For Incident Management Teams 
(IMT) and Incident Controllers (IC) to develop and execute successful and 
safe suppression strategies it is critical they are able to appropriately analyse 
and manage risk.  Hindering both fire engineering analysis and IC in the 
wildfire context is a lack of formal evidence and processes to support 
operational decisions within the operational wildfire fighting context [19-22].  
Decision makers often have to rely on personal experience [1,23].  This is in 
part due to the relatively new discipline of wildfire engineering at the RUI in 
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comparison to traditional fire safety engineering in the urban environment.  
In Australia for instance, following the catastrophic 2009 Black Saturday fires 
in Victoria, the Building Code of Australia first adopted enhanced wildfire 
engineering assessments and wildfire resilient construction codes and in 2010.  
By comparison, fire safety engineering was incorporated into the original 
Building Code of Australia released in 1996.   
Within the context of RUI firefighting Incident Controllers must decide 
whether RUI taskforces have sufficient time to respond and travel to, as well 
as prepare for the impact of the wildfire head fire.  Their decisions are based 
on experience and assumptions supported by limited local information and 
intelligence. In effect, there is an inadequate engineering and systematic 
approach to the decision making, thus increasing the opportunity for error.  
To work towards addressing the existing shortfalls, this paper builds upon 
the Fire Brigade Intervention Model [18], and proposes the Rural Urban 
Interface Model (RUIM) to assist the IC analyse critical information and 
calculate required versus available safe RUI preparation time. Case studies 
representative of historical wildfire events are presented to demonstrate how 
the RUIM can be utilised by IMT to reduce the potential risk of firefighter injuries 
and fatalities. In doing so, this paper provides the critical connection 
between firefighting theory and practice that is essential within the 
firefighting profession [21]. 
 
6.3. Model 
The Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) is a quantitative model of urban 
structural fire service operations for use in fire engineering analysis and is an 
accepted verification method for performance based fire safety systems in 
the Building Code of Australia [18,24].  Developed following extensive 
review of existing international models, research into fire service operations 
and consultation with Australian and New Zealand fire service experts, the 
FBIM is reported to be “flexible enough to expanded to deal with all aspects 
of fire brigade operations” [18, p4] with a primary focus on firefighter safety.  
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The context of the FBIM is fire brigade operations within the urban context, 
such as high rise and complex building fires and does not consider firefighting 
tactical response work flow in the wildfire context.  Based on Australian and 
international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics [4,6,7,25], the Rural 
Urban Interface Model (RUIM) addresses this gap and represents the 
expansion of the FBIM to the specific context of firefighting defense at the 
RUI.  The RUIM is detailed in figures 2-6 and tables 1-5.  When completed, 
the RUIM assists IC and IMT determine whether there is sufficient time for 
taskforce’s assigned to protect life, property and critical infrastructure at the 
RUI, subsequently known as RUI taskforce’s, to safely mobilise, prepare for, 
and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and the untenable conditions 
which can occur well in advance of the headfire front [1]. 
When considering whether there is sufficient time to set up RUI defense 
prior to the impact of the head fire, deterministic analysis of Available Safe 
RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) versus Required Safe RUI Preparation Time 
(RSRPT) can be applied: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 (1) 
ASRPT is calculated by: 
 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝑅𝑅𝜈𝜈𝐹𝐹
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑  (2) 
Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation 
between the headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate 
of spread is calculated using appropriate equations for the vegetation type 
and fuel structure involved, such as those described in [17,26,27] 
Illustrated in figure 2, RSRPT is calculated by: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (3) 
Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time 
(to a base, staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and 
assessment of the immediate area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken 
for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior to the arrival of untenable 
conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are included 
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at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed 
separately in this manuscript.  
 
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be 
determined.  In RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either 
‘backstop defense’ or sheltering within the structures. The RUIM 
reflects this accordingly;  
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those 
in California [28.29], Greece [30] or Victoria [31] required the 
mobilization of military, interstate and even international firefighting 
assistance.  Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and 
firefighting crews will be drawn from many regions and are likely to 
be unfamiliar with the operational area, particularly during the 
escalation phases of the incident.  This results in greater 
uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response, 
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are 
not appropriate to the wildfire context;  
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal 
structural firefighting as structures actively on fire are identified as 
undefendable [6,14]. Therefore external suppression of structures 
only is considered in the RUIM; and 
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points 
(ASTCP) to be calculated, enabling critical components of the 
response including wildfire impacts on access routes, evacuations 
and other aspects to be deterministically assessed.  This further 
enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas involving 
active wildfire. 
 
Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are: 
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the 
total time to complete the required activities; 
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2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the 
sequence of activities determining the minimum time required for 
the firefighting intervention; 
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration 
of mobilization and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM 
provide useful guidance for Incident Controllers when making 
operational decisions; and 
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data. 
 
One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new 
head fires well in advance of the original fire front are not automatically 
considered due to the difficulty in accurately forecasting spot fire formation. 
Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance of the original head fire 
result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately.  This is not 
unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a 
new timeframe to be established.  As with any model, they are only one tool 
firefighters and Incident Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making 
process.  Field validation and current and reliable intelligence will further 
assist to increase the accuracy of predictions. 
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 2, separate flow charts 
and associated tables are required to be referred to in order to calculate the 
total RSRPT.  Whilst firefighters will complete property protection tasks prior to 
seeking shelter inside the building of refuge, the time available to complete 
the property protection (shaded in Figure 2) is calculated after the other 
stages as it is not in the critical path of completing RUI defense.  To calculate 
RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer should commence at Box 1 
in Figure 3 and work their way through the RUIM until all time components 
have been calculated.  The incorporation of safety factors and/or 
percentiles into the RUIM is also essential [18,24] due to: 
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a 
discipline based on complex science which is neither exact or 
complete [18];  
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2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys 
being caught in a burnover [32-35];  
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance 
of the wildfire front [1]; and the complexity of significant wildfire 
events, the incorporation of a safety factors and/or percentiles is 
also required. 
 
As [18,p26] reports 
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science 
which is neither exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved, 
informed approximations and expert judgement must be employed. In 
order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are required in the analysis.” 
 
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency 
and other uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilizing a 
percentile approach can also be incorporated into the RUIM. The mean 
values provided in this manuscript are sourced from [18] and are 
representative of the particular activity being completed within the stated 
duration, 50% of the time.  Due to the severity of the consequences of 
burnover, it is suitable to incorporate a greater percentile.  For reference, 
[18] suggests a 90th percentile is suitable, meaning a particular activity will be 
completed within the stated duration 90% of the time.  Adopting a 
conservative approach, the relationship between X percentile and k 
standard deviations can be expressed as: 





When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 [18], however where 
the average time is at least several standard deviations greater than zero, it 
is reasonable to assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k = 1.28 
[18].  Using the example of an “officer size up” where the mean (μ) is 135 
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seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20 seconds, the 90th percentile can 
then be expressed as: 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎 (5) 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  135 + (1.28 × 20) =  160.6 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴  
Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation 
becomes: 
90𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎 (6) 
 
The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As [18] 
describes, where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound, 
a relatively small safety factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable.  In keeping 
with the recommendations of the FBIM, a safety factor of 2 should be 
considered for the RUIM.  As opposed to applying a single safety factor at 
the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety 
factors is to apply them after each individual stage.  This is demonstrated in 
the case study presented later in this manuscript. 
 




102Figure 2: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology 
 
 This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch / 
turnout message and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be 
defended.  It considers whether the taskforce is pre-assembled or must first 
mobilise to the staging area from various locations. 




103Figure 3: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart.  Adapted from [18, Chart 3, p56] 
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86Table 1: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation.  Adapted from [18, Table E, p106] 
Box / 
diamond 
Description Time (s) 
1 This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters to respond 
to the dispatch / turnout message. It is the time taken from 
activation of the turnout signal to the time when the taskforce 
proceeds to the RUI to be defended. 
n/a 
2 The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to mobilizing 
to the RUI to be defended. 
n/a 
3 When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC, firefighters 
receive their briefing and crew their machines immediately prior to 
mobilizing to the RUI to be defended.   
60*  to 
1,200** 
4 If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then firefighters must 
first mobilize to the RUI taskforce staging area from their home fire 
stations.   
n/a 
5 If firefighters are on station then they must respond to the message 
to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.   
90* 
6 If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case with 
volunteer stations) they must first drive to the fire station prior to 
responding to the dispatch/turnout message.  Once on station the 
firefighters must respond to the message to proceed to the RUI 
staging area, don PPC and depart.   
480*            
to 1,200** 
7 Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of fire 
appliance travel times. 
Fig. 4.17 
8 Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in shaded boxes 
along chosen paths. 
n/a 
*Sourced from [18, Table E, p106] 
**Suggested realistic worst case scenario  
 
This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual 
appliances to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble 
prior to being briefed and dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes 









104Figure 4: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart.  Adapted from [18, Chart 4, p60] 
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9 Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce staging 
area (use greatest time).  Also the process used to determine the 
time taken for the assembled taskforce to reach the designated RUI. 
n/a 
10 If the response is along a defined route then the actual road distance 
can be used (Box 11).  If the route or the exact distance of a route is 
unknown then the radial distance multiplier (Box 12) applies. 
n/a 
11 Use the actual road distance. Actual 
route (km) 
12 [18, p61] reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5 provides a 




13 [18, Tables F1-F5] provide typical fire service travel times for 
different Australian jurisdictions.  The average of these times is 
provided in Table 4.18 and may be used where other data sets are 
not available [18, p61]. 
Table 3 
14 Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by 
average expected speed (Box 13) 
n/a 
 
88Table 3: Mean fire appliance travel speeds, in kph.  Adapted from [18, Tables F1-F5].   
Context Melbourne Tasmania South 
Australia 
Average 
μ σ μ σ μ σ μ σ 
Major city CBD 38.8 12.8 45.1 24.1 36.6 8.7 40.2 15.2 
Major city inner 
suburb 
44.3 12.0 51.0 20.3 41.4 7.3 45.6 13.2 
Major city outer 
suburb 
60.5 16.2 43.9 18.2 42.6 8.8 49.0 14.4 
Rural town centre - - 54.9 25.6 - - 54.9 25.6 
Rural country - - 55.7 23.6 - - 55.7 23.6 
Travel through site 8 - 8 - - - 8 - 
Note: other datasets from [18] included firefighter response times which are 
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4 
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up 
hose lines for the RUI defense.  It provides flexibility around the individual RUI 
tactics that individual fire services utilise.    
 
105Figure 5: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart.  Adapted from [18, Charts 
7&10] 
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15 Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in 
preparation for RUI defense. 
n/a 
16 The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI 
and determine which properties the taskforce will focus on.  
This is considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a 
structure fire context [18, Table K] and the time taken to 







17 If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18.  If high pressure 
hose reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.   
n/a 
18 Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged 
from the appliance.  Guidance is provided in Table 5, 
amended from [18, Table V, p110]. 
Table 
4.20 
19 Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and 
carried to position.  Guidance is provided in Table 5, 
amended from [18,Table Q, p109] and is considered 




20 Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18 
or 19) along chosen path. 
n/a 
90Table 5: RUI defense activities and times.  Adapted from [18, Tables K, L, Q, V] 
Activity Time (s) 
μ σ 
Officer in Charge size up 135  - 
Remove and position high pressure hose reel*  15.8  23.1 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm 
diameter hose 
39.4**  17.4** 
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm 
diameter hose 
33.3**  15.4** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter 
hose 
20.3**  13.2** 
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter 
hose 
18.4**  10.2** 
*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment [18, 
Table Q, p109] 
**Per 30m length of hose 
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek 
shelter in an appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.    
 
 
106Figure 6: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.   
Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs are 
involved) and firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 [18, Table Q ‘dressed in 
turnout uniform with equipment’] the time taken for firefighters to reach the 
building of refuge can be estimated by: 
 






Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is 
the speed of the firefighters.  In the absence of available data it is suggested 
that as a worse case credible scenario it is appropriate to consider this 
distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose consistent with the 
tactics of RUI defense reported in [6,14]. 
The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point 
in a path of travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as [36, Eqn 
11]: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴 [(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠]⁄  (8) 
 
 
Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in 
persons, D is the population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1, 
and We is the effective width in metres of the component being transferred 
(door, corridor, ramp etc.).  In the absence of alternate data, We of a door 
can be assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons per m2 [36]. 
Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not 
on the critical path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can 
increase their resilience to wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al., 
2006). TF is calculated by: 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 −  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) (9) 
If ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential 
for the responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in 
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6.4. Case Study 
In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice, 
and demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire 
scenario, the following case study based on recent and potential wildfire 
events in Western Australia (illustrated in figures 7-9) is presented: 
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west 
of Western Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts 
the wildfire will impact Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 30-
34 hours post ignition.  The fire will also impact the road between the 
taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition.  For the first 
11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting 
and the construction of containment lines.  Community warnings are issued 
and residents are advised to evacuate north towards the regional city of 
Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of 80 high dependency residents 
cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications tower is also 
located in Nannup townsite.  At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a 
defend-in-place strategy is required to protect the aged care facility.  A 
request for a taskforce is issued however it is not known whether the taskforce 
will arrive too late to protect the town.  The taskforce of 30 personnel 
(including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional city of 
Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth.  Bunbury is approximately 70km 
to the north, whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances 
measured lineally). Whilst the Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and 
ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth Taskforce is to be made up 
of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer fire 
stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km 
northeast of Perth).  The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four 
hour delay due to appliance technical issues before they can depart to the 
Perth staging area where the convoy will depart.  The IMT are situated in the 
town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup.  This is also the location of the 
RUI Taskforce Staging point.  To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is 
applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.   




From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the 
headfire in 30-34 hours post ignition.  It is critical however to acknowledge 
the request for the taskforce is issued 12 hours post ignition, reducing the 
Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours. The Incident 
Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 22 hour 
period to be used.  
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 22 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴  
However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the 
available time before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post 
ignition.  It is equally as critical to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur 
16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce is issued.  This is termed the 
Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960 minutes.  
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety 
factors to be applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the 
taskforce staging area located well away from the fireground or any smoke 
impacts etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to be applied in all 
instances. 
Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce, 
subsequently denoted Bunbury TF and Perth TF.  With reference to figures 3-
4, the process for determining TR for each section is detailed in tables 6-7 from 
initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton staging point to receive their briefing 
and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point.  The process results 
in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the Perth TF 
as 637 minutes.  When considering the two separate taskforces are to join 
into a single taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637 minutes 
is applied. 





107Figure 7: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    




108Figure 8: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
 
109Figure 9: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com    
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91Table 6: TR Bunbury TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.  
Proceed to step 4. 
n/a 
4 Firefighters are at their station.  Proceed to step 5. n/a 
5 Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station. 
Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7. 
1.5 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 42km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) = 
0.95 hours 
57 min 
End Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals 
time to respond plus travel time, being 1.5 + 57 min.  Equal to 58.5 minutes. 
58.5 
minutes 
92Table 7: TR Perth TF  
Step Comment Time 
1 Start of RUIM.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Task force is not assembled.  Proceed to step 4. n/a 
4 Firefighters are not at their station.  Proceed to step 6. n/a 
6 For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress, 
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20 
minutes. 
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.   
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 7. 
 
240 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two 
stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km) 
and Northam (90km).  Assumption made that as all other metropolitan 
n/a 
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appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either 
Lancelin or Northam. 
Proceed to step 12. 
12 Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as: 
Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and  
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km 
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’. 
Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as: 
Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes 
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.  
As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew 
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value 
used for the purposes of calculation. 
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF 
staging area in Busselton. 
156 min 
1 No action required.  Proceed to step 2. n/a 
2 Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging 
area in Busselton.  Proceed to step 4. 
 
4 Crews are at the Perth base.  Proceed to step 5.  
5 Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to 
step 7. 
1 min 
7 Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step 
9. 
n/a 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 202km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used.  Proceed to step 14. n/a 
14 Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) = 
4 hours 
240 min 
End Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time 
to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min.  Equal to 637 
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Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the 
Busselton staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be 
calculated.  With reference to figure 3, the process for determining TT is 
detailed in table 8.  Noting that the Joint TF is now proceeding to the 
fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 
2 to be applied will be in effect.  Importantly, the calculations demonstrate 
ASTCP1 of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely 
deployed to the RUI with reasonable confidence that they will not be 
impacted by the headfire during the journey.  The total TT is calculated as 
288 minutes. 
93Table 8: TT Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
9 No action required.  Proceed to step 10. n/a 
10 Exact distance by road is known.  Proceed to step 11. n/a 
11 Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’ 
and 55km through ‘rural country’.  Proceed to step 13. 
n/a 
13 Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed = 
(49.0 – (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x 
23.6) = 25.5kph.  Proceed to step 14. 
n/a 




FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 288 min 
ASTCP1 For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire 
front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT).  Using the forecast time of impact of the access 
road and the calculated TR and TT: 
 ASTCP1 = 960 minutes 
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Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose 
lines and establish the urban defense must be calculated.  With reference 
to figure 5, the process for determining THL is detailed in table 9.  The IC 
requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 2 to be applied is 
incorporated into the calculation.  The total THL is calculated as 10 minutes. 
 
94Table 9: THL Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
15 No action required.  Proceed to step 16. n/a 
16 Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135 
seconds = 2.3 minutes.  Proceed to step 17. 
2.3 min 
17 The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose 
and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18. 
n/a 
18 Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied. 
 90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect 
65mm hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 + 
(1.28 x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm 
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x 
15.4) = 53.0 seconds.   
 
Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both 
38mm lengths of hose.  This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) + 
2(18.4+(1.28 x 10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes 
Proceed to step 14. 
1.7 min 
20 THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes 
 
5 min 
With reference to figure 6, the process for determining TS is detailed in table 
10. The required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival of 
untenable conditions associated with the head fire are calculated in 
accordance with equations 7 and 8, where Rd is the distance of the 
firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the firefighters 
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μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m; 
and D is 1.9 persons per m2.  The total TS is calculated as 6.3 minutes. 
 
95Table 10: TS Joint TF  
Step Comment Time 
21 No action required.  Proceed to step 22. n/a 
16 Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.   
∴ 𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟  
90 (𝑚𝑚)
0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴−1)
= 150 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 
 
Apply Safety factor. 
2.5 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 23. 
5 min 
18 Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7. 
 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 30 [(1 − 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]� = 38 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴.   
Apply Safety factor 
0.65 min 
FS Safety factor of 2 applied. 
Proceed to step 24. 
1.3 min 
24 TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes 
 
6.3 min 
Equation 3 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for 
the taskforce to be deployed.  ASRPT was previously determined to be 22 
hours. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  (637 + 288 + 10 + 6.3)  
∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  941.3 𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 =  15.7 ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴  
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇  
In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that 
there is sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and 
ready the defense of the nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables 
evidence based trigger points to be set by the IMT.  For instance, should 
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spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access road into Nannup 
20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and 
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce 
request is submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 
minutes and the revised ASRPT of 900 minutes > RSRPT of 941.3 minutes.  
Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT are aware that without waiting 
for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours); and only 310 
minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging 
area.  This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of 
deploying a smaller taskforce to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce 
at all.  It also supports the establishment of operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger 




   
Like the FBIM, the RUIM also has its limitations:   
1. As a manual process it can be time consuming and complex, 
especially when attempting to incorporate multiple taskforces and 
rural urban interfaces such as those routinely experienced across 
the globe.  This may be addressed through the development of 
spreadsheets or applications.  Enhancements in technology that 
facilitate real time incident data including Automatic Vehicle 
Location systems, digital logistics systems and integrated fire 
ground intelligence systems that can provide updated data for the 
RUIM will also improve the reliability and accuracy of the model. 
Future research including post incident analysis of specific 
sequencing of events during significant wildfires across jurisdictions 
internationally will serve to further enhance the RUIM; 
2. Whilst the datasets supporting the RUIM have been previously 
published [18], they are somewhat dated and are limited to the fire 
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services of the eastern states of Australia.  This stated, it is a model 
that can be easily adapted to international jurisdictions utilizing 
local data sets, an area identified for further research.  The 
inclusion of larger datasets will also strengthen the model; and 
3. The RUIM process / work flow was developed from existing fire 
services literature.  As new research continues to develop in the 
field of wildfire engineering firefighting tactics will invariably 
change.  Periodic reviews of both the RUIM and FBIM are required 
to ensure the models are current.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The RUIM builds upon the FBIM to provide additional guidance for Incident 
Controllers and Incident Management Teams to assess the safety of 
firefighters during taskforce deployment into areas containing active wildfire.  
Incorporation of critical fire safety engineering concepts including 
percentiles and safety factors assists account for uncertainties in wildfire 
response, enabling fire safety engineering guidance to be applied in 
dynamic environments of potentially catastrophic consequence.  By 
enabling the deterministic analysis of Available Safe Times to Critical Points, 
the RUIM also supports the development of operational trigger points and 
contingency plans. In doing so, the RUIM provides the critical connection 
between firefighting theory and practice that is needed in the wildfire 
context.  Further, the model provides a detailed, yet flexible workflow that 
will assist in logistical resource planning for wildfire events.  
The RUIM is not intended to replace the need for accurate and current 
fireground intelligence and field validations.  However, as demonstrated 
through the Nannup case study, when used by experienced and suitably 
qualified wildfire engineers within the IMT it has the potential to assist 
determine the suitability of firefighting strategies at the RUI and reduce the 
potential for catastrophic injury and the loss of life associated with burnover.    
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
The studies completed in part addresses several of the critical shortfalls of 
existing research and explore the critical link between wildfire suppression, 
firefighter safety and urban design.  In doing so they not only enhance the 
guidance regarding wildfire suppression available to Incident Management 
Teams and firefighters alike, but also provide new operational models and 
analysis of protective systems that will enhance firefighter safety 
internationally. 
The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook) not only 
encompasses the literature review component of the dissertation, but also 
expands upon previous related research in the field.  Whilst the conclusions 
detailed in the Handbook address urban planning for wildfire resilience in 
addition to active suppression of wildfire, it is ultimately important that the 
relationship between firefighting theory and practice is recognized and the 
necessary supporting connections made.  Wildfire engineering is in its 
infancy.  It is a field of complex equations, significant assumptions simplifying 
the chaotic behaviour of wildfires and their interactions with vegetation 
structure and geometry.  These complex relationships need to be 
contextualized and communicated effectively to frontline firefighters who 
have to put them into practice in highly dynamic and dangerous situations.  
At the same time Wildfire Engineering is a highly political field which can 
impact large numbers of the population who chose to live in areas prone to 
wildfire impacts.  It is not a field that should be overly simplified nor 
attempted by those without the necessary wildfire and engineering 
qualifications.   
The first study “Firefighter tenability and its influence on wildfire suppression” 
improves understanding of firefighter tenability in the wildland context, and 
that it provides additional guidance regarding required firefighter safety 
zones. Through analysis of international thresholds and analysis of forest fire 
behaviour using both McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model empirical 
models, this study identifies that even in moderate forest understory fuel loads 
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of 15t/ha, an established siege wildfire will result in untenable conditions at all 
Fire Danger Indexes within 10m separation of the head fire.   Within this 10m 
separation from the headfire, conditions potentially resulting in 
incapacitating burns within 60 seconds of exposure have been shown to 
occur in 95% of wildfire scenarios assessed. This will inherently place firefighters 
attempting to suppress the head of a siege wildfire in grave danger in almost 
all circumstances and represents a significantly greater “dead man zone” 
than is considered in current literature.   It is important to note that while 
these findings apply to all fires, small urban wildfires do not usually achieve 
the same Heat Release Rates, active flame depths or produce the same 
behaviour outputs as large established wildfires which may facilitate more 
aggressive offensive suppression strategies and tactics within the urban 
environment.  When calculating wildfire behaviour in small urban settings, 
the Vegetation Availability Factor detailed must be applied before utilising 
the guidance provided by this research. 
When attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more 
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or 
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear 
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at 
the head fire are not defendable.  It is suggested offensive strategies 
involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after 
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased 
use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early adoption of this approach will 
assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous 
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little 
if any impact on the fire.  Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the 
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community 
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events.  
The second study “Calculation of critical water flow rates for wildfire 
suppression” provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to the 
critical flow rate required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of 
forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths.  Perhaps the 
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greatest ramification of the results is the need to reexamine the use of aerial 
and appliance suppression in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground 
based appliances remains vital in suppression of wildfires.  However, in both 
forest and woodland fuel structures, and when faced with siege wildfire 
behavior with active flame depths across the head fire greater than 3m, 
increased reliance on aerial suppression may be required to deliver the 
critical flow rate necessary to impact the head fire and have any effect on 
the forward Rate of Spread. In reality of this will require greater investment to 
ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near congregations of high value assets 
are prevented from reaching the thresholds that support this level of fire 
intensity. Fire services investment in improved technologies that supports 
night time aerial suppression operations during periods of reduced fire 
behaviour is also suggested.  Where aerial resourcing is limited, strategies 
such as guiding head fire direction and pre-emptive line building adjacent 
to existing fuel breaks such as major roads, supported by appliance based 
suppression may provide enhanced outcomes compared to reliance on 
head fire suppression alone. 
The third study “Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and 
burnover: an analysis of vehicle protection systems.” provides new guidance 
regarding the suitability of vehicles protection systems during wildfire 
entrapment and burnover.  The study concluded that Vehicle Protection 
Systems (VPS) designed to the existing intensity standard 7,500 kWm-1 (i.e. 
Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably be expected to be effective in 0.12 
to 0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate 
without fault 100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00).  An increase in 
efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was observed when vehicle protection systems 
performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1, were considered.  
Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12,000 
kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 
0.47.  This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety 
systems [32,40].  Increasing the operational performance standard of 
vehicle protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / 
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calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result 
in an increase in the efficacy of vehicle protection systems to between 0.62 
to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is 
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria 
are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.  Further 
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems is also 
recommended to determine the effectiveness of each system as part of a 
detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis.  This will 
help a better assessment of the required safety systems for firefighters during 
entrapment and burnover and will reduce injuries or fatalities during wildfire 
suppression.  In conjunction with research into wildfire weather in Australia, 
the results of Phase 2 of the study indicate VPS are unlikely to be effective on 
days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in the protection 
of houses during significant wildfire events.  In order to maximise firefighter 
safety during wildfire suppression, and to avoid providing firefighters 
unrealistic expectations regarding VPS and other fire safety systems which 
may contribute to firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is recommended 
fire services should include training on the limitations of VPS. This study also 
suggests there may be steps firefighters can take in order to position their 
vehicles in optimal positions to survive entrapment and burnover, regardless 
of the presence of vehicle protection systems. This includes maximizing 
separation from the potential head fire as well as attempting to position their 
vehicles with the rear to the approaching head fire. In order to bridge the 
gap between theory and firefighting practice, further research should be 
completed in this area with results implemented into firefighter training and 
wildfire entrapment and burnover procedures.  
The Rural Urban Interface Model developed as part of this study provides 
a fire safety engineering model for Rural Urban Interface firefighter taskforce 
deployment.  In doing so it provides additional guidance for Incident 
Controllers and Incident Management Teams to assess the safety of 
firefighters during taskforce deployment into areas containing active wildfire.  
Incorporation of critical fire safety engineering concepts including 
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percentiles and safety factors assists account for uncertainties in wildfire 
response, enabling fire safety engineering guidance to be applied in 
dynamic environments of potentially catastrophic consequence.  By 
enabling the deterministic analysis of Available Safe Times to Critical Points, 
the Rural Urban Interface Model also supports the development of 
operational trigger points and contingency plans. In doing so, the Rural 
Urban Interface Model provides the critical connection between firefighting 
theory and practice that is needed in the wildfire context.  Further, the 
model provides a detailed, yet flexible workflow that will assist in logistical 
resource planning for wildfire events. The Rural Urban Interface Model is not 
intended to replace the need for accurate and current fireground 
intelligence and field validations.  However, as demonstrated through the 
presented case study, when used by experienced and suitably qualified 
wildfire engineers within the Incident Management Team it has the potential 
to assist determine the suitability of firefighting strategies at the rural urban 
interface and reduce the potential for catastrophic injury and the loss of life 
associated with burnover. 
The results of the studies presented in this dissertation should not be 
considered in isolation, but rather alongside each other. A recurring 
conclusion of this research is that when attempting to suppress landscape 
scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early 
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding, 
evacuations and clear communication to the community and other 
stakeholders that conditions at the head fire are not defendable.  It is 
suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances should be 
employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, 
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression.  Early 
adoption of this approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately 
tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be 
at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire.  Further, it will clearly 
articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to prevent 
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unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during 
catastrophic wildfire events.  
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